Some economic considerations pertaining to the conduct and performance of large scale and small scale enterprise in factor markets by Rabey, Grant F.
Durham E-Theses
Some economic considerations pertaining to the conduct
and performance of large scale and small scale
enterprise in factor markets
Rabey, Grant F.
How to cite:
Rabey, Grant F. (1976) Some economic considerations pertaining to the conduct and performance of large
scale and small scale enterprise in factor markets, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at
Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/9907/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oﬃce, Durham University, University Oﬃce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
2
ABSTRACT 
K.A. T h e s i s Some Economic Considerations P e r t a i n i n g to the 
Conduct and Performance of Large S c a l e and 
Small S c a l e E n t e r p r i s e i n F a c t o r Markets. 
T h i s t h e s i s "begins with the view of some w r i t e r s that f a c t o r 
markets may have been r e l a t i v e l y neglected i n economic a n a l y s i s , 
and that given trends iri i n d u s t r i a l concentration and the p o s s i b l e 
backward market e f f e c t s , t h i s could represent a s i g n i f i c a n t over-
s i g h t . The o v e r a l l o b j e c t i v e i s to a n a l y t i c a l l y a s s e s s the 
relevance of t h i s view. Within t h i s a n a l y t i c a l framework, the 
importance attached to the dynamics of f a c t o r market tr a d i n g 
r e l a t i o n s n e c e s s i t a t e s the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of both t h e i r economic, 
and o r g a n i s a t i o n a l / b e h a v i o u r a l i m p l i c a t i o n s . 
The t h e s i s s t a r t s with a general v e r i f i c a t i o n of the 
i n c r e a s i n g trend i n i n d u s t r i a l concentration and then examines 
the r o l e a t t r i b u t e d . t o f a c t o r market c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . The apparent, 
b e n e f i t s of large s c a l e purchasing leads to a review of economic 
theory which examines the conduct and performance i m p l i c a t i o n s of. 
the various types of f a c t o r market s t r u c t u r e s . R e l a t i v e bargaining 
power i s i d e n t i f i e d as a prime determinant of outcomes i n imperfectly 
competitive t r a d i n g r e l a t i o n s , and i t i s presented as being a 
function of o r g a n i s a t i o n a l dependency. A number of j o i n t economic 
and o r g a n i s a t i o n a l / b e h a v i o u r a l determinants of dependency are 
reviewed. This review also i n d i c a t e s that l a r g e buying u n i t s may 
use t h e i r r e l a t i v e bargaining power to reduce u n c e r t a i n t y i n the 
a c q u i s i t i o n of inputs. These dynamic aspects of market conduct-
are d i s c u s s e d under the heading of ' v e r t i c a l q u a s i - i n t e g r a t i o n ' . 
The a n a l y s i s then changes focus and places the dominant l a r g e 
buyer/smaller s u p p l i e r s i t u a t i o n into a wider macroeconomic 
context. T h i s involves the c o n c e p t u a l i s a t i o n of the dominant firm 
as a. 'propulsive' or key industry f o s t e r i n g industi'i&.lisation and 
through i t s r o l e as a growth pole, regional development. The need 
to consider the dynamic, o r g a n i s a t i o n a l f a c e t s of t r a d i n g r e l a t i o n s 
i n i n d u s t r i a l linkage s t u d i e s i s r e i t e r a t e d . The t h e s i s concludes 
by confirming the need for more information about f a c t o r markets, 
and i t o f f e r s a re l e v a n t conceptual context and i n v e s t i g a t i v e 
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CHAPTER - 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Establishment o f the Conceputal Framework 
The a v a i l a b l e data r e l e v a n t t o the operations of 
f i r m s w i t h i n f a c t o r markets have, according'to a number of 
economists, been somewhat u n s a t i s f a c t o r y , and even incomplete.. 
I n 19U8 M.A. Adelman made the f o l l o w i n g observation: 
"The great b u l k of business t r a n s a c t i o n s are 
sales by one f i r m t o another; yet economic 
a n a l y s i s has almost neglected these, i n d u s t r i a l 
markets i n favour o f consumer m a r k e t s " . ( l ) 
A not u n r e l a t e d p o i n t v/as made four years l a t e r by J.K. 
G a l b r a i t h , t h i s time w i t h i n the context of h i s theory o f 
c o u n t e r v a i l i n g power, as f o l l o w s : -
"The long t r e n d toward c o n c e n t r a t i o n of i n d u s t r i a l 
e n t e r p r i s e i n the hands of r e l a t i v e l y few f i r m s 
has brought i n t o exisjt^nce not only strong 
s e l l e r s , as economists have supposed but 
al s o strong buyers as they have f a i l e d t o see. , ?(2) 
Thus;, w h i l e Adelman seemed t o be o f f e r i n g a general comment 
about the v c r t u a l neglect of f a c t o r market c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n 
economic a n a l y s i s , G a l b r a i t h l i n k e d t h i s neglect t o the 
ominous p o r t e n t o f i n d u s t r i a l c o n c e n t r a t i o n , and through 
- 2 
t h i s , t o the c r e a t i o n o f l a r g e "buyers w i t h i n f a c t o r markets. 
However, what i s p a r t i c u l a r l y remarkable i s t h a t a 
review o f the current l i t e r a t u r e reveals t h a t t h i s o v e r a l l 
assessment of i n d i f f e r e n c e conveyed i n the above, has not r e a l l y 
changed, t h a t i s , t h a t i n d u s t r i a l markets continue t o 
remain a r e l a t i v e l y unexplored area of study. 
A good example of t h i s i s apparent i n an a r t i c l e by 
S.H. Lu s t g a r t e n , who comments as f o l l o w s : 
"Although theory p r e d i c t s t h a t the incidence o f 
monopsony i s an important element o f market 
s t r u c t u r e , the e n t i r e body of recent l i t e r a t u r e 
has d e a l t e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h the s t r u c t u r e of the 
s e l l e r s . " ( 3 ) 
L u s t g a r t e n i n d i c a t e s t h a t t n i s i s p r i m a r l y a t t r i b u t a b l e t o 
t h e i m p l i c i t assumption i n past s t u d i e s t h a t buyers are 
a t o m i s t i c . A review of two fundamental and i n f l u e n t i a l 
w r i t e r s w i t h i n t h i s area, Joan Robinson and J.S. Bain, 
i l l u s t r a t e s r a t h e r e f f e c t i v e l y tne basis upon which such 
an assumption might have been founded: 
"But t o p o s t u l a t e t h a t c o m p e t i t i o n among buyers 
i s p e r f e c t i s f a r more r e a l i s t i c t n a n t o 
p o s t u l a t e t h a t c o m p e t i t i o n among s e l l e r s i s 
p e r f e c t , since the number of buyers i n any 
o r d i n a r y market i s l a r g e r e l a t i v e l y t o the 
number o f sellers«"(L\.) 
" I n the great m a j o r i t y o f i n d u s t r i e s , the s u p p l i e r s 
face markets maae up of many buyers, a l l 
r e l a t i v e l y small."(:?) 
However, L u s t g a r t e n s t a t e s t h a t i n f a c t , "... the m a j o r i t y 
o f t r a n s a c t i o n s i n the United States economy i n v o l v e 
sales between "business f i r m s i n which the number of buyers 
i s o f t ^ n s m a l l enough so t h a t each can have a s i g n i f i c a n t 
i n f l u e n c e on market p r i c e . " ( 6 ) An i n t e r e s t i n g , hut 
unresolved variance o f ideas which serves t o h i g h l i g h t 
the apparent need f o r more i n f o r m a t i o n . 
. I n respect of the l i n k between c o n c e n t r a t i o n trends and 
f a c t o r markets, i t i s p o s s i b l e t o quote two United 
Kingdom economists, S. Aaronovitch and M.C. Sawyer, who 
revealed an o r i e n t a t i o n b r o a d l y s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f f e r e d by . 
J.E. G a l b r a i t h over twenty years e a r l i e r , ( 6 ) These two 
w r i t e r s i n d i c a t e t h a t i n conventional economics aggrqjjo&e l e v e l s • 
of c o n c e n t r a t i o n have l i t t l e meaning because the theory i s 
p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h the a b i l i t y of f i r m s t o e x e r c i s e 
economic power i n u n i t a r y or s i n g l e markets. This approach 
means t h a t : 
"The power o f a f i r m i s no more than the sum 
of the power i t exercises i n each market i n 
which i t operates. I t i s argued t h a t i t i s 
through the exercise of monopoly power t h a t the 
m i s - a l l o c a t i o n o f resources aria:es and t h a t i s 
the main concern of the economist."( 7 ) 
However, Aaronovitch and Sawyer argue t h a t , n... f i r m s 
operate i n f o o t or markets as w e l l as product markets, and 
t h e i r economic power i n the c a p i t a l and labour markets 
ar i s e s from t h e i r share of the t o t a l economy."(8) Thus, 
i n general terms, t h e i r argument, l i k e O a l b r a i t h ' s , 
h i g h l i g h t s the p o t e n t i a l relevance and importance o f 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n l e v e l s w i t h i n a context which also includes 
the f a c t o r market operations of powerful "buyers. 
On the "basis.- of the preceding i t would seem t h a t a 
s i g n i f i c a n t area of economic a n a l y s i s may have "been t o 
a degree overlooked, and thus, r e l a t i v e t o consumer 
market-studies, also under developed. I n t h i s t h e s i s an 
attempt i s made t o examine some of the e x i s t i n g economic 
theory and r e l a t e d e x p i r i c a l evidence r e l e v a n t t o f a c t o r 
market, b u y e r / s u p p l i e r t r a d i n g r e l a t i o n s i n order t o 
determine, through a c r i t i c a l review and a n a l y s i s o f the 
more general t o p i c s considered but p a r t i c u l a r l y by 
f o c u s i n g upon concepts concerning the r o l e of l a r g e scale buyers, 
some of the more i n t e r e s t i n g aspects and i m p l i c a t i o n s a r i s i n g 
out o f these t r a d i n g r e l a t i o n s . W i t h i n t h i s general framework, 
the t h e s i s has been organised so t h a t each chapter considers 
one of a number of s p e c i f i c compound questions which have 
been evolved from the t o p i c s suggest i n the above^ and 
these are as f o l l o w s : 
a) I s t h e r e a l o n g t r e n d toward c o n c e n t r a t i o n ' , 
and i n broad terms, what s o r t of c o n s i d e r a t i o n has 
been given to f a c t o r market c o n d i t i o n s i n the 
l i t e r a t u r e on trends i n i n d u s t r i a l c o n c e n t r a t i o n ; 
but e s p e c i a l l y , t o l a r g e scale e n t e r p r i s e which, 
through c o n c e n t r a t i o n , may have become dominant 
buyers i n i n d u s t r i a l markets? (Chapter 2) 
b ) Assuming t h a t there may be advantages t o be 
gained w i t h i n f a c t o r markets from c o n c e n t r a t i o n , 
the next question i s what are some of these 
advantages? To s t a r t w i t h the t h e s i s considers 
t h i s question w i t h i n the context of 
c o n v e n t i o n a l , e s s e n t i a l l y s t a t i c market t h e o r y . 
Thus,' g e n e r a l l y speaking, how are the various 
forms of f a c t o r market s t r u c t u r e s d e a l t w i t h 
"by conventional economic theory,' and what are 
some of the more important conduct and performance 
p r e d i c t i o n s associated w i t h imperfect f a c t o r 
markets i n v o l v i n g dominant "buyers? (Chapter 3) 
While preceding questions may discuss some of 
the p o s s i b l e outcomes of i m p e r f e c t l y c o m p e t i t i v e 
f a c t o r market t r a d i n g r e l a t i o n s , and as a 
consequence why there may he s p e c i f i c advantages 
a v a i l a b l e t o dominant "buyers, i t leaves l a r g e l y 
unanswered the q u e s t i o n of how b u y e r / s u p p l i e r 
r e l a t i o n s may develop t o the e x t e n t t h a t e v e n t u a l l y 
the dominant buyer acquires i t s s u p e r i o r b a r g a i n i n g 
power. Therefore, based upon the i n f o r m a t i o n 
uncovered by the two preceding questions, what 
are some of the fundamental mediating c o n d i t i o n s 
which help t o determine the outcome of buyer/ 
s u p p l i e r r e l a t i o n s i n imperfect dominant buyer, 
f a c t o r markets? (Chapter k ) . 
Returning t o the question of how dominant buyers 
may c a p i t a l i s e upon t h e i r s u p e r i o r b a r g a i n i n g 
power, the t h e s i s moves away from the more or 
less s t a t i c basis f o r examining f a c t o r market 
r e l a t i o n s employed by c o n v e n t i o n a l market t h e o r y , 
and considers some of the dynamic aspects of 
i n t e r - f i r m t r a d i n g "behaviour. This approach 
i n v o l v e s such t o p i c s as t h e t r a n s f e r of 
i n f o r m a t i o n and the general r e d u c t i o n o f 
t r a n s a c t i o n s costs. Thus, w i t h i n t h i s dynamic 
framework, what s o r t s of a d d i t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s 
may motivate or i n f l u e n c e dominant buyers so 
that, they r e - f o r m u l a t e t h e i r p r o f i t maximising 
objectives; and undertake d i f f e r e n t s t r a t e g i e s , 
and moreover, how are these a l t e r a t i o n s r e f j b c t e d 5 
i n t h e i r market conduct? (Chapter 5 ) 
e) Having examined some of the more 'micro', 
beh a v i o u r a l aspects of trade between f a c t o r 
market buyers and s u p p l i e r s , the t h e s i s broadens 
i t s focus i n order t o analyse i n t e r - i n d u s t r y l i n k s -
i n r e l a t i o n t o both the no t i o n s o f economic 
space, and i n d u s t r i a l development. Therefore, what 
s o r t of r o l e has been ascribed t o l a r g e s c a l e , 
dominant f a c t o r market buyers w i t h i n the wider 
context of the 'macro' i n d u s t r i a l environment? 
(Chapter 6 ) . £ 
I t i s important t o note t h a t i n cons i d e r i n g the subject 
of i m p e r f e c t l y c o m p e t i t i v e b u y e r / s u p p l i e r r e l a t i o n s i n f a c t o r 
markets, the analysis has been i n f l u e n c e d by the r e l a t i v e 
u n a v a i l a b i l i t y of e m p i r i c a l evidence. This has meant t h a t 
i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n of p a r t i c u l a r t o p i c s i t has sometimes been 
necessary to move outside c f s t r i c t l y economic concepts i n 
order t o c l a r i f y the arguments. Moreover, t h i s has also meant 
t h a t i n co n s i d e r i n g the f i v e questions o u t l i n e d above, the 
t h e s i s has in c l u d e d a number of diverse elements.which have 
been r e l a t e d i n a v a r i e t y of d i f f e r e n t ways. The r e s u l t i s 
t h a t the primary o r i e n t a t i o n o f the t h e s i s must be a n a l y t i c a l 
and t h a t , w h i l e i n many cases the exact nature of the elements 
and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p s may I worthy subjects f o r e m p i r i c a l > 
study, t h e u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e of t h i s work has been t o 
f o s t e r understanding by simply s p e c i f y i n g the general 
c o n d i t i o n s i n v o l v e d i n each t o p i c . 
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The R e l a t i o n s h i p Between S t r u c t u r e . Conduct and Performance 
The importance o f market s t r u c t u r e i n most economic 
s t u d i e s i n v o l v i n g the pure t h e o r y of the f i r m and i n d u s t r i a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s can u s u a l l y be a t t r i b u t e d t o the r e l a t e d 
p r e d i c t i v e i m p l i c a t i o n s which i n v o l v e the o r g a n i s a t i o n s ' 
conduct and performance. This s e c t i o n b r i e f l y considers 
the g eneral concept o f the structure-conduct-performance 
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h a view to. d e f i n i n g the terms, and 
e s t a b l i s h i n g the o v e r a l l approach to be adopted by t h i s t h e s i s . 
For the purpose of the t h e s i s , the three components of 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p w i l l be defined as f o l l o w s : - S t r u c t u r e 
r e f e r s t o the aspects of an i n d u s t r y ' environment which 
are r e l a t i v e l y f i x e d and o b j e c t i v e , e.g. a h i g h l y 
concentrated o l i g o p o l y ; behaviour or conduct re f e r s , t o the 
p a t t e r n of de c i s i o n s made by the managements of the component 
firms: ( i n c l u d i n g decisions which may themselves be r e a c t i o n s 
t o s t r u c t u r a l i n f l u e n c e s ) ; and performance i s evaluated 
i n r e l a t i o n t o the r e l e v a n t , or u l t i m a t e norms of economic 
w e l f a r e . ( 9 ) I n a more l i m i t e d sense, 'market performance' 
may a l s o be defined i n terms o f how p r i c e s and output are 
/ E f f e c t e d . 
I n i t s formative s t a t e the structure-conduct-performance 
r e l a t i o n s h i p was o f t e n represented as a type o f a n a l y t i c a l 
scheme which tended t o form a s e r i e s of connected and 
s e q u e n t i a l s t e p s . ( 1 0 ) On t h a t b a s i s , s t a r t i n g v/ith s t r u c t u r a l 
i n f o r m a t i o n , i t was f e l t t h a t i t might be p o s s i b l e to 
p r e d i c t conduct, and consequently, t o also i n f e r performance. 
However, recent thought has moved beyond t h i s somewhat s t a t i c 
conception o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p , and has developed a 
r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t the t h r e e elements may have "been considered 
i n an incomplete t h e o r e t i c a l framework. I t has "been 
suggested t h a t a more complete approach would be one which 
considered these elements t o be dynamic and i n t e r a c t i v e , 
t h a t i s , f o r example, an approach which takes i n t o . 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n the f a c t t h a t .... "Performance leads back 
t o changes i n s t r u c t u r e and conduct. " ( 1 1 ) 
I n the next chapter, and i n the subsequent one, the 
t r a d i t i o n a l form of the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s used i n the 
discussions i n v o l v i n g c o n c e n t r a t i o n trends and the conduct 
and performance i m p l i c a t i o n s of imperfect markets. However, 
when the a n a l y s i s e v e n t u a l l y proceeds beyond the more 
s t a t i c parameters of economic t h e o r y t o evaluate such 
t o p i c s as the i m p l i c a t i o n s a r i s i n g from the need of 
i n d u s t r i a l buyers t o organise and c o n t r o l the inward f l o w 
of i n p u t s over t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n c y c l e s , then the dynamic, 
adaptive responses of buyers and s u p p l i e r s take precedence. 
This i s p a r t l y because, as i t w i l l be shown, a dominant buyer's 
conduct may s i g n i f i c a n t l y yftffeet b o t h market s t r u c t u r e and 
s e l l e r performance, but more i m p o r t a n t l y , t h i s o r i e n t a t i o n 
i s g i v e n prominence because u l t i m a t e l y , t r a d i n g r e l a t i o n s ?~ 
tend to.be i n h e r e n t l y dynamic and adaptive, and may 
t h e r e f o r e only be adequately evaluated w i t h i n t h a t type 
of conceptual framework. 
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CHAPl'ER 2. 
"THE LONG TREND TOWARDS CONCENTRATION t. , . " 
I n t r o d u c t i o n 
The primary o b j e c t i v e of t h i s chapter may be summarised 
as an attempt t o present some supportive evidence, of both 
an e m p i r i c a l and t h e o r e t i c a l nature, t h a t there i s indeed 
a c o n t i n u i n g t r e n d towards the c r e a t i o n and s u r v i v a l of 
i n c r e a s i n g l y l a r g e s e l l i n g o r g a n i s a t i o n s , and t h e r e f o r e , 
on a l o g i c a l b a s i s , a l s o l a r g e purchasing u n i t s - b u t t h a t 
t h e r e i s als;o a l a r g e measure o f u n c e r t a i n t y about the 
c o n t r i b u t o r y f a c t o r s . The proxies, g e n e r a l l y used f o r 
v a l i d a t i n g t h i s t r e n d i n economy wide, or s p e c i f i c i n d u s t r y 
market s t r u c t u r e s c o n s i s t s of a number of d i f f e r e n t , 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n measures, and a b r i e f survey of some of these 
i s produced. I n c o n s i d e r i n g the t h e o r e t i c a l f a c t o r s i n v o l v e d 
i n c o n c e n t r a t i o n , s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n i s devoted t c two t o p i c s ; 
the p r o p o r t i o n a t e or Gi b r a t e f f e c t i n the c o n c e n t r a t i o n process, 
and the a b i l i t y of l a r g e f i r m s to exercise superior buying 
power. The chapter also b r i e f l y o u t l i n e s the types of 
market s t r u c t u r e s which may have emerged as a r e s u l t of the 
co n c e n t r a t i o n process and those which are o f p a r t i c u l a r r e l e -
vance t o t h i s a n a l y s i s . 
S t r u c t u r a l I n d i c a t o r s : The Use of C o n c e n t r a t i o n Measures 
I n p u r e l y economic terms, measures of c o n c e n t r a t i o n 
attempt to serve as f u n c t i o n a l and q u a n t i f i a b l e p r o x i e s 
f o r the d e s c r i p t i o n of v a r i o u s market s t r u c t u r e s . 
I n h i s book on i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e , J . F . P i c k e r i n g 
i n d i c a t e s t h at these are b a s i c a l l y two types, of 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n measure and that these two v a r i e t i e s can 
be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d by t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e l e v e l s of 
a g g r e g a t i o n . ( l ) The f i r s t type are termed measures of 
'market c o n c e n t r a t i o n ' and they a r e d i r e c t e d towards l e v e l s 
of c o n c e n t r a t i o n i n p a r t i c u l a r i n d u s t r i e s . Dr. P i c k e r i n g 
goes., on to s t a t e t h a t most s t r u c t u r e - c o n d u c t - p e r f ormance 
s t u d i e s are conducted on the basis, of market or i n d u s t r y 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n measures. These measures, enable a s i t u a t i o n 
to be c h a r a c t e r i s e d as one of a number of p o s s i b l e market 
c o n d i t i o n s , e.g. o l i g o p o l y or monopoly, and consequently, 
permit the i n c l u s i o n of the a s s o c i a t e d p r e d i c t i o n s i n terms 
of s p e c i f i c and r e c o g n i s a b l e p a t t e r n s of conduct and 
performance. The second type of s t r u c t u r a l i n d i c a t o r s are 
termed 'aggregate c o n c e n t r a t i o n ' measures and they attempt 
to d e s c r i b e economy wide c o n c e n t r a t i o n l e v e l s . Aggregate 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n measures appear to i n c l u d e a number of complex 
v a r i a b l e s i n t h e i r f o r m u l a t i o n , and t h i s means t h a t the 
c o n c l u s i o n s which may be drawn are more tenuous. I t has been 
suggested t h a t h i g h levels-, of aggregate c o n c e n t r a t i o n may be 
s i g n i f i c a n t because of the r e l e v a n t o r g a n i s a t i o n s ' a b i l i t i e s 
to i n f l u e n c e economic p o l i c y , and hence, t h e i r a c t i o n s take 
on a p o l e m i c a l , and often a p o l i t i c a l n a t u r e c I n a d d i t i o n , 
i t has a l s o beer, p o s t u l a t e d that l a r g e d i v e r s i f i e d o r g a n i s a t i o n 
may be unresponsive to market i n d i c a t o r s and may use t h e i r 
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broad resource bases t o dominate, i n d i v i d u a l markets. 
Hov/ever, i n o f f e r i n g these somewhat p r o b l e m a t i c a l and 
t h e o r e t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r being concerned about 
aggregate c o n c e n t r a t i o n measures, Dr. P i c k e r i n g e v e n t u a l l y 
admits that there i s a d e a r t h of e m p i r i c a l evidence on 
th e : 
a c t u a l p o l i t i c a l and economic impact of 
ver y l a r g e f i r m s i n a s o c i e t y and there i s 
not much inf o r m a t i o n a t p r e s e n t on the 
e f f e c t s of high l e v e l s of conglomeration 
t h a t such h i g h aggregate concentration" would 
impl y . " ( 2 ) 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , he does conclude that e x c e s s i v e l y high l e v e l s 
of aggregate concentration'would very l i k e l y be economically 
unnecessary and s o c i a l l y u n d e s i r a b l e . I n c o l l e c t i n g 
s t a t i s t i c s on c o n c e n t r a t i o n trends both types, of measures 
have been surveyed. Because they both tend to g e n e r a l l y 
p o i n t i n the same d i r e c t i o n i n terms of the e x i s t e n c e of 
I 
l a r g e r factor, market buying u n i t s , i t has not been c o n s i d e r e d 
n e c e s s a r y to r e c o n c i l e t h e i r somewhat d i f f e r e n t i m p l i c a t i o n s . 
I n g e n e r a l terms, i t i s p o s s i b l e to i d e n t i f y a number 
of problems a s s o c i a t e d . w i t h c o n c e n t r a t i o n measures themselves, 
and w h i l e these problems may be somewhat t e c h n i c a l i n 
nature, they do q u a l i f y the use of such measures. Appendix 
2.-1 p r e s e n t s a more d e t a i l e d review of these problems and so 
i t i s only necessary, t o b r i e f l y summarise them.. I n the 
p r e p a r a t i o n of c o n c e n t r a t i o n measures- two problems which 
may a r i s e concern the s e l e c t i o n of the s i z e v a r i a b l e s to be 
employed, and t h e i r c o n t i n u i t y from time period to time 
p e r i o d . Simply put: "there e x i s t s the r i s k t h a t 
some s i z e v a r i a b l e s , e.g. a s s e t l e v e l s , may mask important 
f a c t o r s or u n d e r l y i n g a s s o c i a t i o n s , e.g. a p o s i t i v e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p "between c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y and f i r m s i z e . I n an 
attempt to overcome the problem t h a t d i f f e r e n t measures 
may give d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s , s e v e r a l types of s i z e v a r i a b l e 
from a number of d i f f e r e n t s t u d i e s -were used to e v a l u a t e 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n tre n d s . A second type of q u a l i f i c a t i o n , 
which i s much more fundamental to the a n a l y s i s , r e l a t e s 
to the inherent l i m i t a t i o n s of c o n c e n t r a t i o n measures. 
B r i e f l y , t h e s e d e f i c i e n c i e s e x i s t f o r the f o l l o w i n g 
r e a s o n s : - because of the d i f f i c u l t i e s of i d e n t i f y i n g a 
product's or market's boundaries; because n a t i o n a l 
s t a t i s t i c s hide r e g i o n a l a b e r r a t i o n s ; because key 
s t r u c t u r a l elements, such as v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n and e n t r y 
c o n d i t i o n s , are not r e f l e c t e d ; because b e h a v i o u r a l 
r e l a t i o n s i n markets a r e ignored; and because f o r e i g n 
t r a n s a c t i o n s may be unaccounted f o r . I n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s 
the problems and d e f i c i e n c i e s serve as reminders t h a t not 
too much of a s p e c i f i c nature can be p r e d i c a t e d upon the 
b a s i s of a v a i l a b l e c o n c e n t r a t i o n s t a t i s t i c s a l o n e . 
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Relevant Trends ir. I n d u s t r i a l C o n c e n t r a t i o n 
I n an a r t i c l e d e a l i n g w i t h the growth of i n d u s t r i a l con-
c e n t r a t i o n S . J . P r a i s : s t a t e s t h a t the w r i t i n g s of the • 
c l a s s i c a l E n g l i s h economists r e v e a l l i t t l e evidence of a 
concern f o r the p r o c e s s . ( 3 ) ( k ) However, P r a i s continues 
on t o i l l u s t r a t e , u sing the w r i t i n g s of A l f r e d M a r s h a l l , 
hew i t i s p o s s i b l e to ' i n f e r 1 what M a r s h a l l ' s ideas were on 
the i n f l u e n c e s a f f e c t i n g the s i z e d i s t r i b u t i o n of f i r m s . 
P r a i s f o l l o w s the famous ' t r e e s i n the f o r e s t ' analogy 
from i t s i n i t i a l appearance i n 1890 i n the f i r s t e d i t i o n 
of P r i n c i p l e s of Economics, to the modified v e r s i o n which 
appeared i n the s i x t h e d i t i o n and which was p u b l i s h e d i n 
1910. The change i s s i g n i f i c a n t and worth c i t i n g as i t i s 
presented by P r a i s : 
The 1890, f i r s t e d i t i o n , r e f e r s to the growth of t r e e s and 
how t h e y become stronger as they emerge i n t o the l i g h t and 
a i r but t h a t they e v e n t u a l l y ' l o s e v i t a l i t y ' and g i v e way 
to o t h e r s ; 
"And as with the growth of t r e e s , so i t i s w i t h 
the growth of b u s i n e s s e s . " 
The 1910, s i x t h e d i t i o n . f o l l o w s the same l i n e s of r e a s o n i n g 
i n terms of the analogy i t s e l f but t h i s key quotation undergoes 
a m a t e r i a l change; 
"And as w i t h the growth of t r e e s , so i t was w i t h 
the growth of b u s i n e s s e s as a g e n e r a l r u l e before 
the gre a t r e c e n t development of v a s t j o i n t - s t o c k 
companies which often stagnate but do not r e a d i l y d i e . " 
P r a i s suggests that w h i l e there may have been a r e a l i s a t i o n 
t h a t the natural- f o r c e s which had s t a b l i s e d changes i n the 
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s i z e s of firms i n the past (e.g., d i s t r i b u t i o n of a b i l i t y 
and wealth, t e c h n i c a l and market c o n s t r a i n t s ) w$re no longer 
e x e r t i n g . t h e same i n f l u e n c e s ; l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n was 
a c t u a l l y devoted to the t o p i c u n t i l the 1930's. I n t h i s 
p e r i o d he i d e n t i f i e s two notable developments; t h e 
p u b l i c a t i o n of The Modern Corporation and P r i v a t e Property 
by A.A. B e r l e and G.C. Means(5) i n 1932, and the p u b l i c a t i o n 
of R. G i b r a t ' s Les I n e q u a l i t e s economiques ( 6 ) i n 1931. 
B e r l e and Means drew a t t e n t i o n to the r o l e of the l a r g e 
i n d u s t r i a l c o r p o r a t i o n s i n the United S t a t e s , and i n b r i e f 
terms, G i b r a t p o s t u l a t e d t h a t the logarithms of f i r m s * 
s i z e s , were d i s t r i b u t e d normally, P r a i s examines Gibratfs 
law i n some d e t a i l but f o r the purposes of t h i s s e c t i o n i t 
can be reviewed very b r i e f l y . I n s t a t i s t i c a l terms G i b r a t ' s 
law of proportionate e f f e c t s t a t e s that a l l f i r m s •fce-ftefc* to 
grow at e q u a l p r o p o r t i o n a t e r a t e s . Thus, i t i s p r e d i c t e d 
t h a t c o n c e n t r a t i o n w i l l i n c r e a s e . T h i s i s because, u n l i k e 
many p h y s i c a l phenomena which have t h e i r absolute s i z e s 
d i s t r i b u t e d normally due to the e x i s t a n c e of tendencies 
to r e g r e s s towards a mean ( e . g . human h e i g h t s ) ; an economic 
phenomenon, l i k e f i r m s i z e s , has i t s r e g r e s s i v e i n f l u e n c e s 
outweighed by a n t i - r e g r e s s i v e i n f l u e n c e s . Reasons why t h i s 
may be so are examined i n the next s e c t i o n . To summarise, 
P r a i s has drawn a d i r e c t l i n e from M a r s h a l l ' s acknowledgement 
of the l o n g e v i t y of the ' t a l l ' and 'strong' to B e r l e and 
Means' e m p i r i c a l ^ based r e c o g n i t i o n of r o l e or the l a r g e f i r m 
i n s o c i e t y , and then to r e i n f o r c e h i s poi n t , has produced 
G i b r a t 1 s s t a t i s t i c a l law to h i n t that the trend may be 
i n e v i t a b l e . 
I n e m p i r i c a l terms P r a i s ' study i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h 
P. Hart has concluded t h a t a ' G i b r a t - t y p e . p r o c e s s ' was evi d e n t 
i n B r i t a i n and was probably the most important leng-run 
f a c t o r e x p l a i n i n g the r i s e i n c o n c e n t r a t i o n . (7) T h e i r 
study examined the growth of quoted i n d u s t r i a l companies 
i n B r i t a i n from 1885 to 1955. I n e f f e c t , K a r t and Prais. 
concluded not only that "... the d i s p e r s i o n of f i r m s ' s i z e s 
was i n c r e a s i n g over time..." but that " . . . t h i s can be 
e x p l a i n e d by the hypothesis t h a t the growth of f i r m s was 
random and m u l t i p l i c a t i v e i n nature."(8) I n t h e i r book 
on the t o p i c of i n d u s t r i a l c o n c e n t r a t i o n , S. Aaronovitch and 
M.C. Sawyer r e v e a l that they appear to agree w i t h Hart and 
P r a i s by i n d i c a t i n g t h a t the t y p i c a l s i z e - d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
f i r m s i s i n f a c t c l o s e to a log-normal d i s t r i b u t i o n . (9) 
However, they proceed t o p o i n t out t h a t t h i s approach does 
have at l e a s t one disadvantage; 
"... i t i s not e n t i r e l y c l e a r t h a t there i s any 
u n d e r l y i n g theory of i n d u s t r i a l behaviour other 
than the one based upon 'random' behaviour."(10) 
I n t h i s context, they continue, the "... growth of the f i r m 
i s random w i t h r e s p e c t to economic f a c t o r s . " ( 1 1 ) I t would 
seem t h e r e f o r e t h a t .the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of G i b r a t ' s Law and 
i t s a s s o c i a t e d 'randomness' may imply some degree of 
ignorance about the growth process i t s e l f . I n terms of the 
o b j e c t i v e s of t h i s chapter, the f a c t t h a t the p r o c e s s i s not 
f u l l y understood does not d i m i n i s h the importance of the 
u l t i m a t e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t there appears to have been an 
e m p i r i c a l l y v e r i f i a b l e t r e n d of r i s i n g c o n c e n t r a t i o n ( a t 
l e a s t up to 1955). 
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I t i s p o s s i b l e to c o n s o l i d a t e t h i s c o n c l u s i o n and 
extend i t to more r e c e n t times, by s u r v e y i n g some r e l e v a n t 
s t u d i e s and t h e i r s t a t i s t i c s . T h i s survey i n v o l v e s both types 
of c o n c e n t r a t i o n measures but begins w i t h market or i n d u s t r y 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n l e v e l s i n the manufacturing s e c t o r . I n t h e i r 
e v a l u a t i o n of the progress of c o n c e n t r a t i o n trends over 
time Aaronovitch and Sawyer used a number of b a s i c 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n s as t h e i r raw m a t e r i a l , and they were as 
f o l l o w s : - (12) 
Year i n Question - 1935 : Leak and Maizels (13), 
Board of Trade ( l i ) 
- 1951 : E v e l y and L i t t l e (15) 
- 1958 : Armstrong and S i l b e r s t o n ( l 6 ) . 
3hepherd(l7) 
- 1963 : Sawyer ( 1 8 ) , Shepherd(19) 
Attempting to combine a l l of these s t u d i e s i s a complex 
process and introduces a number of problems. (20) However, 
Aaronovitch and Sawyer conclude that w h i l e they were not able 
t o make exact comparisons covering the whole p e r i o d extending 
from 1935 u n t i l 1968 (1963 from t h e i r own c a l c u l a t i o n s ) , they 
were able to s t a t e that f o r each sub-period examined, 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n had shown an i n c r e a s e , and that the r a t e of 
i n c r e a s e appears to have a c c e l e r a t e d towards the end of the 
e n t i r e p e r i o d . I n order to obtain the s t a t i s t i c s upon which 
t h i s c o n c l u s i o n i s based i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o go to a d i f f e r e n t 
s o u r c e . I n a separate a r t i c l e , the same authors p r e s e n t some 
f i g u r e s on the r a t e of change i n c o n c e n t r a t i o n i n B r i t i s h 
manufacturing from 1955 to 1968, and these f i g u r e s a r e 
reproduced i n Table 2-1 -which f o l l o w s : (21) 
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Table 2-1 
Rates of'change i n c o n c e n t r a t i o n 1955-1968 
A c t u a l change over 
p e r i o d 
1935-5l(a) 1951-58(b) 
7° 
5.21 +7.22. 
1958-63(c) 
% 
+8.27 
1963-68(c) 
% 
+8.66 
Annual r a t e of 
change O.kk 0.73 1.60 1.67 
Source: Aaronovitch, S., and Sawyer, M.C., .'.'The C o n c e n t r a t i o n of 
B r i t i s h Manufacturing"', Lloyds Bank Review. 1974, October p.15 
Notes: ( a ) Determined from t h r e e - f i r n : c o n c e n t r a t i o n r a t i o s 
based on employment and taken from Leak and 
Maizels (22) and E v e l y and L i t t l e . ( 2 3 ) 
( b ) Determined from c o n c e n t r a t i o n r a t i o s based on 
employment and taken from Armstrong and 
Silbertson . ( 2 L | . ) 
( c ) Determined from f i v e - f i r m c o n c e n t r a t i o n r a t i o s 
based on s a l e s and taken from Sawyer.(25) 
From Table 2-1 i t i s apparent that f o r the four sub-periods 
g i v e n t h e r e was w i t h i n each sub-period an a c t u a l i n c r e a s e 
i n c o n c e n t r a t i o n . Moreover, the annual r a t e of change has, 
over the e n t i r e range of sub-periods given, shown an 
i n c r e a s e which approaches a m u l t i p l e of f o u r . 
The w r i t i n g s of K.D. George r e p r e s e n t a n o t h e r s u b s t a n t i v e 
source which uses the most r e c e n t evidence a v a i l a b l e to 
come to p r i m a r i l y the same c o n c l u s i o n s as above f o r the 
1958 to 1963, and 1963 to 1968 sub-periods. I n h i s a r t i c l e 
on i n d u s t r i a l c o n c e n t r a t i o n i n the United Kingdom,, which was 
publishe d i n 1972, K.D.George cafiie up w i t h the f o l l o w i n g 
o v e r a l l r e s u l t s f o r the 1958 to 1963 sub-period:(26) 
( a ) There had "been a s i g n i f i c a n t i n c r e a s e i n the 
average f i v e - f i r m s a l e s c o n c e n t r a t i o n r a t i o , 
l e v e l of from 5k.k per cent i n 1958 to 58.9 
percent i n 1963 ( 2 09 products a n a l y s e d ) . 
( b ) Out of the 209 products analysed 67 percent 
had shown an i n c r e a s e and 32 percent a 
decrease i n c o n c e n t r a t i o n . 
( c ) The i n d u s t r y groups which r e v e a l e d the 
h i g h e s t i n c r e a s e s were: food and d r i n k ; 
v e h i c l e s ; t e x t i l e s ; l e a t h e r c l o t h i n g and 
footwear. 
George p o i n t s out that the i n d u s t r i e s which shaved the 
h i g h e s t i n c r e a s e s , along w i t h e l e c t r i c a l e n g i n e e r i n g , were 
a l s o h e a v i l y a f f e c t e d "by a c q u i s i t i o n s and mergers i n 
the 1960's. 
I n 1975 K.D. George publis h e d a follow-up a r t i c l e 
which was intended to extend h i s a n a l y s i s . ( 2 7 ) I n h i s 
examination of the 1963 to 196S sub-period f o r the U.K., 
he was able to use the most r e c e n t 1968 Census of Production 
f i g u r e s which were made a v a i l a b l e i n 197U. I n g e n e r a l terms 
he found that f o r the roughly 150 products f o r which 
comparisons could be made, using f i v e - f i r m r a t i o s , the 
unweighted average c o n c e n t r a t i o n r a t i o s i n 1958, 1963 
and 1968 were 56.6 per cent, 59.6 percent and 65.k percent 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . As a r e s u l t he was able to p o i n t e d l y conclude 
t h a t the average i n c r e a s e i n c o n c e n t r a t i o n from 1963 to 1968 
was n e a r l y twice the average f o r 1558 t o 1963- Table 2.2 
p r e s e n t s some of the f i n d i n g s i n more d e t a i l as f o l l o w s : -
Table 2-2 
fioncentraticn S t a t i s t i c s 
" '• ' No. of Products i n 
Weighted Concen- which c o n c e n t r a t i o n 
No. of t r a t i o n R a t i o s (a) (t>) ( c ) 
I n d u s t r y Group Products , 0,-, -mca ™ I n c r e a s e d Decreased 
1963 1968 Change A 1 1 1 0 % A 1 ] 1 Q % 
Pood, d r i n k 
tobacco 
Chemicals and 
a l l i e d 
Metal Manufactures 
P l a n t Machinery & 
Instrument Eng. 
E l e c t r i c a l Eng. 
V e h i c l e s 
Metals n.e.s. 
T e x t i l e s 
L e a t h e r , c l o t h i n g & 
Footwear 
B r i c k s , p o t t e r y , 
g l a s s , cement 
Timber, f u r n i t u r e 
Paper, p r i n t i n g , 
p u b l i s h i n g 
Other 
A l l manufacturing 302 
Source: George, K.D., "A Note on Changes i n I n d u s t r i a l 
C o n c e n t r a t i o n i n the United Kingdom", Economic J o u r n a l , 
1975 v o l . 85 pp. 124-123. Data taken from: Department 
of I n d u s t r y . Report on the Census of Production 1968 
p a r t 158, Summary t a b l e s : E n t e r p r i s e A n a l y s e s , t a b l e 
44, H.M.S.O. 1974. 
Notes: ( a ) Weighted according t o t o t a l s a l e s of each product 
as i n 1968 Census of Production. 
( b ) C o ncentration measure used was f i v e - f i r m s a l e s 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n r a t i o . 
( c ) For s i x products there was no change. 
42 78.8 81.5 + 2.7 25 2 15 -
47 75.4 78.9 + 3.5 21 5 25 1 
20 63.7 75.3 +11.6 17 6 3 -
40 49.7 53.9 + 4.2 24 . 8 15 5 
27 66.4 75.9 + 9.5 24 10 3 . — 
9 87.7 93.4 + 5.7 8 1 JL 1 -
21 55.3 58.3 + 3.0 13 2 8 -
28 41.6 52.8 +11.2 25 11 3 -
19 27.3 32.2 + 4.9 14 7 5 
16 ' 59.7 65.4 + 5.7 13 6 . 2 -
9 2.2.2 23.4 + 1.2 4 1 4 -
10 51.4 52.4 4- 1.0 5 - 5 -
14 62.5 60.7 -1.8 9 2 5 -
.02 63.9 69.1+ +5.5 202 61 94 7 
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Looking f i r s t a t the l a r g e i n c r e a s e s i n c o n c e n t r a t i o n , 
i . e . g r e a t e r than or equal to 10 per cent, George remarks 
t h a t but of the 202 i n c r e a s e s , 61, or 30 percent were i n 
the l a r g e category; w h i l e i n the .1958 to 1963 sub-period the 
comparable proportion was only 18 per c e n t . On an i n d i v i d u a l 
i n d u s t r y b a s i s he makes the g e n e r a l observation t h a t those 
i n d u s t r i e s i n which b i g i n c r e a s e s of c o n c e n t r a t i o n took 
p l a c e were a l s o the ones i n which merger a c t i v i t y was 
e s p e c i a l l y strong i n the 1960's. The i n d u s t r i e s which 
stand out are as f o l l o w s : - metals, e l e c t r i c a l engineering, 
v e h i c l e s , t e x t i l e s , l e a t h e r c l o t h i n g and footwear, and 
b r i c k s p o t t e r y g l a s s cement. Of s p e c i a l note are metals 
which r e f l e c t s the r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of s t e e l i n 1967, and 
e l e c t r i c a l engineering i n which 10 of the 2h. i n c r e a s e s were 
g r e a t e r than or equal to 10 per cent, and these were i n 
transformers, switchgear, domestic a p p l i a n c e s and e l e c t r o n i c 
and r a d i o communications equipment. I n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , 
George's f i g u r e s r e v e a l t h a t f o r the sub-period 1963 to 
1968 there was an o v e r a l l predominance of c o n c e n t r a t i o n 
i n c r e a s e s among the 302 products examined, and they t h e r e f o r e 
a l s o accord with the g e n e r a l c o n c l u s i o n reached by Aaronovitch 
and Sawyer. 
One of the weaknesses of market or i n d u s t r y c o n c e n t r a t i o n 
measures i s that they do not take account of the extent 
t o which the same firms a r e able t o operate i n a number 
of d i f f e r e n t economic s e c t o r s , and are thus able to w i e l d 
s i g n i f i c a n t l e v e l s of i n f l u e n c e . However, the advantage 
of aggregate measures of c o n c e n t r a t i o n , and the reason 
why they are p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l e v a n t ; i s the f a c t t h a t they 
give a somewhat rough guide to the t o t a l power of f i r m s . 
Table 2-3 p r e s e n t s a number of standard aggregate 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n measures extended over time and t h e data 
r e v e a l e d that w i t h few ex c e p t i o n s the shares of the 
l a r g e s t f i r m s i n terms of employment (1935 to 1971) and 
net output (1909 to 1970) have been s t e a d i l y i n c r e a s i n g . ( 2 8 ) 
Table 2-5 
Aggregate c o n c e n t r a t i o n i n manufacturing s e c t o r by employment 
(1935-1971): by output (1909-1970) i n the U.K. 
( a ) Share {%) of l a r g e s t f i r m s i n employment ( f i r m s ranked 
by employment) 
Number of Firms 1935 1958 1963 1968 1970 1971 
50 15 21.1 24,3 29.4 51.8 31>5 
100 22 27.7 32.6 57.8 40.5 59.7 
200 28 . 35.3 42.0 47.1 49.3 49.0 
( b ) Share' { % ) of l a r g e s t f i r m s i n net output ( f i r m s ranked by . 
output) 
Number of Firms 1909 1924 1955 1949 1958 1965 1968 1970 
50 24.7 27.9 5?-.4 
100 16 21 24 21 32.5 57.4 42.0 4 6 s 
200 41.0 47.9 52.5 
it E s t i m a t e (from s o u r c e ) 
Source: Aaronovitch, S., and Sawyer, M.C., B i g B u s i n e s s , 
Macmillan, 1975, p. 117. 
T h i s i n c r e a s i n g t r e n d as evidenced i n the above aggregate 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n measures has l e d one a u t h o r i t y on the s u b j e c t , 
n a m e l y ^ . J . P r a i s , to sp e c u l a t e that a t the c u r r e n t r a t e of 
i n c r e a s e ( i . e . c u r r e n t i n 1973) the l a r g e s t one hundred, 
manufacturing f i r m s may account f o r two-thirds of net 
manufacturing output by 1983* (29) T h i s type of s p e c u l a t i o n 
a s i d e , on the b a s i s of the above information i t i s 
p o s s i b l e t o conclude t h a t , s u b j e c t to t h e i r own 
l i m i t a t i o n s , both the i n d u s t r y and aggregate measures 
do c o n f i r m an o v e r a l l i n c r e a s i n g trend i n c o n c e n t r a t i o n . 
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F a c t o r Market S t r u c t u r a l Arrangements 
Within the o v e r a l l framework of the t h e s i s i t was 
intended, t h a t t h i s chapter, i n accomplishing i t s primary 
o b j e c t i v e of confirming the existence of a long run 
s e c u l a r i n c r e a s e i n c o n c e n t r a t i o n , should a l s o achieve at 
l e a s t two s u b s i d i a r y aims. 
One aim was to show that t h e r e was a sound t h e o r e t i c a l 
underpinning f o r b e l i e v i n g t h a t the c r e a t i o n of l a r g e 
s e l l e r s i n the manufacuring s e c t o r may,, p a r i passu, mean 
the c r e a t i o n of l a r g e b u y e r s . At the beginning of the 
chapter i t was p o s t u l a t e d t h a t the p a r a l l e l growth of l a r g e 
s e l l e r s as s i g n i f i c a n t , f a c t o r market buyers could be 
accepted on the b a s i s of l o g i c a l argument alone. However, 
as the f o l l o w i n g diagram i l l u s t r a t e s , t h i s l o g i c a l 
argument could be g r e a t l y strengthened and u n i f i e d i f i t 
could be shown that there e x i s t s a c i r c u l a r i t y of motivation. 
F i g u r e 2-1 
C i r c u l a r i t y of S i z e Motives 
j _ Motivated by j 
Large S e l l i n g " Large Buying 
I Advantage of 1 
I n e f f e c t F i g u r e 2-1 suggests that a l a r g e s e l l e r could be 
p a r t i a l l y motivated to grow so that i t becomes a l a r g e 
buyer; and the a b i l i t y to behave as a l a r g e buyer, r e p r e s e n t s 
one of the p o s i t i v e advantages of being a l a r g e s e l l e r . This 
argument w i l l be developed i n the next s e c t i o n but i t s 
s t r u c t u r a l i m p l i c a t i o n s a r e considered in t h i s one. 
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Another s u b s i d i a r y aim of the chapter i s to, i n g e n e r a l 
terms, d e s c r i b e the s t r u c t u r a l arrangements or components 
of f a c t o r markets which are of p a r t i c u l a r r e l e v a n c e to 
t h i s a n a l y s i s . On the b a s i s ; of what has a l r e a d y been 
surveyed, i t i s apparent that f a c t o r markets must c e r t a i n l y 
be i n p a r t composed of l a r g e s e l l i n g and l a r g e buying 
u n i t s . Looking at both s i d e s of the market the s i t u a t i o n 
. may be f a i r l y r e p r e s e n t e d by the f o l l o w i n g schema; 
F i g u r e 2-2 
T o t a l F a c t o r Market S t r u c t u r e 
O v e r a l l 
S t r u c t u r e 
Of 
F a c t o r 
Markets 
Small Buying 
Units 
i 
i 
S m a l l S e l l i n g _^ 
Uni t s 
S i z e 
Spectrum 
FACING 
1 
S i z e 
Spectrum 
Large Buying 
U n i t s 
I 
1 
Large S e l l i n g 
U n i t s 
T h i s f a r t the a n a l y s i s has only confirmed the existence of * 
the l a r g e u n i t s i n t h i s schema and so i t i s n e c e s s a r y to v a l i -
date the e x i s t e n c e of the other s i z e s of t r a d i n g u n i t s . 
Obviously, given the complexity of g e n e r a l economic 
t r a d i n g p a t t e r n s and the v a s t number of d i f f e r e n c e s between 
the input and ot&put c o - e f f i c i e n t s of v a r i o u s productive 
p r o c e s s e s ; there i s every reason to b e l i e v e t h a t l a r g e 
s c a l e e n t e r p r i s e buyers w i l l not purchase s i g n i f i c a n t 
q u a n t i t i e s i n terms of each input's t o t a l market, of a l l 
t h e i r sundry f a c t o r s of production* Moreover, w h i l e the 
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s t a t i s t i c s confirm a growing r o l e f o r l a r g e f i r m s w i t h i n 
key a r e a s of economic a c t i v i t y , there s t i l l e x i s t s a 
f a i r l y l a r g e number of s m a l l and medium s i z e d f i r m s 
i n most of the i n d u s t r y groupings i n the manufacturing 
s e c t o r . Table 2-4 below summarises the rough s i z e 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of manufacturing e s t a b l i s h m e n t s i n 1972 a c c o r d i n g 
to Standard I n d u s t r i a l C l a s s i f i c a t i o n s (S.I.C.)(30) I t 
i s noteworthy that the S I C d e s c r i p t i o n s i n Table 2-4 
c l o s e l y f ollow those i n d u s t r y groupings presented i n 
Table 2-3 i n r e l a t i o n to i n c r e a s e s i n c o n c e n t r a t i o n . 
Table 2-k 
Proportions of Units by Employment S i z e by SIC Order United 
Kingdom 
SIC Order P r o p o r t i o n of U n i t s Employing 
From 11 to 199 Employees 
I I I Food d r i n k and tobacco 81,9 
V Chemicals and a l l i e d 79.1 
VI Metal Manufacture 78.7 
V I I Mechanical E n g i n e e r i n g 88.5 
V I I I Instrument E n g i n e e r i n g 86.4 
IX E l e c t r i c a l E n g i n e e r i n g 77.6 
X I V e h i c l e s 77.0 
X I I Metals n.e.s.. 92.7 
X I I I T e x t i l e s 82.6 
XIV ) 
XV ) 
L e a t h e r , c l o t i n g and 
Footwear ) ) 
91.5 
XVI B r i c k s , P o t t e r y , g l a s s , cement 86,4 
X V I I Timber, F u r n i t u r e 96.0 
X V I I I Paper, p r i n t i n g , p u b l i s h i n g 89.9 
XIX Other 
T o t a l 
88.5 
87.4 
Source: Department of i n d u s t r y , B u s i n e s s Monitor PA 1005 1972, 
H.M.S.G. 1975 
The size range or from 11 t o 199 employees was chosen 
f o r Table 2.Aj. because t h i s was the s t a t i s t i c a l d e f i n i t i o n 
given t o a s m a l l f i r m "belonging t o the manufacturing s e c t o r 
by the Bolton Committee i n q u i r y i n t o s m a l l f i r m s . (31) (32) 
The major d e f i c i e n c y w i t h the i n f o r m a t i o n i n Table 2-4; 
i s t h a t the manufacturing u n i t r e f e r s t o an establishment, 
and not t o a separate l e g a l e n t i t y , or e n t e r p r i s e . As 
suggested i n Appendix 2-1 an e n t e r p r i s e may have more than 
one establishment, and so, i n c l u d e d i n the p r o p o r t i o n s shown 
i n the t a b l e t h e r e are almost c e r t a i n l y a l a r g e number of 
establishments which are e i t h e r w h o l l y owned by, or 
are branches and s u b s i d i a r i e s of, l a r g e f i r m s . Since most 
Census m a t e r i a l i s c o l l e c t e d on an. establishment b a s i s , i t i s 
d i f f i c u l t t o overcome t h i s problem and i t becomes necessary 
t o use somewhat crude data i n order t o g a i n an impression 
of the s i z e d i s p e r s i o n of e n t e r p r i s e s . The B o l t o n Committee 
was. faced w i t h the same problem but managed t o come up 
w i t h the f o l l o w i n g incomplete set of s t a t i s t i c s : (33) 
Table 2-5 
Number of Establishments and E n t e r p r i s e s i n Manufacturing i n 
the U~K., 192U^19%3 (Thousands) 
Establishments E n t e r p r i s e s 
T o t a l Small Larger T o t a l Small Larger 
192U 163 160 — — — 1930 168 16k k - — — 
1935 IkQ Ikk k iko 136 k 19^3 108 103 5 — - -
1951 102 96 6 - . — -
195^ 97 91 6 - - — 1958 93 85 8 70 66 k 
1963 90 82 8 6U 60 k 
Source : Small Firms , Crnnd. i ; 8 l l H.I 1.s.o.? 1972. p.60 0 
A l l of which, when combined, tends t o confirm the existence • 
of a spectrum or range o f firms, of d i f f e r e n t sizes which 
may "be i n v o l v e d i n f a c t o r market t r a d i n g r e l a t i o n s . 
I n c o n v e n t i o n a l economic theory a l l o c a t i v e problems 
emerge when t r a d i n g r e l a t i o n s f a l l outside of the parameters 
of the pure models of the market and t h e f i r m . That i s , 
when at l e a s t one o f the p a r t i e s can i n f l u e n c e the 
co n d i t i o n s attached t o the exchange, f o r example, when 
there i s a s h i f t from being a ' p r i c e - t a k e r ' , t o being a 
'price-maker'. At t h i s stage the a n a l y s i s i s concerned 
w i t h the f a c t t h a t i n d u s t r i a l c o n c e n t r a t i o n trends mean 
t h a t r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e buyers are o p e r a t i n g i n f a c t o r 
markets which are populated by s u p p l i e r s of d i f f e r i n g 
s i z e s . Consequently, i t i s possible t o s c h e m a t i c a l l y 
represent t h i s n e c e s s a r i l y more narrow s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s 
of f a c t o r markets, as f e l l o w s : -
Figure 2-5 
A n a l y t i c a l Factor Market S t r u c t u r e 
A n a l y t i c a l 
S t r u c t u r e 
of Factor 
Markets 
R e l a t i v e l y Large 
Buying Units 
I , 
FACING 
I J ! 
Small ^ Siae _w Large 
S e l l i n g U n i t s Spectrum ' S e l l i n g Units 
I n t h i s s e c t i o n an attempt has been made t o e s t a b l i s h 
and c l a r i f y the general s t r u c t u r a l c o n d i t i o n s of f a c t o r 
markets which are re l e v a n t t o the o v e r a l l a n a l y t i c a l framewor 
o f the t h e s i s . I t i s against t h i s backdrop, t h a t the next 
chapter looks a t what these c o n d i t i o n s may mean i n terms 
of i n d u s t r i a l conduct and performance. 
- 30 -
Some C o n t r i b u t o r y Factors in. the Process of' I n d u s t r i a l 
G oncer, tr- at i on 
It.was suggested i n a previous s e c t i o n t h a t t he process 
of i n d u s t r i a l c o n c e n t r a t i o n may not- r e a l l y be f u l l y 
understood, and t h a t moreover, i n some instances t h e r e 
was a s u s p i c i o n t h a t the process, might be random w i t h 
respect t o economic f a c t o r s . Despite t h i s apparent 
indeterminacy, or perhaps because of i t , t h ere i s 
nevertheless an abundance of p o s i t e d c o n t r i b u t o r y f a c t o r s . 
This s e c t i o n i s mainly r e s t r i c t e d t o r e v i e w i n g those f a c t o r s 
which appear t o be of p a r t i c u l a r relevance t o f a c t o r market 
t r a d i n g r e l a t i o n s . 
I n h i s paper on c o n c e n t r a t i o n , S.J, P r a i s i n d i c a t e s 
t h a t i n a study of c o n t r i b u t o r y f a c t o r s he would weight 
changes i n the i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l markets very h e a v i l y 
indeed.{3k) While he does not elaborate i n any d e t a i l , 
Prais suggests t h a t changes i n personal wealth and 
t a x a t i o n along w i t h company t a x a t i o n and the i n f l u e n c e of 
f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s - the insurance companies, pension 
funds and u n i t t r u s t s - has meant t h a t i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l 
has g r a v i t a t e d towards the l a r g e r quoted companies. I n 
f a c t , he p o s i t s t h a t lower c a p i t a l costs may have a c t u a l l y 
p r o v i d e d a p o s i t i v e i n c e n t i v e f o r the development o f 'large 
f i n a n c i a l u n i t s ' . This i s indeed a compelling f a c t o r ; 
however, i t i s p o s s i b l e t o speculate t h a t i n the o r y the 
i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l market t o some degree represents a 
screen behind which a number of more t e c h n i c a l motives l i e . . 
I n other words, there may e x i s t a number o f p o s i t i v e 
advantages, i n being l a r g e and t h a t , &u l e a s t i n i t i a l l y , 
c a p i t a l moved i n response t o these s p e c i f i c advantages and 
not s o l e l y because i t may have been.mesmerised by 
largeness. I n which case, a study o f the c o n c e n t r a t i o n 
process might f r u i t f u l l y l o o k not only at changes i n the 
i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l market but at what r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s l a y 
behind the investment d e c i s i o n s . 
I n a b r i e f examination of the determinants of 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n Douglas Needham i d e n t i f i e s some of the more 
t e c h n i c a l aspects of the process. (35) On the assumption 
t h a t f i r m s attempt t o minimise u n i t c osts; t h e maximum and 
minimum number of f i r m s i n a p a r t i c u l a r i n d u s t r y w i l l 
c o i ncide i f the i n d u s t r y ' s long-run average cost curve 
i s 'U' shaped. This means, of course, t h a t economics of 
scale have been exhausted and t h a t there are diseconomies 
of scale beyond the one scale of output which minimises u n i t 
c o s t s . Under these c o n d i t i o n s the number of f i r m s i n the 
p a r t i c u l a r i n d u s t r y w i l l be a f u n c t i o n of scale economies 
and the s i z e of the market. I n r e a l i t y , as Needham 
.points out, there may be a number of d i f f e r e n t scales o£ 
output which minimise u n i t costs and i n any case, th e r e i s 
no j u s t i f i c a t i o n why f i r m s should n e c e s s a r i l y seek the 
o b j e c t i v e o f u n i t cost m i n i m i s a t i o n . Under c o n d i t i o n s of 
p r o f i t maximisation other f a c t o r s come i n t o p l a y , such as 
the f i r m ' s p r i c i n g s t r a t e g y . For example; a f i r m could 
produce at l e v e l s of output which d i d not minimise costs but a l s o 
s e l l a t p r i c e s which covered the costs, and continue t o do 
so through the existance of e n t r y b a r r i e r s . The i n t r o d u c t i o n 
of s t r u c t u r a l or market im p e r f e c t i o n s tend t o throw i n t o 
question the r a t h e r d e t e r m i n i s t i c c o n s t r u c t s associated 
w i t h such assumptions as u n i t cost minimisation., and 
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r e t u r n the a n a l y s i s t o an examination of the p l e t h o r a 
of d i f f e r e n t p o s s i b l e c o n t r i b u t o r y f a c t o r s . This i s complicated 
by the f a c t t h a t many of these f a c t o r s may be s p e c i f i c t o 
a p a r t i c u l a r i n d u s t r y or market s i t u a t i o n . 
A more complete, and n e c e s s a r i l y general, approach t o 
the q u e s t i o n of why t h e r e has been an increase i n aggregate 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n has been o f f e r e d by J.P. P i c k e r i n g . ( 3 6 ) 
Returning t o Gibrat's law on p r o p o r t i o n a t e e f f e c t , 
P i c k e r i n g suggests t h a t c o n t r i b u t o r y f a c t o r s probably 
r e l a t e t o circumstances which have favoured the l a r g e f i r m , 
( i . e . the a n t i - r e g r e s s i v e i n f l u e n c e s ) and disadvantaged 
the small f i r m ( i . e . the r e g r e s s i v e i n f l u e n c e s ) . He then 
considers some of the r e l e v a n t circumstances i n each 
case s t a r t i n g w i t h the n o t i o n t h a t t e c h n i c a l progress may 
have r a i s e d the minimum optimum s i z e of f i r m . While he 
grants the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h i s may have occurred i n some 
instances, he i n d i c a t e s t h a t i t i s more probable t h a t t h e 
m o t i v a t i o n u n d e r l y i n g increased c o n c e n t r a t i o n can be 
a t t r i b u t e d t o what he terms the "...pecuniary • advantages 
of i n c r e a s i n g s i z e , , , " and these pecuniary advantages 
are m a n i f e s t e d " . t h r o u g h s u p e r i o r buying power, gr e a t e r 
a b i l i t y t o spread r i s k s and t o s t a b i l i s e earnings."(37) Also 
of relevance, he c i t e s the pressures t o grow exerted not 
onl y from w i t h i n the f i r m b u t by e x t e r n a l sources such as 
the stock market. This i s a f a c t o r which complements 
P r a i s ' argument presented above. The f i n a l f a c t o r , suggested 
by P i c k e r i n g , which can i n f l u e n c e l a r g e f i r m s i s t h a t o f 
growth i n order t o preserve managerial independence. On 
the t o p i c of the absence of r e g r e s s i v e tendencies by s m a l l . 
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f i r m s P i c k e r i n g suggests t h a t t h i s may he due t o 
d e f i c i e n c i e s i n c a p i t a l a v a i l a b i l i t y and managerial 
e x p e r t i s e . The net r e s u l t of these kinds of trends 
or circumstances appears t o "be an i n c r e a s i n g economic • 
r o l e f o r larg e f i r m s and a decreasing one f o r small 
e n t e r p r i s e , and t h i s i s m i r r o r e d t o some ext e n t by t h e 
U.K. c o n c e n t r a t i o n measures, 
A comment which i s of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t r e l a t e s 
t o Dr. P i c k e r i n g s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of 'superior buying power' 
as one of the 'pecuniary advantages' of i n c r e a s i n g s i z e . 
I n e f f e c t , the advantage probably l i e s i n economies of 
buying, and i n t h i s respect i t i s p o s s i b l e t o b r i e f l y , 
focus upon the d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t one w r i t e r on the s u b j e c t 
of l a r g e c o r p o r a t i o n s , Graham Bannock, has made r e g a r d i n g 
purchasing economies.(38) Bannock i d e n t i f i e s two d i s t i n c t 
types: 
" . . . f i r s t those a r i s i n g where the purchaser's 
exercise o f buying power fo r c e s the s u p p l i e r 
t o reduce h i s p r o f i t margin; second, genuine 
cost economies f o r the s u p p l i e r r e s u l t i n g 
from the reduced handling—costs of l a r g e 
orders."(39) 
He then comments t h a t ; " e. T i n the United States the 
Robinson-Patman Act makes p r i c e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n of the 
f i r s t type i l l e g a l . "(Ij.0) Regardless of the l e g a l i t y 
i n v o l v e d i n the exercise of buying power, i t i s a theme 
which i s of relevance t o economic a n a l y s i s , and i t s general 
i m p l i c a t i o n s w i l l be explored i n more d e t a i l i n the next 
chapter. 
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A p r e v i o u s l y referenced v / r i t e r i n the f i e l d of . 
i n d u s t r i a l c o n c e n t r a t i o n . K.D. George, has suggested 
t h a t "... the tendency towards l a r g e r u n i t s and 
increased c o n c e n t r a t i o n i s l i k e l y t o he accentuated by 
the increasing•amount of government i n t e r v e n t i o n i n 
i n d u s t r y . " ( ^ 1 ) He continues.on t o i n d i c a t e t h a t the 
government's d i r e c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i n d u s t r i e s l i k e 
s h i p b u i l d i n g , a i r c r a f t , i r o n and s t e e l and i t s 
involvement i n planning lf... r e i n f o r c e s any tendency 
f o r i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t y t o be organised i n fewer and 
l a r g e r businesses."(^2) The r o l e of the government 
as an agent i n the c o n c e n t r a t i o n process can q u i t e o b v i o u s l y 
not be overlooked. Associated w i t h t h i s r o l e i s the one 
played by the n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s as buyers of goods 
and s e r v i c e s , f o r they too may be expected t o exercise 
a p owerful i n f l u e n c e i n f a c t o r markets,. Thus George 
introduces another s i g n i f i c a n t element i n t o the 
a n a l y s i s of f a c t o r market s t r u c t u r e s . 
To summarise: out of t h i s s e c t i o n two s a l i e n t p o i n t s 
have emerged. The f i r s t i s t h a t l a r g e scale e n t e r p r i s e may 
not only f i n d the exercise of f a c t o r market buying power 
a p o s i t i v e i n c e n t i v e , t o grow: but also a pecuniary 
advantage of being l a r g e . The second p o i n t , which i s of 
associated s i g n i f i c a n c e , i s t h a t the a n a l y s i s of l a r g e 
buyer t r a d i n g r e l a t i o n s must not only i n v o l v e p r i v a t e 
e n t e r p r i s e , but p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e as w e l l . The two questions 
which are begged by t h i s s e c t i o n are: Why i s buying power 
such an inducement? How may i t be exercised? To a major 
extent these two questions form the centrepiece of t h i s 
t h e s i s ' attempt t o examine f a c t o r market b u y e r / s u p p l i e r 
r e l a t i o n s , and as such, the next f o u r chapters are devoted 
t o the development of some p o s s i b l e answers w i t h i n t h a t 
c o n t e x t . Chapter 3 concentrates upon some of the 
inducements d e a l t w i t h "by economic th e o r y , and v/hile 
Chapters l±, 5 and 6 p r i m a r i l y focus upon the 'hows', 
they also introduce a number of a d d i t i o n a l 'whys'. 
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Appendix 2-1 
Some Problems- and D e f i c i e n c i e s Associated w i t h Concentration 
Measures-
The f i r s t set of problems r e l a t e t o the choice o f 
v a r i a b l e s . A p a r t i c u l a r f a c e t of t h i s problem which i s 
o f t e n c i t e d i s r e l a t e d t o the use of ' f i r m s ' or ' p l a n t s ' . 
When using the number o f ' f i r m s ' i n the c o n c e n t r a t i o n 
c a l c u l a t i o n , the emphasis i s upon the separate d e c i s i o n 
making u n i t s ; but f o r measures using ' p l a n t ' shares, 
the focus i s upon p r o d u c t i o n u n i t s . The r e l e v a n t f e a t u r e 
of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t where f i r m s 
tend t o have se v e r a l p l a n t s , l e v e l s of c o n c e n t r a t i o n of f i r m s 
w i l l be higher than those of p l a n t s . I n such cases the 
main concern i s b a s i c a l l y one of c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l data 
c o m p a r a b i l i t y and the i n d u s t r y measure appears t o be the 
one which i s most l i k e l y t o be e f f e c t e d . Measures of 
aggregate c o n c e n t r a t i o n g e n e r a l l y use the same data base 
from one time p e r i o d t o the next, e.g. the share of the 
l a r g e s t 100 o r g a n i s a t i o n s , and so t h e r e i s some degree of 
consistency. However, w i t h i n d u s t r y measures there i s 
obvi o u s l y a need f o r c a u t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o how the r e l e v a n t 
' f i r m ' has been de f i n e d i n terms of the f i r m c o n c e n t r a t i o n 
r a t i o s employed. Another c o n s i d e r a t i o n which i s r e l e v a n t 
t o the s e l e c t i o n of v a r i a b l e s r f l v o l v e s | t h e frequent use 
of output and sales data. Aside from the apparent d i f f i c u l t i e s 
of data c o l l e c t i o n , there i s a l s o the fundamental d i f f i c u l t y 
associated w i t h the f a c t t h a t d i f f e r i n g l e v e l s of v e r t i c a l 
i n t e g r a t i o n can intro d u c e an element of double-counting i n 
c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l s t u d i e s which use gross output, data,, 
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Once again market c o n c e n t r a t i o n measures appear t o be 
p a r t i c u l a r l y s u s c e p t i b l e t o t h i s type of problem 
since the emphasis i s upon a product's or i n d u s t r y ' s 
data over time and not on a f i r m ' s or o r g a n i s a t i o n ' s 
o v e r a l l t o t a l growth i n a p a r t i c u l a r area, as i s the case 
w i t h aggregate measures. F i n a l l y , s i m i l a r types of problems 
are a l s o encountered i n the use of asset and employment 
l e v e l s as s i z e v a r i a b l e s , because they too may mask an 
important f a c t o r . I n t h i s instance the hidden f a c t o r i s 
the v a r y i n g degrees of c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y i n p r o d u c t i o n . 
Dr. P i c k e r i n g i n h i s review of the above problems, suggests 
t h a t since c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y may be p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d 
w i t h f i r m s i z e , asset measures w i l l . o v e r s t a t e , and employment 
measures w i l l understate, the t r u e l e v e l s of concentration.(.1) 
The short method of coping w i t h t h i s problem would appear t o 
be not t o use a u n i t a r y measure of c o n c e n t r a t i o n and f o r the 
s t u d i e s used i n Chapter 2f t h i s approach was adopted. I n 
terms of the two preceding p o t e n t i a l problems, the t h e s i s i s 
f o r c e d t o r e l y upon the e x p e r t i s e of the authors of the 
r e l e v a n t s t u d i e s t o ensure a c o n s i s t a n t data base. 
Of p o t e n t i a l l y more d i r e c t relevance t o the chapter 
are the f o u r major d i f i c i e n c i e s which Dr. P i c k e r i n g i n d i c a t e s 
may be e x h i b i t e d by c o n c e n t r a t i o n measures when they are 
used as i n d i c a t o r s of market s t r u c t u r e . ( 2 ) F i r s t l y , t here 
i s the fundamental and v a l i d argument t h a t i n d u s t r y 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s may be i n a p p r o p r i a t e given the problems 
associated w i t h i d e n t i f y i n g close s u b s t i t u t e s ( o r i n more 
t e c h n i c a l terms, determining the r e l e v a n t c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t i e s 
of demandX(3) Coupled c l o s e l y t o t h i s i n d u s t r y c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
- kl— 
d e f i c i e n c y i s the f a c t t h a t n a t i o n a l c o n c e n t r a t i o n r a t i o s 
may o f t e n d i s g u i s e pockets of considerably higher 
r e g i o n a l l e v e l s of c o n c e n t r a t i o n . I n i t s eventual 
p r e s e n t a t i o n o f an i n v e s t i g a t i v e framework the t h e s i s 
w i l l attempt t o support the n o t i o n t h a t a f i r m ' s ' e f f e c t i v e 
market' i s of considerable importance i n f a c t o r market 
s t u d i e s , and i n some cases, t h i s may h i g h l i g h t the 
s i g n i f i c a n c e of r e g i o n a l c o n c e n t r a t i o n on the buying s i d e . 
At l e a s t i n t h i s respect the t h e s i s a ttempts.to answer 
the secondary d e f i c i e n c y . A second major d e f i c i e n c y l i e s 
i n the f a c t t h a t c o n c e n t r a t i o n r a t i o s o f t e n ignore some 
fundamental elements of market s t r u c t u r e , f o r example, 
aside from the already mentioned element of v e r t i c a l 
i n t e g r a t i o n , there are c o n d i t i o n s of e n t r y , p a t e n t s , 
and the existance or otherwise of c o u n t e r v a i l i n g buying 
power, t o name a few. With regards t o the existance 
of c o u n t e r v a i l i n g or other power s t r u c t u r e s , i t i s the 
i n t e n t i o n of the t h e s i s t o move beyond the s i n g l e 
p r e s e n t a t i o n of c o n c e n t r a t i o n trends t o examine economic 
power based r e l a t i o n s i n more d e t a i l . T h i r d l y , Dr. P i c k e r i n g 
suggests t h a t the l i n k between c o n c e n t r a t i o n and conduct 
may be a f f e c t e d by a-number other i n f l u e n c e s which can 
come i n t o p l a y and i n v a l i d a t e the assumption t h a t separate 
f i r m s are independent of each other, and thus, behave 
independently. He c i t e s as examples the existence of K 
i n t e r l o c k i n g d i r e c t o r s h i p s , m i n o r i t y shareholdings i n 
r i v a l s , c a r t e l arrangements and the s t r e n g t h of h i s t o r i c a l 
and t r a d i t i o n a l p r a c t i c e s . I t ' i s apparent t h a t such f a c t o r s may 
i n f l u e n c e the de c i s i o n making process and wh i l e h i s examples 
p r i m a r i l y r e l a t e t o the conduct among s e l l e r s , the same- types 
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of c o n d i t i o n s can a f f e c t r e l a t i o n s between buyers. This 
i s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e w i t h respect t o the l a s t f a c t o r , as i t may 
also e f f e c t the.ostensive independence i n bu y e r / s u p p l i e r 
r e l a t i o n s . For the f o u r t h and f i n a l d e f i c i e n c y Dr. 
P i c k e r i n g warns t h a t c o n c e n t r a t i o n measures may i n some 
cases r e l a t e only t o s t a t i s t i c s on domestic p r o d u c t i o n 
and t h a t as a r e s u l t h i g h import shares i n domestic 
sales could overstate degrees of market c o n c e n t r a t i o n i f 
the r a t i o s are based upon domestic p r o d u c t i o n only. I n 
a d d i t i o n , exports may lead t o d i s t o r t i o n s i n the c a l c u l a t i o n 
of domestic market c o n c e n t r a t i o n l e v e l s i f lar g e and 
d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e shares of domestic p r o d u c t i o n are 
exported. 
I n essence, the above.confirms the need t o search f o r 
and i d e n t i f y s a l i e n t f a c t o r s which may reside behind the 
o b j e c t i v e s t a t i s t i c s a v a i l a b l e f o r most i n d u s t r i e s . 
^Appendix 2-1 
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CHAPTER 5 
FACTOR MARKET BUYERS AND ECONOMIC THEORY 
"Perfect c o m p e t i t i o n among s e l l e r s r e q u i r e s 
two c o n d i t i o n s , t h a t the number of s e l l e r s 
s h a l l be l a r g e , and t h a t the customers s h a l l 
a l l have the same preference ( o r t h e same 
i n d i f f e r e n c e ) between one f i r m a n d . i t s 
r i v a l s . S i m i l a r l y p e r f e c t c o m p e t i t i o n 
among buyers r e q u i r e s t h a t the number of 
buyers composing a market s h a l l be l a r g e , so 
t h a t a change i n the amount purchased by any 
one of them has a n e g l i g i b l e e f f e c t upon the 
t o t a l purchases of the market, and t h a t the 
s e l l e r s are i n d i f f e r e n t as t o whom they 
provide t h e i r v/ares."(Joan Robins o n ) ( l ) 
I n t r o d u c t i o n 
The aim of t h i s chapter i s t o review i n general terms 
the s u b j e c t s of concentrated and la r g e buyers as they 
appear i n selected areas o f economic theory i n order t o 
i l l u s t r a t e two fundamental p o i n t s . The f i r s t p o i n t i s t o 
show t h a t , on the basis of c u r r e n t theory, the conduct 
of large buying u n i t s , as revealed i n the exercise of t h e i r 
b a r g a i n i n g power, may a c t u a l l y c o n f i r m and r e i n f o r c e the 
a n t i - r e g r e s s i v e i n f l u e n c e s associated w i t h i n c r e a s i n g l e v e l s 
o f c o n c e n t r a t i o n . The second p o i n t i s t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t a 
q u i n t e s s e n t i a l f a c t o r i n the a b i l i t y of concentrated or 
lar g e buying f i r m s to exploit, or b e n e f i t from, t h e i r dominant 
p o s i t i o n s i s the s e l l e r s ' dependence upon t h e i r buyers, 
t h a t i s , the absence of the s e l l e r ' s i n d i f f e r e n c e ' a s t o whom 
they provide t h e i r wares.' 
- hk -
The chapter "begins w i t h a b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n of the 
parameters of buyer c o n c e n t r a t i o n , and then an o u t l i n e 
of the types of market s t r u c t u r e s t o be reviewed i s presented. 
This i s f o l l o w e d by an examination of the c o n d i t i o n s 
s.urrounding each r e s p e c t i v e type ct' market s t r u c t u r e . 
The penultimate s e c t i o n of the chapter reviews two 
e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s , one on producer goods markets and the 
other on buyer c o n c e n t r a t i o n . The chapter's conclusion attempts 
t o summarise how the two p o i n t s , concerning a n t i - r e g r e s s i v e 
i n f l u e n c e s and the r o l e of dependence^ have been met. 
' p'-
Buyer Concentration and Relevant Forms of Market S t r u c t u r e 
I n a market s t r u c t u r e context J.3. Bain describes 
the degree of "buyer c o n c e n t r a t i o n as "... the number and 
size d i s t r i b u t i o n of the buyers who make up the market which 
a g i v e n i n d u s t r y of s e l l e r s supplies . " ( 2 ) The various t( 
degrees of c o n c e n t r a t i o n which may e x i s t cover a range 
which runs from monopsonistic, through t o o l i g o p s o n i s t i c , 
and i n t o a t o m i s t i c buying markets. Against, these buying 
market s t r u c t u r e s i t i s p o s s i b l e t o set the various 
types of s e l l i n g markets and these range from monopoly, 
t o o l i g o p o l y , t o a t o m i s t i c as w e l l . These d e s c r i p t i o n s 
may be used t o d i s t i n g u i s h and c l a s s i f y d i f f e r e n t types o f 
b u y e r - s e l l e r market s t r u c t u r e s , f o r example, Bain 
i d e n t i f i e s the f o l l o w i n g important categories which may 
be d i s t i n g u i s h e d on the basis of b o t h buyer and s e l l e r 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n ^ 3) 
F u l l y a t o m i s t i c markets; many small buyers 
and many small s e l l e r s . 
2. Simple o l i g o p o l y ; many small buyers w i t h 
a s i g n i f i c a n t degree of s e l l e r c o n c e n t r a t i o n . 
3, Siniple o1ig op s ony; s i g n i f i c a n t degree of buyer 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n and many small s e l l e r s . 
B i l a t e r a l o l i g o p o l y ; s i g n i f i c a n t degree of 
buyer c o n c e n t r a t i o n and s i g n i f i c a n t degree 
of s e l l e r c o n c e n t r a t i o n . 
However, since t h i s t h e s i s i s p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h 
the r o l e of l a r g e scale e n t e r p r i s e as buyers, t h i s chapter 
is. l i m i t e d t o the f o l l o w i n g types of buyer and s e l l e r 
market s t r u c t u r e s : 
C 
Monopsony; s i n g l e l a r g e buyer and p e r f e c t l y 
c o m p e t i t i v e or a t o m i s t i c s e l l e r s . 
B i l a t e r a l Monopoly; s i n g l e l a r g e buyer 
and s i n g l e l a r g e s e l l e r . 
Oligopsony and b i l a t e r a l o l i g o p o l y . 
The l a r g e f i r m as a buyer f a c i n g a number 
of i m p e r f e c t l y c o m p e t i t i v e s u p p l i e r s . 
The f o u r t h type of s t r u c t u r a l arrangement c i t e d does not 
l e n d i t s e l f t o the r i g i d economic c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s of the 
three preceding ones, but nevertheless i t does employ the 
same t h e o r e t i c a l concepts and a n a l y t i c a l tools„ 
Associated w i t h the s t r u c t u r e of buyer markets are 
the general parameters of buyer conduct. According t o 
J.S. Bain, i n the American economy non-atomistic market 
s t r u c t u r e s are much more common on the s e l l i n g sides than 
on the buying sides of markets.(1+) As a r e s u l t , the usual 
conduct of the buyer i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d by Bain as b eing 
'passive'. This passiveness means t h a t each buyer acts 
i n d i v i d u a l l y and takes what i s o f f e r e d by the s e l l e r 
w i t h o u t "... being able t o make a p o l i c y r e g a r d i n g the 
p r i c e he pays, or p e r c e p t i b l y i n f l u e n c i n g i t or the 
product a l t e r n a t i v e s " a v a i l a b l e t o him'/. ( 5 ) On t h i s 
b a s i s Bain i n d i c a t e s t h a t there are very few markets 
where buyers are few i n number, and take a l a r g e enough 
p r o p o r t i o n of t o t a l output so t h a t they are able t o 
play an ' a c t i v e r o l e ' . Firms which p l a y t h i s r o l e , 
do so by i n f l u e n c i n g or dominating p r i c e d e t e r m i n a t i o n , and 
t h i s i s accomplished through, t h e i r a b i l i t y t o w i t h h o l d 
t h e i r s i g n i f i c a n t l e v e l s of. purchases. In. simple terms. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
h. 
i t i s the "buyer's p r i c e determining conduct which i s 
a c e n t r a l f a c t o r , and i t i s t h i s type of conduct which 
u l t i m a t e l y determines the associated l e v e l s of market 
performance. 
As a concluding comment, i t i s noteworthy t h a t Bain 
i n d i c a t e s t h a t n e a r l y a l l cases of non-atomistic and 
non-independent "buying occur i n producer goods markets.(6 
I n the sections which f o l l o w , the r e l e v a n t types of 
"buyer/seller f a c t o r market s t r u c t u r e s are examined i n 
c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the types of "buyer conduct described 
a"bove. 
Monopsony 
The f i r s t type of s t r u c t u r a l arrangement t o "be 
reviewed i s t h a t of monopsony, t h a t i s , a s i n g l e l a r g e 
buyer f a c i n g p e r f e c t l y c o m p e t i t i v e or a t o m i s t i c s e l l e r s . 
I n a general senoe, the economic p r i n c i p l e s of monopsony 
u s u a l l y serve as the f o u n d a t i o n f o r understanding a l l 
non-competitive buying s i t u a t i o n s , and t h e r e f o r e , they 
are examined i n some d e t a i l . I t should be remembered 
t h a t i n most cases the a n a l y s i s i s concerned w i t h the 
purchase of f a c t o r s of p r o d u c t i o n , fundamentally from 
other e n t e r p r i s e s , and t h a t t h i s e l u d e s from the 
d e t a i l e d examination the a c q u i s i t i o n of labour as a 
pr oduc t i ve i n p u t . 
Because the monopsonist i s the only buyer of a resource, 
he t h e r e f o r e faces the i n d u s t r y or market supply curve of tha 
resource. This means t h a t instead of f a c i n g a p e r f e c t l y , 
c o m p e titive type of h o r i z o n t a l supply curve, he i s 
confronted by an upward-sioping one, as g r a p h i c a l l y 
represented i n Figure 3-1. Appendix 3-1 describes how 
these curves may be derived, and i t a l s o i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t 
t h e average cost of the f a c t o r or in p u t (AG) i s equal t o 
the p r i c e of the i n p u t , The m a r g i n a l c o s t of the input(MC) 
l i e s above the average cost curve, which i s of course 
compatible (and necessary) w i t h a r i s i n g average cost 
f u n c t i o n . 
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•Figure 3-1 
Monopsonistic Supply Curve 
P r i c e 
MC of Input AC of Input = Supply of Input 
The demand side of the s i t u a t i o n i s s l i g h t l y more 
complex. As o r i g i n a l l y formulated by Joan Robinson, 
the demand curve f o r any one f a c t o r of p r o d u c t i o n ; 
"... w i l l depend upon the demand curve f o r the commodity, 
the t e c h n i c a l c o n d i t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n , and the supply 
curves of the other f a c t o r s of p r o d u c t i o n . " ( 7 ) I n 
order t o s i m p l i f y matters i t i s customary t o assume 
t h a t the commodity demand curve and other f a c t o r s ' supply 
curves are known, and giv e n , when a s p e c i f i c demand curve 
i s being described. On t h i s b a s i s , when a p e r f e c t l y • 
co m p e t i t i v e s e l l e r employs an a d d i t i o n a l u n i t of a f a c t o r 
h i s output i s increased by the marginal product of 
t h a t u n i t . S i m i l a r l y , t o t a l revenue i s increased by the 
value of the i n p u t ' s marginal -product; but because of 
market c o n d i t i o n s , the s e l l i n g p r i c e of the output 
remains constant. However, v/hen the f i r m i s a monopolist 
c o n d i t i o n s change somewhat. The a d d i t i o n a l i n p u t does 
of course increase the output by the f a c t o r ' s marginal 
product i n a f a s h i o n s i m i l a r t o t h a t set out above; b u t 
i n order t o dispose of h i s l a r g e r output the monopolist 
must reduce the market p r i c e , and consequently, the t o t a l 
revenue i s not augmented by the value of the f a c t o r s marginal 
product as under the p e r f e c t l y c o m p e t i t i v e s i t u a t i o n . 
This means t h a t i n i m p e r f e c t l y c o m p e t i t i v e s i t u a t i o n s , the 
a d d i t i o n of a u n i t of v a r i a b l e i n p u t increases revenue 
by the product of marginal revenue and marginal p r o d u c t , 
t h a t i s . by the increase i n t o t a l revenue which i s accounted 
f o r by the a d d i t i o n of the marginal product t o output and 
sa l e s . This magnitude i s termed the :marginal revenue 
i 
- -
product* and f o r the sake of c l a r i t y i s defin e d "by 
C.E. Ferguson as f o l l o w s : 
"... the net a d d i t i o n to t o t a l revenue 
a t t r i b u t a b l e t o the a d d i t i o n of one u n i t 
of the v a r i a b l e p r o d u c t i v e s e r v i c e , " ( 8 ) 
Appendix 3-2 presents a simple a l g e b r a i c d e r i v a t i o n of 
the concept. I n terms o f snape, the marginal revenue 
product curve (MRP) slopes downward t o the r i g h t i m p l y i n g 
t h a t marginal revenue product diminishes as output 
increases. This i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p which i s accounted 
f o r by the f o l l o w i n g f a c t o r s : 
( a ) marginal p h y s i c a l product declines w i t h 
the a d d i t i o n of- v a r i a b l e i n p u t s , and, 
(b ) marginal revenue d e c l i n e s , as output 
increases and market p r i c e f a i l s . 
Given the r e l e v a n t demand and supply curves, the 
monopsonist w i l l purchase a d d i t i o n a l q u a n t i t i e s of the f a c t o r 
of p r o d u c t i o n provided the a d d i t i o n a l q u a n t i t i e s 
c o n t r i b u t e more t o t o t a l revenue than t h e y do t o t o t a l 
c o s t . This of course assumes the u n d e r l y i n g , and standard 
motive of p r o f i t maximisation. Figure 3-2 i l l u s t r a t e s 
t h i s s i t u a t i o n f o r v a r i a b l e input f a c t o r 'a'. The 
monopsonist w i l l h i r e q u a n t i t y ' a j ; t h i s i s because 
at t h i s p o i n t the marginal revenue product of i n p u t 'a' 
( a d d i t i o n s t o t o t a l revenue), MRPa, i s equal t o t h e marginal 
cost of i n p u t 'a' ( a d d i t i o n s t o t o t a l c o s t ) , MCa. At the 
q u a n t i t y of 'a^, the monopsonist faces a p r i c e of 
'Ea' which i s t h e supply p r i c e of the f a c t o r . The excess. 
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F i g u r e 3-2 
Monopsonistic P r i c e and Employment 
Pa 
HO a 
Sa AC a 
Pa 
MRPa 
Qa 
of the marginal revenue product over the p r i c e p a i d "by the 
f i r m represents a monopsonistic p r o f i t of Pa2 - ?al» per 
u n i t . - This pure p r o f i t i s termed 'monopsonistic 
e x p l o i t a t i o n ' anS'- expression which i s grounded i n 
A.C. Pigou's argument t h a t t o pay a worker a wage 
which i s less than the value of h i s marginal p h y s i c a l . 
product of labour i s tantamount t o e x p l o i t a t i o n ; and 
i n t h i s case stems from the f a c t t h a t the? v a r i a b l e f a c t o r 
'a' i s p a i d l e s s than i t c o n t r i b u t e s t o t o t a l revenue.(9) 
As a f i n a l p o i n t , i t i s apparent t h a t the monopsonist 
also r e s t r i c t s the quantity employed of the f a c t o r i n 
r e l a t i o n t o what i t would be under more c o m p e t i t i v e 
c o n d i t i o n s . 
I t should be remarked t h a t J.S. Bain i n d i c a t e s t h a t 
instances of simple monopsony are i n f r e q u e n t l y enccuntQ^l 
i n product markets, and are more l i k e l y t o e x i s t i n labour 
markets.(10) ( i t i s p o s s i b l e t o speculate t h a t i f the 
American economy was c h a r a c t e r i s e d by the existence o f 
n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s , as i s the case i n the United Kingdom, 
he might have moderated t h a t assessment somewhat,). 
However, regardless 'of the extent of pure moriopsonistic 
s i t u a t i o n s , i t i s the o v e r a l l i m p l i c a t i o n s which are of 
importance, and i n terms of conduct and performance, these 
p r e d i c t ; u n i l a t e r a l p r i c e d e t e r m i n a t i o n by the b u y e r - w i t h 
a tendency to r e s t r i c t the q u a n t i t y purchased so t h a t the 
p r i c e of the f a c t o r i s depressed below what i t would have 
been under perfect c o m p e t i t i o n . 
Monopsonistic D i s c r i m i n a t i o n 
I n simple terms, p r i c e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a r i s e s 
when a commodity i s s o l d at d i f f e r e n t p r i c e s t o 
d i f f e r e n t people" .(11) On the "buying side t h i s can "be 
t r a n s l a t e d i n t o '"buying' a commodity at d i f f e r e n t p r i c e s 
from d i f f e r e n t people, and t h i s s e c t i o n deals w i t h two 
forms of monopsonistic d i s c r i m i n a t i o n - , f i r s t - a n d t h i r d 
degree d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . I n a n a l y s i n g these two forms 
of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , an attempt i s made t o describe t h e i r 
general relevance t o l a r g e buyer/smaller s u p p l i e r 
t r a d i n g r e l a t i o n s . 
F i r s t - d e g r e e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i s o f t e n described as 
'per f e c t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ' because i t represents a s i t u a t i o n 
i n which the buyer i s able t o separate each s u p p l i e r 
i n the market. Generally speaking, i f the monopsonist 
can p r a c t i s e f i r s t - d e g r e e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , he i s able t o 
increase h i s monopsony p r o f i t s . To describe how t h i s may 
occur r e q u i r e s the f o l l o w i n g t a b l e and graph which have 
been adapted from R. B i l a s ' book on microeconomic a n a l y s i s . ( 1 2 ) 
Table 3-1 
Monopscnistic D i s c r i m i n a t i o n 
Qa ACam=Pa TGam MCam TCaja MOap ACap 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 2 h 3 3 2 1.5 
3 3 9 5 6 3 2 
k h 16 7 10 k 2.5 25 9 15 5 3 
6 6 36 11 21 6 3.5 
7 n i U9 28 7 t k 
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The f i r s t two columns represent the supply schedule of 
the monopsonised resource 'a', and the next two columns 
may "be de r i v e d a c c o r d i n g l y . The s u b s c r i p t 'm' r e f e r s 
t o the market, w h i l e s u b s c r i p t 'p l r e f e r s t o p e r f e c t 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . The monopsonist's t o t a l cost under 
p e r f e c t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n (TCap) i s based upon the f a c t 
t h a t the f i r s t u n i t of 'a' w i l l be supplied f o r £1 w h i l e 
the second u n i t w i l l be supplied f o r £2; t o t a l cost f o r two 
u n i t s of resource 'a 1 i s £3. From Table 3-1 i t i s 
apparent t h a t the marginal cost of 'a' w i t h p e r f e c t 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i s the same as the average cost when 
the n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t o r y market s i t u a t i o n i s considered. 
I t i s assumed t h a t monopsonist's supply curve i s the 
h o r i z o n t a l summation of i d e n t i c a l i n d i v i d u a l ' s supply 
curves, then i t i s p o s s i b l e t o d e p i c t the s i t u a t i o n 
g r a p h i c a l l y as i n Figure 3-3. With a g i v e n marginal 
revenue product curve and w i t h o u t p e r f e c t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n 
the amount of 'am' i s su p p l i e d at the p r i c e of 'Pin'. 
Under p e r f e c t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n an amount of ' ap' i s s u p p l i e d 
at the p r i c e of 'P^'* a n (^ monopsony p r o f i t s increase Ajc^'-n 
from ' (MRPal-Pm)aa}' t o 1 (MRPa2~ P p - I n essence, ' y r£ 
under p e r f e c t monopsonistic d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , more of the 
p r o d u c t i v e resource i s employed at what amounts t o 
a lower p r i c e and monopsony p r o f i t s increase. 
I n a general sense the monopsonist e . . , w i l l s u b s t i t u t e 
i n p u t s whose p r i c e s r i s e s l o w l y (whose supplies are 
e l a s t i c ) f o r those whose p r i c e s r i s e more rar>idly w i t h 
q u a n t i t y , " ( 1 3 ) This statement c h a r a c t e r i s e s t h i r d - d e g r e e 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n which occurs i f the buyer".., i s able t o 
separate f a c t o r s i n t o sunmarkets i n which the supply 
F i g u r e 3-3 
F i r s t - D e g r e s Monopsonistic D i s c r i m i n a t i o n 
Pa 
MCam 
MCap AC am 
MRPa ACap 
MRPa 
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PP 
• 
MRPa 
Qa 
ap am 
curves- have d i f f e r e n t p r i c e e l a s t i c i t i e s of supply 
a t common p r i c e s and i f the monopsonistic buyer i s able 
t o keep the markets separate."(14) I t i s apparent 
t h a t t h i r d - d e g r e e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n represents a refinement 
of the simple d e f i n i t i o n of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n - g i v e n a t the 
begin n i n g ; f o r r a t h e r than buying the same q u a n t i t y 
at d i f f e r e n t p r i c e s , the.purchaser i s f a c i n g d i f f e r e n t 
- q u a n t i t i e s a t the same p r i c e from d i f f e r e n t s u p p l i e r s . 
Figure 3-4 g r a p h i c a l l y represents t h i r d - d e g r e e 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n f o r two submarkets,(15) I n t h i s case the 
monopsonist attempts t o equalise marginal costs i n 
the two submarkets, and he accomplishes t h i s by equating 
t h e . h o r i z o n t a l summation of the marginal cost curves 
f o r each submarket (£MC) w i t h h i s marginal revenue product 
curve (MRPa). I n f i g u r e 3~k the monopolist h i r e s a t o t a l 
q u a n t i t y of the resource equal t o an amount of 'a 1. Of the 
t o t a l amount 'a', 'a2' i s su p p l i e d from submarket 2 and a^ 
i s s u p p l i e d from submarket 1. Looking at the supply 
curves reveals t h a t the p r i c e p a i d i n submaris t 1 i s 
higher than t h a t p a i d i n submarket 2, and since the former 
submarket has a more e l a s t i c supply curve, t h i s i s t o be 
expected. R.A. B i l a s suggests t h a t t h i s s i t u a t i o n c o u l d 
occur i f the f a c t o r s i n submarket 1 had more a l t e r n a t i v e uses 
than those f a c t o r s i n the second submarket, e.g. the f a c t o r s 
i n the more e l a s t i c submarket may be s i t u a t e d i n a l o c a t i o n 
which i s more favourable f o r a l t e r n a t e employments.(16) 
Once again, monopsony p r o f i t s have been maximised w i t h i n 
the two submarkets., 
F i g u r e 3-4 
Third-Degree Monopsonistic D i s c r i m i n a t i o n 
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I n summarising, i t i s p o s s i b l e t o conclude t h a t i n 
l a r g e buyers/small s u p p l i e r t r a d i n g r e l a t i o n s , i t i s 
obv i o u s l y t o the buyer's advantage i f s u p p l i e r s are 
separated i n t o tv/o or more classes whose e l a s t i c i t i e s 
of supply d i f f e r . I t i s a l s o i n the buyer's i n t e r e s t s 
t o ensure t h a t , i f he holds a dominant p o s i t i o n 
s i m i l a r t o t h a t of the monopsonist, h i s s u p p l i e r s remain 
separated and d i f f e r e n t . 
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B i l a t e r a l Monopoly 
B i l a t e r a l monopoly represents a market s i t u a t i o n i n 
which a single s e l l e r i s confronted "by a single "buyer. 
In' a general sense the p r i n c i p l e s of b i l a t e r a l monopoly 
are s i m i l a r to those of "b i l a t e r a l oligopoly (several 
"buyers confronting several s e l l e r s )„ and so a review 
of the graphical analysis i s p a r t i c u l a r l y useful. 
Figure 3-5 represents the relevant curves 
under a s i t u a t i o n of " b i l a t e r a l monopoly.(17) The 
monopolist's marginal cost curve i s assumed to "be given 
"by 'S'. Subscript 's' depicts s e l l e r (monopolist), and 
subscript 'b' depicts buyer (raonopsonist)» The curve 
'S' thus shows at any price,, the price per uni t v/hich 
the buyer undertakes, and so i t represents the average 
cost curve of the buyer. Prom the buyer's average cost 
curve (ACb) i t i s possible to construct 'Sf :, his marginal 
cost curve (MCb). The monopsonist's marginal revenue 
product curve i s given and i s depicted by curve 'D'. 
Because the buyer would purchase quantitj.es on t h i s curve 
at f i x e d prices, i t also represents the monopolist's 
average revenue curve (ARs). Once again, by construction, 
i t i s possible to derive the s e l l e r ' s marginal revenue 
curve (MRs) v/hich i s depicted by 'D"e 
I t i s apparent i n Figure 3-5 that the monopolist w i l l 
maximise his p r o f i t s , at a pric e of 'Pa(y and w i t h a °~i 
quantity of 's^/- Per the monopsonist, p r o f i t maximisation 
occurs at the respective pri c e and q u a n t i t y levels. 'Pa!§/ and „ 
F i g u r e 3-5 
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' ag/'.. I n e f f e c t , the p r o f i t maximisation objectives of 
the two are inconsistent and because.each of the p a r t i e s 
wants t o charge a d i f f e r e n t p r i c e , bargaining ensues.(1.8) 
B i l a t e r a l bargaining implies that the better bargainer 
w i l l acquire the mere favourable terms and t h i s introduces 
the concept of indeterminacy int o the process. I n J.S. 
Bain's terms, the performance, that i s , p r i c e and output 
determination, i s established by the bargaining or negotiating 
conduct of the firms which are involved, and " t h e price 
arrived at being h y p o t h e t i c a l l y variable over a range 
admitting both super competitive and subcompetitive prices"(19) 
Aside from i t s value i n describing the p r i n c i p l e s of 
b i l a t e r a l s i t u a t i o n s ; the most s i g n i f i c a n t concept t o 
emerge from this- analysis i s the notion that when imperfect 
competition prevails on both sides of the market, bargaining 
may become the essential form of conduct, and the ultimate -
l e v e l of performance i s dependent upon the outcome of the 
bargaining process. The question which i s begged i s what 
determines the outcome? 
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Oligopsony. B i l a t e r a l Oligopoly and Countervailing Power 
I n t h i s section a review i s made of some of the general 
implications associated w i t h market structures i n which 
r e l a t i v e l y few large "buyers p r e v a i l . 
The f i r s t type of structure t o he. considered is. that 
of simple oligopsony. Under such conditions J.8. Bain 
suggests that large "buyers are l i k e l y t o exercise some 
degree of price c o n t r o l , v/hile on the atomistic s e l l i n g 
side of the market there i s no co n t r o l at a l l . (20) 
Depending upon the degree of buyer concentration, the overall 
tendency i s f o r the r e l a t i v e l y large "buyers to c o l l e c t i v e l y , 
depress the price to a l e v e l below that of a f u l l y atomistic 
market, and i n the process, t o r e s t r i c t purchases. Due 
to a dearth of empirical evidence on "buyer conduct Bain 
warns that "... dir e c t reference t o market performance is 
generally essential as a "basis f o r i n f e r r i n g the guiding 
aims of conduct."(21) Despite t h i s d i f f i c u l t y , he 
does off e r some general observations ahout t h i s s t r u c t u r a l 
s e t t i n g . 
With hi g h l y concentrated buying s i t u a t i o n s evidence 
often suggests e i t h e r t a c i t c o l l u s i o n of the price 
leadership v a r i e t y , or close interdependence i n buying 
price p o l i c i e s among the main buyers. Performance r e l a t e d 
evidence, which i s based cn either supplier's price-cost 
r a t i o s or hypothetical price l e v e l s , suggests the f o l l o w i n g : 
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"... a lowering of price roughly consistent 
w i t h the maximisation of the j o i n t p r o f i t s 
of the "buyers and l i t t l e independent or 
competitive action on the part of i n d i v i d u a l 
"buyers. "(22) 
With moderate buyer concentration and fa f r i n g e of 
small "buyers', Bain indicates that performance levels 
approach competitive ones and "buying price p o l i c i e s are 
influenced "by independent and competitive action among the 
"buyers. I n essence, i t can be concluded that the o v e r a l l 
tendency may be considered as cne with properties v/hich 
are monopsonistic i n nature. 
Turning to b i l a t e r a l , oligopoly, Bain states that due 
to 'countervailing power', which arises when large buyers 
confront large s e l l e r s , there may be a b l u n t i n g of both 
monopsonistic and monopolistic tendencies,(23) Thus, 
market conduct i s usually one of bargaining or negotiation 
and this" r e f l e c t s the 'active antagonism' of s e l l e r and buyer 
i n t e r e s t s . I n e f f e c t , the s i t u a t i o n i s somewhat s i m i l a r 
to that of b i l a t e r a l monopoly. For his review of b i l a t e r a l 
o l i g o p o l i s t i c conduct, Bain draws upon what he c a l l s 
'available evidence' to make a number of i n t e r e s t i n g points, 
which he warns, may not be generally, or universally 
applicable,(2i|.) The f i r s t point v/hich he makes concerns 
the usual outcomes emerging from the patterns of bargaining, 
and they are; that either a general, a l l transaction price 
emerges; or a variety of prices r e s u l t and these are paid 
j .l_.LJ.tAJw W J . LlU-CU*. J . wt.^ V I >^ ^ ^ J. -L±L J . . i U i V 1 U U.LA J . Li J. C2.J.J* O LA W U JU Ull-> • i . 11 v 
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l a t t e r s i t u a t i o n means t h a t , I n the absence of a general 
market p r i c e , there p r e v a i l s : u.,. a complex of d i f f e r e n t 
prices r e f l e c t i n g a sort of 'chaotic discrimination' i n 
price among.different buyers and d i f f e r e n t transactions."(25) 
The general implications of monopsonistic price discrimination 
have already been discussed and they were shown to favour 
the. larger buyer. 
A second s i g n i f i c a n t point als:o concerns the bargaining 
pa t t e r n . There i s apparently l i t t l e evidence to support 
the e x i s t e n c e of the ' c l a s s i c a l ' very few large firms 
on each side of a market a r r i v i n g at an agreed industry-
wide p r i c e . I n f a c t , the usual b i l a t e r a l oligopoly 
s i t u a t i o n i s one i n which there is a concentrated core of 
large firms on each side of the market, supplying or buying 
s i g n i f i c a n t i n d i v i d u a l shares of t o t a l supply; and 
numerous smaller s e l l e r s and buyers who i n d i v i d u a l l y 
account f o r r e l a t i v e l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t shares of t o t a l market 
supply. Under such ' t y p i c a l ' conditions, 3ain states that 
price determining market conduct and performance may be 
described as; 
"..„ a pattern of individual negotiations of 
single large buyers w i t h both large and small 
i n d i v i d u a l s e l l e r s , i n which bargaining 
or negotiation the large buyer uses h i s 
r e l a t i v e l y massive purchasing power as a 
lever t o secure more favourable prices, and 
i n which the s e l l e r s , as best they can, 
attempt to 'hold a l i n e ' on price., "(26) 
To some extent the bargaining power of the buyer may be 
lessened by the p r e v a i l i n g l e v e l of demand and capacity 
conditions. I n periods of low demand and excess capacity, 
the large buyer can usually expect price concessions, 
However, under conditions of high demand and f u l l 
capacity u t i l i s a t i o n , the large buyer's power can be 
expected t o be s i g n i f i c a n t l y c u r t a i l e d , but the 
general tendency i s s t i l l one of more favourable prices 
than those obtained by small buyers i n the market. As 
a relevant note; i t i s pointed out that the hypothesis 
has been advanced that the overall e f f e c t of b i l a t e r a l 
oligopoly negotiations should be to produce a price 
s i m i l a r to that which might p r e v a i l under roughly 
competitive conditions. The hypothesis, i t would appear, 
has l i t t l e i n the way of support.(27) 
I n the f i n a l analysis, i t i s possible to summarise by 
pointing out that the general tendency i s f o r oligopsony 
and b i l a t e r a l oligopoly to follow the same patterns as 
those of monopsony and b i l a t e r a l monopoly. Moreover, 
i t i s now possible to i d e n t i f y an apparent key factor i n 
the determination of the outcome of the bargaining process, 
that i s , trie use of 'massive purchasing power' as a 'lever'. 
I n the preceding but one paragraph, mention was made 
of the concept of 'countervailing power' as a phenomenon 
which might i n someway m i l i t a t e against the mis-allocations 
associated with b i l a t e r a l oligopoly. This would n a t u r a l l y 
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also "be related t o the use of purchasing power to gain 
advantage. This concept was explored and popularised 
"by J.K. Galbraith i n h i s early attempt to explain, i n 
a modern context, the mitigation, or regulation of 
economic power.(28) I n b r i e f , Professor Galbraith suggested 
that i n the market, competition mitigates economic power 
by ensuring that the behaviour of any one p a r t i c i p a n t i n the market, 
is . contingent- upon the behaviour of other and s i m i l a r 
p a r t i c i p a n t s . Thus; 
"The undoubted e f f e c t .is to l i m i t or dissolve 
the opportunity f o r a r b i t r a r y , or s e l f -
interested, or perhaps any e f f e c t i v e use 
of market power which would l i m i t or lower 
the r e a l income of others."(29) 
With the decay of independent market behaviour as a reasonable 
explanation of "... the operative mechanics by which the 
economy i s governed ..."(30), Galbraith argued that the gap 
had been f i l l e d by countervailing power. I n his paper which 
c r i t i c i s e s the theory, G.J. S t i g l e r summarises i t s basic 
tenet w i t h the fo l l o w i n g quotation:, which is taken from the 
1952 e d i t i o n of Galbraith's work: 
" I t comes to t h i s : Competition which, at least 
since the time of Adam Smith, has been viewed 
as the autonomous regulator of economic a c t i v i t y 
and as the only available regulatory mechanism 
apart from the state, has, i n f a c t , been 
superseded.„.* i n the t y p i c a l modern market of 
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few s e l l e r s , the active r e s t r a i n t i s provided 
not by competitors but from the other side of 
the market by strong buyers."(31) 
Thus, i n simple terms, b i l a t e r a l oligopoly was posited 
to represent a phenomenon which was imposing 'active 
r e s t r a i n t ' upon an economic system i n which competition 
v/as no longer exerting i t s t r a d i t i o n a l influence. 
One of S t i g l e r ' s fundamental c r i t i c i s m s of Galbraith's 
theory v/as that the empirical evidence could not support, 
the notion that there was a "... general tendency f o r 
new oligopolies and blocs of owners of productive resources 
to appear i n j u x t a p o s i t i o n .to established oligopolies,"(32) 
I n answering t h i s c r i t i c i s m Galbraith states that "... as 
w i t h competition, the r o l e of countervailing power i s 
uneven..." and i n any case, he had only intended to construct 
a p a r t i a l model.(33) A point which he reinforces i n the 
1956 revised e d i t i o n of his book, i n which he follows the 
1952, " I t comes to t h i s , , , " , quotation ( c i t e d above) w i t h 
the following curt statement: "' Competition s t i l l plays 
a role."(3U) This now meant t h a t , i n essence, the economic 
system was being described by Galbraith as an admixture of 
b i l a t e r a l o l i g o p o l i s t i c and competitive markets. 
The second maj o r ' c r i t i c i s m of Galbraith's theory • 
revolved around the thesis that countervailing power arose 
i n response t o monopolistic and o l i g o p o l i s t i c organisation 
of i n d u s t r i e s , and that. the power was "c... exercised i n such 
a way as-to preserve the economy from undue exactions and 
restraints."(33) 
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"The fa c t that a s e l l e r enjoys a measure of 
monopoly power, and is reaping a measure 
of monopoly r e t u r n as a r e s u l t , means that 
there i s an inducement t o those firms from 
whom he buys or those t o whom he s e l l s t o 
develop the power with which they can 
deBend themselves against e x p o l i t a t i o n . 
I t means also that there i s a reward 
to them, i n the form of a share of the 
gains of t h e i r opponents' market power, 
i f they are able t o do so. I n t h i s way 
the existance of market power creates an 
incentive t o the organisation of another 
p o s i t i o n of power that neutralizes i t . " ( 3 6 ) 
I n the above statement Galbraith appears to be implying that 
economic performance i s improved when a monopolist, or 
group of o l i g o p o l i s t s confront and attempt to share the 
gains of an established monopolist, or group of 
o l i g o p o l i s t s . Using the example of large r e t a i l organisations 
t h i s contention i s c i t e d by S t i g l e r as re s t i n g upon the 
premise that newly arrived o l i g o p o l i s t s use t h e i r opposing 
power t o reduce prices t o the consumer,(37) As S t i g l e r 
points out, and as preceding sections have shown, on the 
basis of e x i s t i n g economic theory, the expectations would 
be f o r b i l a t e r a l oligopoly to be r e l a t i v e l y monopolistic i n 
operation. So at the time of the debate over the e n t i r e 
concept. Galbraith himself was forced t o pose the question: 
- 65 -
"... as t o what eleemosynary i n s t i n c t causes the 
gains that are won "by the mass "buyer to be passed 
along to the consumer."(38) 
I n answering i t , he r e l u c t a n t l y confessed a. reliance upon • 
h i t h e r t o dismissed competition w i t h the f o l l o w i n g , 
t y p i c a l l y Galbraithian quip; 
"After a l l , i t i s a b i t embarrassing a f t e r 
one has j u s t murdered his motber-in-law 
to d i s i n t e r the lady and ask her to help 
do the cooking."(39) 
Witticisms apart, the theory was l e f t somewhat incomplete. 
I t s * rather roughly sketched s t r u c t u r a l parameters lacked ^ 
d e t a i l s , and p a r t i c u l a r l y , d e t a i l s which would explain 
why b i l a t e r a l oligopoly should eliminate and not simply 
r e d i s t r i b u t e monopoly gains. Such a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n would 
probably be based upon superior bargaining power. 
I t was not u n t i l over twenty years l a t e r , when 
Galbraith published his s i g n i f i c a n t l y altered view of the 
economic system, that i t became possible to determine what 
might have happened to his concept of countervailing power, 
and t o his somewhat incomplete theory of b i l a t e r a l o l i g o p o l i s t i c 
conduct, (';C) I n Economics and the Public Purpose, Galbraith 
paints with his c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y broad brush the p i c t u r e 
of a dual economy as f o l l o w s : -
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"No agreed l e v e l of assets or sales divides the 
mi l l i o n s of small firms which are h a l f the 
private economy from the handful of giant 
corporations which are the other h a l f . But 
there i s a sharp conceputal difference between 
the enterprise that i s f u l l y under the 
command of an i n d i v i d u a l and owes i t s 
success to t h i s circumstance and the f i r m which, 
without e n t i r e l y e l u d i n g the influence of 
in d i v i d u a l s , could not exist without 
organisation. This d i s t i n c t i o n , which 
may be thought of as separating the twelve 
m i l l i o n small firms from the one thousand 
giants, underlies the broad d i v i s i o n of 
the economy here employed. I t distinguishes 
what i s henceforth called the market system 
from what i s ca l l e d the planning system, e» (41) 
I n very general terms, Galbraith indicates that the market 
system may be characterised by the fo l l o w i n g elements: 
(a) Conformity i n broad outline to the neoclassical 
model of the f i r m , including, p r o f i t 
maximisation and an i n a b i l i t y to exercise 
e f f e c t i v e and r e l i a b l e c o n t r o l over 
production, prices and consumer behaviour. (Zj.2 ) 
(b) Earnings are u n l i k e l y t o exceed f o r very long 
a l e v e l which compensates the entrepreneur 
f o r his e f f o r t and c a p i t a l making him 
dependent upon external c a p i t a l . ( k 3 ) 
- 67 -
'(c) S e l f - e x p l o i t a t i o n "by the entrepreneur, 
defined i n terms of a lower r e t u r n 
than the economy generally provides for 
simi l a r e f f o r t , i s how the small f i r m 
competes against the organised sector 
and thus, survives, despite generally 
lower technical competence,[kk) 
While the planning system i s described by the 
following points: 
(a) Non-conformity t o the neoclassical model 
of the f i r m , including an a b i l i t y to increase 
size, c o n t r o l costs, technological processes, 
prices, demand and the s t a t e . ( k 5 ) 
(b) 'Collegial decision-making 1 by a technostructure 
which has been developed out of the need 
to organise s p e c i a l i s t functions.(46) (47) 
( c ) The need to protect i t s e l f from external 
interference and to c o n t r o l i t s . external 
environment which i s achieved through 
growth maximisation.(^8) 
(d) The reliance upon growth t o serve the 
pecuniary needs of a technostructure 
which e f f e c t i v e l y controls the f i r m (as 
d i s t i n c t from the shareholders which do 
not). (1+9) 
These general conditions, along w i t h t h e i r associated 
implications, and the fa c t that the planning system i s a 
part of the environment to which the market system i s 
subordinate, lead Galbraith t o point out that "... there 
i s a prima facie case that things w i l l work better f o r the 
planning system than f o r the market system."(50) This i s because 
the market system "buys at prices which are extensively 
determined "by the counterpart system, and must also s e l l 
an important part of i t s output at prices v/hich i t does 
not c o n t r o l . As a r e s u l t , S a l b r a i t h offers tViro hypotheses; 
"The termsof trade "between the two systems 
w i l l have an insouciant tendency to favour 
the system that controls i t s prices and 
costs and there with the prices and costs 
of the other system as w e l l . " and, 
"... unless there i s unimpeded m o b i l i t y between 
the two systems, (there) w i l l be i n e q u a l i t y 
of r e t u r n - a r e l a t i v e l y secure and favourable 
income f o r p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the planning system, 
a less secure and less favourable r e t u r n f o r 
those i n the market system."(51) 
I t i s w i t h i n the context of t h i s general view of the 
private economic sector that Galbraith discusses the 
purchasing behaviour of large f i r m buyers. 
In simple terms, Professor Galbraith indicates that the 
problem of the v e r t i c a l co-ordination of productions, i . e . 
the predictable and timely a c q u i s i t i o n of the factors of 
production, i s by and large solved i n the planning system 
through the use of contracts.(52) I n the neoclassical 
model, f a i l u r e s o f coordination are ac-conimodate^'fthrough price 
• movements which r e f l e c t the s h i f t s i n demand and supply.. 
- &9 ._ 
However, i n the system outlined "by Galbraith, the market 
mechnaism does not automatically ensure that a higher p r i c e 
w i l l ; "... r e l i a b l y accommodate supply t o need w i t h i n 
any predictable period of time, and t h i s i s especially so 
as. products, components, materjals and manpower become * 
more specialised and technical."(53) So the contract 
is c entral to understanding factor market buying behaviour -
but Galbraith states that the contract i s not compatible 
w i t h the neoclassical model. The reason f o r t h i s 
i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y i s that w i t h neoclassical assumptions 
firms attempt to a r r i v e at f i n a l prices which maximise 
p r o f i t s . Thus, w i t h i n the planning system, imperfectly 
competitive firms would negotiate as producers and 
suppliers under conditions v/hich would be s i m i l a r to that 
of a zero sum game. With goals of p r o f i t maximisation, 
negotiations; "... would be a time-consuming test of 
r e l a t i v e power, endurance and cu p i d i t y . "(5U-) I n f a c t , 
Galbraith has returned to the b i l a t e r a l oligopoly problem 
set out e a r l i e r i n the discussion of countervailing power. 
However, i n i t s new context, the problem f a i l s to a c t u a l l y 
materialise because "... negotiations have u l t i m a t e l y to 
do w i t h establishing" the l e v e l of cost or price v/hich 
maximises growth for both p a r t i c i p a n t s , " ( 5 5 ) Galbraith 
states that when buyers and s e l l e r s of roughjltly equal s i 
power-measured i n terms of need- negotiate, the prices and 
costs w i l l tend to be the same. I n short, the common 
goal of aales maximisation means t h a t , 'roughly speaking', 
the price which w i l l s a t i s f y both parties i s the same. 
Therefore, w i t h i n the planning system, mutually shared goals 
and i n t e r e s t s ensure r e l a t i v e l y easy contract negotiations, 
- 70 -
and the indeterminacy associated w i t h b i l a t e r a l oligopoly 
and p r o f i t maximisation, has been assumed i n t o o b l i v i o n . 
I n the ac q u i s i t i o n of f a c t o r s , when' the balance of 
power between the buyer and s e l l e r i s no longer equal, 
Galbraith suggests that a d i f f e r e n t outcome w i l l emerge. 
The important factor i s siaej f o r a large firm-has 
many a l t e r n a t i v e sources of supply and the smaller f i r m , 
r e l a t i v e l y , fewer. This means that the rel a t i o n s h i p and 
bargaining w i l l be unequal, and from t h i s i n i t i a l 
premise, Galbraith proceeds to the fol l o w i n g statement; 
"The large f i r m derives no advantage from 
negotiating a price lower than that at 
which the smaller f i r m can continue t o 
supply the product. A contract that i s 
so unfavourable or so i n f l e x i b l e that 
i t destroys the small f i r m i s s e l f -
defeating. The e f f e c t of power emerges 
i n the v/ay price i s graded t o need. The 
larger f i r m can calculate the income 
t h a t the smaller f i r m requires for 
su r v i v a l , and ' i t does so as a matter of. 
course ..... The consequence i s that 
a smaller f i r m doing business w i t h a 
larger one w i l l almost airways have i t s 
returns more nearly at the necessary 
minimum than the larger f i r m doing 
business with the smaller ones."(5o) 
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Furthermore, the presumption of i n e q u a l i t y of r e t u r n . i s 
f u r t h e r extended, i f the small f i r m does not c o n t r o l i t s ; 
p r i c e s or costs, and i f there are. circumstances which 
would prompt entrepreneurs and workers t o lower their- r a t e 
of r e t u r n i n order t o stay i n business, i . e 3 s e l f -
e x p l o i t a t i o n . Both c o n d i t i o n s , G a l b r a i t h has p o s i t e d , 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e the planning system from, the market system, 
and i n a d d i t i o n , the market system i s also l a r g e l y populated 
"oy small f i r m s . A l l of which leads Professor G a l b r a i t h t o 
the f o l l o w i n g c o n c l u s i o n : 
"The r e l a t i o n s h i p "between the p l a n n i n g and the 
market systems, t h e i r unequal r a t e of 
development, the e x p l o i t a t i o n of the second 
"by the f i r s t . , the r e s u l t i n g i n e q u a l i t y i n 
r e t u r n are c e n t r a l f e a t u r e s of the modern 
economy."(57) 
Turning f i r s t t o problem of b i l a t e r a l o l i g o p o l y , 
G a l b r a i t h appears t o have abandoned the p o s i t i v e connotations 
associated w i t h c o u n t e r v a i l i n g power by assuming away the 
existance of c o n f l i c t between lar g e buyers and s e l l e r s i n 
the p l a n n i n g system. The common goal of growth ensures 
not only smooth n e g o t i a t i o n s , b u t the establishment of a 
p r i c e which s a t i s f i e s t h i s goal f o r b o t h p a r t i e s . I t i s 
not the exercise of power which i s n e u t r a l i s e d , b u t the 
existance of c o n f l i c t i t s e l f . Since Professor G a l b r a i t h once 
again f a i l s t o provide d e t a i l s , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o 
understand e x a c t l y why t h i s harmony of i n t e r e s t s should e x i s t , 
I n a d i s c u s s i o n concerning the t h r e e d i f f e r e n t o b j e c t i v e s 
of the f i r m , t h a t i s , p r o f i t , growth and sales maximisation, 
J.H. Williamson i n d i c a t e s t h a t any f i r m successfully-
pursuing any of the three goals w i l l also attempt t o 
s a t i s f y c e r t a i n e f f i c i e n c y c o n d i t i o n s . ( 5 8 ) Included 
amongst these c o n d i t i o n s i s the selaction o f ' l e a s t - c o s t 
i n p u t combinations'. I n h i s review of growth theory, and 
h i s synthesis of the main arguments of i t s two p r i n c i p l e 
proponents, W. Baumol and R. Ma r r i s , J.R. Wildsmi t h 
p o i n t s out t h a t dynamic growth r e q u i r e s a c t i o n s "by f i r m s 
which s h i f t demand curves and increase product ranges,(59) 
This i s accomplished through expenditure on research, 
development and marketing and these t o t a l development costs, 
increase w i t h f i r m s i z e * Moreover, not only i s t h i s growth-
c r e a t i n g expenditure an i n c r e a s i n g f u n c t i o n of the growth 
r a t e , hut i t i s also subject t o d i m i n i s h i n g e f f e c t i v e n e s s . 
On the basis of these two referenes alone, i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
t o see why a buyer should not press f o r the lowest i n p u t 
costs which he can achieve, and a s e l l e r f o r the h i g h e s t 
p r i c e . A f t e r c i t i n g the s e l l e r ' s a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l h i s 
p r i c e as a f e a t u r e of h i s power i n the economy, Professor 
G a l b r a i t h then appears t o suggest t h a t when he i s c o n f r o n t e d 
w i t h a large p l a n n i n g system buyer, he i s not only u n w i l l i n g 
b u t also lacks the i n c e n t i v e , t o e x e r c i s e t h i s power. The 
reverse s i t u a t i o n can be s a i d t o apply t o the p l a n n i n g 
system buyer- \vho i t was p o s i t e d can c o n t r o l h i s costs. 
I n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , t h i s l a c k of consistency between 
o b j e c t i v e s , and i n behaviour, remains unexplained. 
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I t i s of course d i f f i c u l t t o comment upon the 
general, or aggregative e f f e c t s of t r a d i n g between the 
pl a n n i n g and market systems, and also the n o t i o n of 
e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l s e l f - e x p l o i t a t i o n presented by G a l b r a i t h , 
However, on the basis of what has p r e v i o u s l y been reviewed 
i n t h i s s e c t i o n , i t i s p o s s i b l e t o co n f i r m t h a t on a micro, 
or i n d i v i d u a l f i r m l e v e l , the r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n a l a r g e 
i m p e r f e c t l y c o m p e t i t i v e buyer and a r e l a t i v e l y smaller 
c o m p e t i t i v e s u p p l i e r , w i l l tend towards monopsonistic 
e x p l o i t a t i o n . This would c e r t a i n l y reduce the p o s s i b i l i t y 
t h a t the entrepreneur w i l l earn a pure or economic p r o f i t . 
Thus, t o the extent t h a t t h e f i r m ' s t o t a l revenue continued 
t o cover i t s t o t a l costs, G-aibraith's c o n t e n t i o n t h a t the 
entrexjreneur i s j u s t compensated f o r h i s e f f o r t and c a p i t a l 
would appear t o be reasonable.(60) 
A concluding comment about G-albraith's view of f a c t o r 
market buying behaviour concerns the use of c o n t r a c t s . 
I n an a r t i c l e concerning supply c o n t r a c t s and t h e i r use 
i n the G a l b r a i t h i a n p l a n n i n g system, K.J. B l o i s presents 
somewhat anecdotal evidence wnich suggests t h a t s u p p l i e r s 
are o f t e n bound t o t h e i r customers t o such a degree t h a t 
t h e i r a c t i o n s extend beyond the con d i t i o n s set out i n 
t h e i r c o n t r a c t s . ( 6 1 ) I n simple terras, the a b i l i t y of the 
customer t o make s p e c i a l demands upon tne s u p p l i e r w i l l 
depend upon the importance of the customer t o the s u p p l i e r . 
I f the s u p p l i e r i s p a r t i c u l a r l y responsive to customer 
demands, t h i s may also l e a d t o the s h o r t - r u n a b s o r b t i o n 
of costs a r i s i n g from the customer's problems. Thus, 
B l o i s ends as f o l l o v / s : -
"...the supplier/customer r e l a t i o n i s 
•sometimes one where t r o u b l e s are shared 
and perhaps t h i s i s the basis of 'the 
e s s e n t i a l mechanism f o r the c o - o r d i n a t i o n 
of p r o d u c t i o n plans by d i f f e r e n t f i r m s 
i n the plan n i n g system' and not 'the 
c o n t r a c t ' . " ( 6 2 ) 
The Large Firm and I m p e r f e c t l y Competitive Suppliers 
. Thus f a r the a n a l y s i s has mainly centred around 
market s i t u a t i o n s i n which l a r g e "buyers are confronted 
e i t h e r "by e q u a l l y as l a r g e s e l l e r s , or numerous a t o m i s t i c 
or p e r f e c t l y c o m p e t i t i v e s e l l e r s . I n t h i s s e c t i o n the 
aim i s t o review some of the key elements which may 
emerge when d i f f e r e n t i a t e d products are s o l d under 
c o n d i t i o n s o f imperfect c o m p e t i t i o n t o one or a few 
l a r g e "buyers. The l a r g e "buyers themselves, i t w i l l be 
assumed, have a s i g n i f i c a n t degree of c o n t r o l i n t h e i r 
forward markets, and als o r e - s e l l the products they buy 
a f t e r they have converted, processed or handled them. 
The fundamental d i s t i n c t i o n under t h i s type of market s t r u c t u r e 
i s t h a t the s e l l e r s are i m p e r f e c t l y c o m p e t i t i v e , but not 
i n a p o s i t i o n t o challenge the l a r g e buyer, as described 
i n the case of c o u n t e r v a i l i n g power. The discussion which 
f o l l o w s i s based upon a paper by M.A. Adelman.(63) 
The f i r s t s i g n i f i c a n t p o i n t t o be made by Adelman 
concerns the l a r g e buyer's p o s t u l a t e d tendency t o lower the 
p r e v a i l i n g market p r i c e f o r the f a c t o r product i n questi o n , 
This tendency i s n o t - e n t i r e l y due t o the l a r g e f i r m ' s 
b a r g a i n i n g power - but r a t h e r i t i s a t t r i b u t e d t o the f i r m s 
a b i l i t y t o survey a wider spectrum of p o s s i b l e sources of 
supply and thus, be aware of the best o f f e r s . Once i t has 
completed i t s search, i t i s presumed t h a t the l a r g e 
buyer w i l l e i t h e r buy at the lower p r i c e s , or present 
e x i s t i n g s u p p l i e r s w i t h the o f f e r s i n order t o n e g o t i a t e 
e q u a l l y good terms. Because the l a r g e buyer would i n e f f e c t 
"be buying at a lower than average p r i c e , i t would "be making 
an ' a r b i t r a g e p r o f i t ' , which would be r e f l e c t e d i f i t 
r e - s o l d i t s purchases t o i t s competitors,' T h i s , Adelman 
i n d i c a t e s , would bring.about b e n e f i c i a l and r a p i d market 
response: 
."...«. f o r a r b i t r a g e i s the t r a d i t i o n a l means 
of d i f f u s i n g knowledge and b r i n g i n g about 
a. s i n g l e p r i c e , or a smaller spread o f p r i c e s . 
The p r i c e or the average o f p r i c e s , which 
f i n a l l y p r e v a i l e d , would be lower than i f the 
l a r g e buyer had not operated."(6U) 
Adelman concludes h i s argument by n o t i n g t h a t w h i l e market 
coverage i n v o l v e s costs, which may not make i t w o r t h w h i l e 
• t o undertake the search, i n those cases where a 
department already e x i s t s , t h e i r more i n t e n s i v e use 
would mean "... a smaller u n i t burden of . i n d i v i d u a l and 
s o c i a l overhead."(65) B r i e f l y summarised, i t would seem 
t h a t the whole process r e l i e s upon the la r g e buyer undertaking 
market search a c t i v i t y , and some i n v e s t i g a t o r s have suggested 
t h a t t h i s may not i n f a c t occur. I n t h e i r study of i n d u s t r i a l 
buyers of machine t o o l s , Cunningham and White found t h a t 
low. buyer search f o r c o m p e t i t i v e o f f e r i n g s occured i n at l e a s t 
one t h i r d of the purchases s t u d i e d , and t h a t t h i s non-
e x i s t e n t shopping behaviour was s u b s t a n t i a l l y more p r e v a l e n t 
i n l a r g e r a t h e r than small firms.(66) This f i n d i n g was' 
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a t t r i b u t e d t o the r e l a t i v e l a c k of importance of the 
purchases i n r e l a t i o n t o the t o t a l c a p i t a l expenditure 
"budget, and the r e c o g n i t i o n by la r g e f i r m s of the 
h i g h cost of search. I t would appear t h e r e f o r e , t h a t 
t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 'advantage' of l a r g e buyers a c t i o n s 
cannot ' be accepted w i t h o u t r e s e r v a t i o n s , and t h a t 
reference probably has t o be made t o the a c t u a l types 
of buyer conduct under c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 
.. I n s p i t e of the p r i c e l e v e l l i n g tendencies associated 
w i t h l a r g e buyer search, Adelman suggests t h a t the buyer 
w i l l u s u a l l y be confronted w i t h an array of p r i c e s from 
d i f f e r e n t suppliers.. This may be represented g r a p h i c a l l y 
as f o l l o w s i n Figure 3-b. The d i f f e r e n t p r i c e s , or t o the 
buyer, costs w i l l occur f o r v a r i o u s reasons; f o r example, 
the r e l a t i v e l y stronger b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n of some of 
the s u p p l i e r s , distance costs, or the r e l a t i v e 
u n s u i t a b i l i t y of some products. Under c o n d i t i o n s 
approximating p e r f e c t c o m p e t i t i o n on the buying 
s i d e , the hi g h e s t p r i c e would be the one which ensured 
s u f f i c i e n t supplies and so i t would be pai d t o a l l the 
s u p p l i e r s . I n e f f e c t , the lower-cost s u p p l i e r s 
As B and Cs would rece i v e an 'economic r e n t ' represented 
by the shading i n Figure 3-6. Under' c o n d i t i o n s i n 
which the buyer i s able t o d i s c r i m i n a t e or separate i t s 
Figure 3-6 
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s u p p l i e r s , " .... i t w i l l push down the p r i c e p a i d 
t o each one toward the necessary minimum needed t o 
b r i n g f o r t h the necessary supply or, on a longer 
p e r s p e c t i v e , needed t o keep the s u p p l i e r i n 
business.'-(67) Figure 3-7 represents the 
various a l t e r n a t i v e s g r a p h i c a l l y and .in a 
f a m i l i a r form. P e r f e c t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i s i n d i c a t e d 
by p o i n t '3' ( d i s c r i m i n a t i n g monopsony). Po i n t '2* 
i n d i c a t e s monopsony or imperfect c o m p e t i t i o n , and 
p o i n t '1', p e r f e c t c o m p e t i t i o n . The l i m i t i n g 
r e s u l t , f3', reveals an output l e v e l e q u i v a l e n t t o 
t h a t of p e r f e c t c o m p e t i t i o n , '1', but a t a lower average 
p r i c e . Adelman states t h a t w h i l e i t may not be 
p o s s i b l e f o r the buyer t o achieve p e r f e c t d i s c r i m -
i n a t i o n , the f a c t remains t h a t i n the absence of the 
l a r g e buyer i n the market the r e s t i l t would tend towards 
a higher p r i c e and lower output. I n e f f e c t , Adelman's 
a n a l y s i s confirm's Bain's d e s c r i p t i o n of the p a t t e r n s 
of b a r g a i n i n g conduct which r e s u l t i n the emergence 
of a complex of d i f f e r e n t p r i c e s . Moreover, the a n a l y s i s 
a l s o supports G a l u r a i t h ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t the l a r g e r 
f i r m c a l c u l a t e s the income the s u p p l i e r r e q u i r e s f o r 
s u r v i v a l and grades the p r i c e s a c c o r d i n g l y . 
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However, i n Adelman's terms t h e l a r g e buyer has a 
genuinely p o s i t i v e r o l e t o p l a y i n t h e exercise of i t s 
market power. Ke suggests t h a t i f the s u p p l i e r i s 
induced t o d i s c r i m i n a t e i n order t o capture the l a r g e 
"block of the buyer's business, then t h i s w i l l i n g n e s s t o 
lower p r i c e s may imply one or two f a c t o r s : 
( a ) the s u p p l i e r has an unused c a p a c i t y t o 
pr'oduce a t costs which are below 
p r e v a i l i n g p r i c e s , and/or, 
( b ) the a d d i t i o n a l output would lower the 
s u p p l i e r ' s average u n i t coats. 
I n the f i n a l analysis., the- l a r g e buyer may have increased 
t o t a l output and lowered the average cost and average 
revenue o f the "encouraged" s e l l e r . Another b e n e f i c i a l 
e f f e c t a t t r i b u t e d t o l a r g e buyer conduct r e l a t e s t o 
Adelman's statement t h a t j 
" I n imperfect markets ... the c h i e f economic 
f u n c t i o n of sporadic d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s i s t o 
i n i t i a t e g eneral p r i c e reductions,."(68) 
These p r i c e r e d u c t i o n s are f e l t t o be d e s i r a b l e and they 
occur because of the d i f f i c u l t y i n keeping s p e j ^ a l bargains 
a. s e c r e t , and the g e n e r a l l y r a p i d r e a c t i o n s o f f i r m s 
o p e r a t i n g i n i m p e r f e c t l y c o m p e t i t i v e markets t o competitor^ 
p r i c e changes. I n s h o r t , inducing s e l l e r s t o d i s c r i m i n a t e 
tends t o reduce some of t h e i r a l l o c a t i v e i m p e r f e c t i o n s , but 
i t i s notable that;, thus f a r , the f a c t o r goods buyers have 
been the only b e n e f i c i a r i e s . Another area i n r h i c h the l a r g e 
buyer exercises i n f l u e n c e i s r e l a t e d -co the s u p p l i e r ' s 
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s e l l i n g costs and product d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n a c t i v i t i e s . 
Adeiman contends t h a t , '*e.. a d v e r t i s i n g d i r e c t e d t o 
"business f i r m s may s p o t l i g h t the u t i l i t y of the product, 
"but cannot 'create? i t " , and t h i s i s because "... the 
f i r m i s a ' r a t i o n a l 1 buyer."(69) This means t h a t due t o 
the tendency f o r the l a r g e buyer 'to t e s t and compare', 
the s u p p l i e r ' s s e l l i n g and a d v e r t i s i n g campaigns may 
achieve no more than a maintenance of market share a t 
increased cost and. p r i c e s t r u c t u r e . The a b i l i t y of the 
l a r g e buyer t o provide l a r g e blocks of business means t h a t , : 
by dispensing w i t h a d v e r t i s i n g and sales promotion, a 
lower p r i c e may be o f f e r e d , and i f the expense saving 
exceeds the p r i c e r e d u c t i o n , both p a r t i e s b e n e f i t . I n 
e f f e c t , as Adelman p o i n t s out, "C. under the presjftre of 
s t r o n g buyers the market i s back t o p r i c e c o m p e t i t i o n , " (70) 
and i f the buyer's p o s i t i o n i s extremely s t r o n g , i t may 
be able to o b t a i n the i n p u t at cost plus a f i x e d fee or 
percentage, which i t r e g u l a t e s . 
I n simple terms Adslman's a n a l y s i s perceives the r o l e 
of the dominant buyer as making i t s s u p p l i e r s ' demand 
curves h i g h l y e l a s t i c s and l a r g e buyer b a r g a i n i n g power is; 
seen as, -
I : , . , a. symptom and o f t e n a c o r r e c t i v e where 
the excess c a p a c i t y and the gap between 
marginal and average cost would otherwise 
be u n d e s i r a b l y l a r g e r " ( 7 1 ) 
The f i r s t q u estion wnich is. "begged by Adelman 1 s a n a l y s i s 
i s * e s s s i i s § s B ^ of S t i g l e r ' s c r i t i c i s m of G a l b r a i t h ' s 
concepts, and that; i s , v/nat happens t o a l l > o f the 
surpluses which the l a r g e buyer absorbs from i t s s u p p l i e r s ? 
A second q u e s t i o n which i s a l s o begged, and which i s of 
fundamental importance t o t h i s t h e s i s , i s wnat are 
the long-term dependency i m p l i c a t i o n s of t r a d i n g 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n which l a r g e buyers dominate t h e i r 
s u p p l i e r s ? 
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Two E m p i r i c a l Studies on Factor Market Concentration 
Most of the m a t e r i a l covered i n t h i 3 chapter has 
"been of a t h e o r e t i c a l n a t u r e , w i t h the p o s s i b l e exception 
of Bain's review of buyer c o n c e n t r a t i o n which wa3 b r o a d l y 
based upon an e m p i r i c a l background. The purpose of t h i s 
s e c t i o n i s t o review the f i n d i n g s o f two e m p i r i c a l 
s t u d i e s wnich deal w i t h f a c t o r market and buyer 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n , and t o evaluate the extent t o which 
they c o n f i r m the t h e o r e t i c a l p r e d i c i t i o n s presented above. 
The f i r s t study t o be reviewed i s C o l l i n s and Preston's 
t e s t i n g o f s e v e r a l structure-performance hypotheses.(72 ) 
The study uses U.S. census of p r o d u c t i o n f i g u r e s and other 
American based data. For t h e i r performance measure the 
authors used the percentage p r i c e - c o s t margin, which they 
assumed was an i n d i c a t o r of the a b i l i t y o f the f i r m s i n 
a p a r t i c u l a r i n d u s t r y t o achieve p r i c e s i . e . , revenues, 
i n excess of average c o s t s . I n pure economic the o r y , 
resources are a l l o c a t e d e f f i c i e n t l y when the long-run 
s e l l i n g p r i c e equals the long-run marginal c o s t . For. 
e m p i r i c a l work, marginal costs must be estimated from 
average costs, and t h e r e f o r e , the e m p i r i c a l 
c r i t e r i o n of a l l o c a t - i v e e f f i c i e n c y i s an average p r i c e -
cost r a t i o approaching unity 0"(-73) T h e i r measure of 
market s t r u c t u r e was t h e f o u r - f i r m c o n c e n t r a t i o n r a t i o 
f o r f o u r - d i g i t i n d u s t r i a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s . 
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I n general terms, t h e a u t h o r s ' f e l t t h a t producer 
goods markets would d i f f e r from consumer goods markets f o r 
a number, of reasons. E s s e n t i a l l y , producer goods markets 
might "be expected t o ahow g r e a t e r c o n c e n t r a t i o n on the 
"buying . side and a g r e a t e r use o f o b j e c t i v e purchasing 
c r i t e r i a , 3uch as, q u a l i t y s p e c i f i c a t i o n s . This would a l s o 
mean a lower degree o f emphasis on product d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n 
than consumer goods markets. Thus, t o t h e ext e n t t h a t i t 
wa3 a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t the two types of markets would d i f f e r , 
producer goods markets would appear t o be 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d by g r e a t e r knowledge and 
b a r g a i n i n g power on the side of buyers, and 
t h e r e f o r e by a narrower range or p r i c e 
d i s c r e t i o n on the side of s e l l e r s , as 
compared t o consumer goods markets w i t h 
e q u i v a l e n t levels, of c o n c e n t r a t i o n . "(74-) 
G.J. S t i g l e r has expressed a rough i n d i c a t i o n of the same 
c o n t e n t i o n by n o t i n g t h a t on the basis of somewhat scanty 
e m p i r i c a l evidence, no i n d u s t r i e s which were experiencing 
high r a t e s of r e t u r n on t h e i r investments were conf r o n t e d 
by only a few buyers.(75J i n any event, C o l l i n s and 
Preston's s t a t i s t i c a l r e s u l t s revealed ' s t r i k i n g ' 
d i f f e r e n c e s betv/een the producer and consumer goods 
i n d u s t r y market c a t e g o r i e s . For t h e i r r e g r e s s i o n a n a l y s i s , 
i n which c o n c e n t r a t i o n was. one of the independent 
v a r i a b l e s , the authors found t h a t the r e g r e s s i o n c o - e f f i c i e n t 
f o r consumer goods i n d u s t r i e s was much higher than t h a t 
f o r producer. The Upvalues revealed t h a t 26 percent of the 
v a r i a t i o n s i n which p r i c e - c o s t margins of the consumer 
goods i n d u s t r i e s could "be explained by c o n c e n t r a t i o n , 
but t h a t f o r the producer goods i n d u s t r i e s , the e q u i v a l e n t 
value was only k p e r c e n t . On the basis o f t h e i r 
o bservations, C o l l i n s and Preston suggest t h a t the 
d i f f e r e n c e s between the two types of i n d u s t r i e s , 
as r e f l e c t e d i n the concentration-margins r e l a t i o n s h i p , 
" e o o i s s t r o n g l y a f f e c t e d by the balance of b u y e r - s e l l e r 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s across markets and by d i f f e r e n c e s i n 
marketing o r g a n i s a t i o n and methods."(76) 
As. a general observation, the f i n d i n g s of t h i s study 
may i n d i c a t e t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e s i n the p r i c e - c o s t margins 
may be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e importance of buyer c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
and other r e l a t e d f a c t o r s which fltffect the demand f o r 
producer goods. I n a d d i t i o n , the r e s u l t s may f u r n i s h 
i n d i r e c t evidence of a prevalence of l a r g e buyers who, 
us i n g Adelman's framework, may be able t o d i s c r i m i n a t e 
among i m p e r f e c t l y c o m p e t i t i v e s u p p l i e r s and thus, lower 
t h e i r economic r e n t s . Using G a l b r a i t h ' s concepts, such a 
d i s p a r i t y i n r e t u r n s would occur i f the buyers of the 
producer goods were r e l a t i v e l y powerful f i r m s i n the 
pl a n n i n g system. Speculation aside, i t , i s not unreasonable 
to p o s i t t h a t C o l l i n s and Preston's f i n d i n g s may simply 
r e f l e c t among other t h i n g s , the r e l a t i v e b a r g a i n i n g power 
which f a c t o r market buyers g e n e r a l l y possess i n r e l a t i o n 
t o t h e i r s u p p l i e r s . 
The second study t o "be reviewed i s S. Lustgarten's 
s t a t i s t i c a l examination of the i n f l u e n c e o f buyer 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n i n manufacturing i n d u s t r i e s . ( 7 7 ) I n h i s study, 
L u s t g a r t e n c a l c u l a t e s measures of buyer s t r u c t u r e using 
f o u r - d i g i t SIC manufacturing product markets from i n p u t -
output t a b l e s and c o r r e l a t e s them w i t h measures of s e l l e r 
s t r u c t u r e , conduct and performance. The data were once 
again based upon the American economy. For h i s a n a l y s i s 
of buyer s t r u c t u r e , L u s t g a r t e n uses a number of d i f f e r e n t 
measures; each of which i s based upon a d i f f e r e n t 
t h e o r e t i c a l premise. The f i r s t measure of buyer s t r u c t u r e 
i s simple buyer c o n c e n t r a t i o n , t h a t i s , an average 
f o u r - f i r m c o n c e n t r a t i o n r a t i o of consuming i n d u s t r i e s 
weighted by the importance of the consuming i n d u s t r i e s ' 
purchases i n r e l a t i o n t o the o v e r a l l sales of the producing 
i n d u s t r y . As might be expected, the t h e o r e t i c a l p r e d i c t i o n 
i n t h i s case was t h a t concentrated buyers w i l l i m p a i r the 
a b i l i t y o f even o l i g o p o l i s t i c s e l l e r s t o m a i n t a i n p r i c e s 
above marginal costs, and thus, i t i s l i k e l y . t h a t s e l l e r s 
w i l l experience lower p r o f i t a b i l i t y . Buyer c o n c e n t r a t i o n 
v/as regressed against the same measure of s e l l e r performance 
used by C o l l i n s and Preston, t h a t i s , i n d u s t r y p r i c e - c o s t 
margins, and the r e s u l t s revealed t h a t a negative r e l a t i o n s h i p 
e x i s t e d between the two. The next two measures o f buyer 
s t r u c t u r e examined by L u s t g a r t e n were order s i z e and 
r e l a t i v e f i r m s i z e , and these were c a l c u l a t e d using s t a t i s t i c a l 
averaging techniques. I n a t h e o r e t i c a l sense, i t was f e l t 
t h a t l a r g e orders probably j u s t i f y the costs o f search f o r a 
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lower c o s t s u p p l i e r , and v e r y l a r g e orders might re a c h 
minimum e f f i c i e n t s c a l e of production s i z e , thus r a i s i n g 
the s p e c t r e of "backward v e r t i c a l integration,. I f the 
"buyer was r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e r than the s e l l e r , t h i s was 
a l s o f e l t l i k e l y t o i n f l u e n c e s e l l e r performance,, As 
p o s t u l a t e d , order s i z e and r e l a t i v e "buyer s i z e were 
n e g a t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h s e l l e r price-cjS^/t margins. The 
f i n a l measure of "buyer s t r u c t u r e d e a l t v/ith "by L u s t g a r t e n 
was the s e c t o r d i s p e r s i o n of "buyers, that i s , "... degree 
to which buying fi r m s are c l u s t e r e d i n a few i n d u s t r i e s 
or spread out i n many d i f f e r e n t s e c t o r s of the economy." ( 7 8 ) 
The t h e o r e t i c a l "basis behind t h i s measure l a y ^ t h e 
premise t h a t the buyer's b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n i s enhanced by 
h i s knowledge of c u r r e n t market c o n d i t i o n s . Thus, i f 
buying f i r m s are c e n t r e d i n a very few i n d u s t r i e s , and 
not spread throughout many, they are l i k e l y to have more 
information about demand c o n d i t i o n s and to be mere e f f e c t i v e 
b a r g a i n e r s . Once again, the r e s u l t s confirmed the t h e o r e t i c a l 
p r e d i c t i o n , as buyer d i s p e r s i o n was n e g a t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d 
w i t h s e l l e r p r i c e - c o s t margins. 
A r a t h e r i n t e r e s t i n g s i d e - l i g h t of L u s t g a r t e n 1 s study 
isi h i s t e s t of one aspect of the theory of c o u n t e r v a i l i n g 
power, and that i s , t h a t high s e l l e r c o n c e n t r a t i o n induces 
buyers to grow l a r g e . L u s t g a r t e n c o r r e l a t e d h i s inflftbi'tia-
of buyer c o n c e n t r a t i o n w i t h e x i s t i n g i n d i c i a a of s e l l e r 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n and found t h a t t h e r e was a p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n 
between the two. 
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L u s t g a r t e n concludes h i s paper w i t h the statement 
t h a t h i s a n a l y s i s of buyer s t r u c t u r e r e p r e s e n t s a d d i t i o n a l 
e m p i r i c a l evidence 7/hioh supports e x i s t i n g t h e o r i e s 
i n i n d u s t r i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n . While h i s s t a t i s t i c a l 
manipulations appear somewhat arduous, the b a s i c 
i m p l i c a t i o n s are t h e o r e t i c a l l y consistent and s i g n i f i c a n t , 
i n t h a t they go some way towards d e s c r i b i n g the types of 
buyer c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and demand c o n d i t i o n s which C o l l i n s 
and P r e s t o n i n d i c a t e may e x p l a i n the p a t t e r n s of 
a s s o c i a t i o n d i s c o v e r e d i n t h e i r a n a l y s i s of producer 
goods markets„ 
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C o n c l u s i o n 
The aim of t h i s chapter was to review the l a r g e buyer 
and buyer c o n c e n t r a t i o n w i t h i n the framework of e s t a b l i s h e d 
economic theory in. order t o i l l u s t r a t e two p o i n t s . 
The f i r s t point was to show t h a t l a r g e buying u n i t 
behaviour tends to r e i n f o r c e the a n t i - r e g r e s s i v e i n f l u e n c e s 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h i n c r e a s i n g l e v e l s of c o n c e n t r a t i o n . I n b r i e f 
terms, a review of the v a r i o u s forms of buyer market s t r u c t u r e s 
has r e v e a l e d the f o l l o w i n g matrix of a s s o c i a t i o n s : 
Table 5-2 
Matrix of F a c t o r Market P r e d i c i t o n s 
Buyer Market 
S t r u c t u r e 
P r i c e 
Determination P r i c e Quantity P r o f i t 
a ) Simple 
Monopsony 
U n i l a t e r a l 
b ) Monopsonistic U n i l a t e r a l 
F i r s t Degree 
D i s c r i m -
i n a t i o n 
Below 
compet-
i t i v e 
Lower 
than i n 
( a ) 
R e s t r i c t e d Monppsonisti 
e x p l o i t a t i o r : 
G r a t e r than G r e a t e r 
i n ( a ) monopsonistii 
e x p l o i t a t i o r 
c ) Monopsonistic U n i l a t e r a l 
T h i r d Degree 
D i s c r i m -
i n a t i o n 
d) Simple Degree of 
Oligopsony p r i c e 
c o n t r o l 
d) B i l a t e r a l 
Monopoly 
Below 
compet-
i t i v e 
R e s t r i c t e d Monopsonisti 
e x p l o i t a t i o n 
L i k e l y t o R e s t r i c t e d 
be below 
compet-
i t i v e . 
A b s orbtion 
of surpluses 
by buyer, 
f ) B i l a t e r a l 
O ligopoly (. Ba r g a i n i n g behaviour w i t h performance ' determined by s u p e r i o r power. 
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I n a d d i t i o n , the a n a l y s i s has a l s o examined J.K. 
G a l b r a i t h ' s n e o - I n s t i t u t i o n a l approach to the l a r g e f i r m ' s 
operations i n f a c t o r markets, and h i s contentions t h a t the 
terms of trade tend to favour the l a r g e f i r m , and t h a t 
the l a r g e f i r m may, when i t i s a b l e , s e t p r i c e s which 
are only s u f f i c i e n t to keep i t s s u p p l i e r s i n "business. I n 
M.A. Adelman's paper i t was r e v e a l e d t h a t the l a r g e buyer 
may, i n theory, reduce and. absorb t h e i r i m p e r f e c t l y 
competitive s u p p l i e r s ' economic r e n t s , s e t p r i c e s at l e v e l s 
which would only ensure t h e i r s u p p l i e r ' s s u r v i v a l , and even 
make t h e i r supply curves more e l a s t i c ( a genuine advantage 
as r e v e a l e d i n the review of t h i r d - d e g r e e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ) . 
The two e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s reviewed provided evidence t h a t 
f i r m s i n producer goods markets cou l d not achieve comparable 
p r i c e - c o s t margins, w i t h the same l e v e l s of c o n c e n t r a t i o n , 
as f i r m s i n consumer goods markets. T h i s f i n d i n g was 
a t t r i b u t e d to the d i f f e r e n t buyer and demand c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s < 
p r e v a l e n t i n f a c t o r markets, and the second e m p i r i c a l 
study tended to confirm t h i s by d i s c o v e r i n g a n e g a t i v e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between buyer market s t r u c t u r e measures and 
s e l l e r ' s performance. The attempt to s y n t h e s i a e a l l of 
t h i s i n f ormatioii, and to r e l a t e i t to P i c k e r i n g ' s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
of the e x e r c i s e of s u p e r i o r buying power as a p r e c u n i a r y advantage 
of l a r g e s c a l e e n t e r p r i s e , yieldfs the f o l l o w i n g c o n c l u s i o n ; ( 7 9 ) 
When "buyers are l a r g e i n s i z e and few i n number, i n r e l a t i o n 
to t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r f a c t o r goods markets, they may be a b l e 
to capture and r e t a i n any s u r p l u s e s which a r i s e out of 
the t r a d i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e i r s u p p l i e r s i n those 
markets. Furthermore, t h i s a b i l i t y to capture and r e t a i n 
those s u r p l u s e s may i n e v i t a b l y f o s t e r t h e i r continued 
growth and longevity, t h a t i s , i t may r e p r e s e n t a 
p o s i t i v e l y a n t i - r e g r e s s i r e s i n f l u e n c e . ( 8 0 ) 
A t o p i c which i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to the a b s o r p t i o n * 
of s u r p l u s e s by the l a r g e f i r m as a buyer, i s what the g e n e r a l 
i m p l i c a t i o n s are f o r t h e i r suppliers,, I t has been suggested t h a t 
i f they are r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l and without s i g n i f i c a n t 
b a r g a i n i n g power, they may be f o r c e d to operate at a l e v e l 
of r e t u r n which i s determined by t h e i r major customer. 
Moreover, based upon the preceding, i f t h e i r customers 
m i s c a l c u l a t e the margins which are r e q u i r e d by t h e i r 
s u p p l i e r s i n order to s t a y i n b u s i n e s s , they may not even 
s u r v i v e . Using Joan Robinson's c o n d i t i o n s f o r p e r f e c t 
competition among buyers, i t i s apparent t h a t , i n these 
types of t r a d i n g r e l a t i o n s , a s i n g l e buyer does have 
c o n s i d e r a b l y more than a n e g l i g i b l e e f f e c t upon, t o t a l 
market purchases, and the s e l l e r cannot be i n d i f f e r e n t 
as t o whom they s u p p l y . ( 8 1 ) I n f a c t , the e x e r c i s e of the 
l a r g e "buyer's s u p e r i o r b a r g a i n i n g power i s p o s s i b l e because 
the s e l l e r s i n v o l v e d are no longer i n d i f f e r e n t . I?or indeed 
- y± -
can they be expected to remain i n d i f f e r e n t i f l a r g e 
buyers can depress p r i c e s , r e s t r i c t q u a n t i t i e s , 
d i s c r i m i n a t e between s u p p l i e r s and sub-markets, 
e l i m i n a t e economic p r o f i t s , reduce t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , and even r e a c h the extreme of determining 
f o r the s u p p l i e r c o s t , p l u s ' a f i x e d margin on s a l e s . B i l a s 
i n d i c a t e s t h a t "... monopsony i s the r e s u l t of l a c k of 
f a c t o r m o b i l i t y , or the s p e c i a l i s a t i o n of the f a c t o r to 
a p a r t i c u l a r u s e r . " ( 8 2 ) T h i s r e p r e s e n t s another way 
of s t a t i n g the second p o i n t to emerge from the chapter, 
and i t i s that a q u i n t e s s e n t i a l f a c t o r i n t h i s a n a l y s i s 
i s the s u p p l i e r ' s dependence upon a r e l a t i v e l y few, s i g n i f i c a n t 
buyers i n a p a r t i c u l a r market. There are two questions 
which are r a i s e d by t h i s c o n c l u s i o n : - F i r s t l y , what are 
some of the circumstances and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of dependency 
which emerge i n economic t r a d i n g r e l a t i o n s between f i r m s ? 
Secondly, v/hat are some of the i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s 
dependency f o r i n d u s t r i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n ? 
I n h i s paper d e a l i n g w i t h the l a r g e f i r m and i t s 
s u p p l i e r s , M.A. Adelman .makes the f o l l o w i n g o b s e r v a t i o n : 
" I n s t u d ying p a r t i c u l a r i n d u s t r i e s , we must 
keep i n view the l a r g e r market c o n s t e l l a t i o n s 
of which they may be only sub-markets. The 
s t a t e of c c E i p o o i t i o r L i n the i n d u s t r y may w e l l 
- 9 2 -
be determined l e s s by number and s i z e , e t c . 
of the f i r m s w i t h i n than by the buyers 
w i t h o u t . "(83) 
The m a t e r i a l covered i n t h i s chapter has c e r t a i n l y 
s e rved to confirm and r e i n f o r c e t h i s o b s e r v a t i o n . 
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APPEKDIX 3 . - 1 
Monopsony and the Input, Supply Curve 
. The f o l l o w i n g t a b l e p r e s e n t s a numerical example 
which d e s c r i b e s the d e r i v a t i o n of the supply curve 
f a c i n g the monopsonist.(l) The f i r s t column r e p r e s e n t s 
the q u a n t i t i e s of the p r o d u c t i v e input a v a i l a b l e , 
w h i l e the second g i v e s p r i c e s at which the r e s p e c t i v e 
q u a n t i t i e s w i l l be s u p p l i e d . The remaining columns are 
s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y . 
(TC) (MC) (AC) 
Q uantity P r i c e T o t a l Cost Marginal Cost Average Cost 
6 0 . 5 0 3 . 0 0 - 0.5C 
7 0 . 5 5 3 . 6 5 0 . 6 5 0 . 5 5 
8 0 . 6 0 i+,80 0 . 9 5 0 . 6 0 
9 0 . 6 5 5 . 8 5 1 . 0 5 0 . 6 5 
1 0 0 . 7 0 7 . 0 0 1 . 1 5 0 . 7 0 
The important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the t a b l e are that the 
f a c t o r ^ average c o s t equals itfe p r i c e , and t h a t t h i s 
r e p r e s e n t s the raonopsonist's supply c u r v e . 
Footnote 
( l ) Adapted from: B i l a s , R.A., Microeconomic Theory: 
A G r a p h i c a l A n a l y s i s . McGraw-Hill, 1 9 5 7 , p. 265. 
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APPENDIX 3-2 
D e r i v a t i o n of Marginal Revenue Product. 
The f o l l o w i n g r e p r e s e n t s a simple a l g e b r a i c demonstration 
t h a t marginal revenue product equals marginal revenue 
m u l t i p l i e d by marginal p h y s i c a l p r o d u c t . ( 1 ) L e t MRP, TR, 
MPP, and L stand f o r marginal revenue product, t o t a l 
revenue, t o t a l product, marginal p h y s i c a l product and the 
f a c t o r input r e s p e c t i v e l y . The symbol '&' denotes 
'change i n ' . 
MRP A TR 
^ T, 
(by d e f i n i t i o n ) 
S i n c e , MR A TR 
A TP 
then, * TR MR x a T P . 
S i n c e , MPP A T P 
then, A T P 
MPP 
Thus, by s u b s t i t u t i o n , 
MRP = MR x A TP = MR x MPP. 
A TP 
MPP 
Footnote: 
( 1 ) 
CHAPTER k 
THE LARG-5 BUYER AMD SUPPLIER DEPE^IDEITCY 
"Monopolistic and o l i g o p o l i s t i c elements i n 
h o r i z o n t a l competition add u n c e r t a i n t i e s 
t o v e r t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s and cause t h e i r 
outcome t o r e s t i n p a r t on r e l a t i v e 
"bargaining s t r e n g t h s . . . The primary 
weapon of economic power, the boycott, 
... occurs i n v e r t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . " ( 1 ) 
I n t r o d u c t i o n 
I n the c o n c l u s i o n to the previous, chapter, a q u e s t i o n 
was posed which concerned the circumstances and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
of dependency as i t emerges i n the course of t r a d i n g 
r e l a t i o n s between f i r m s . The question orginated from the 
a n a l y s i s of economic theory, which had r e v e a l e d that w i t h 
some types of f a c t o r market s t r u c t u r e s , market conduct would 
i n c l u d e b a r g a i n i n g behaviour, and th a t t h i s behaviour could 
be s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n f l u e n c e d by the degree of s u p p l i e r s ' 
dependency upon t h e i r buyers. The main aim of t h i s 
chapter- i s to examine, w i t h a view to understanding, some 
of the circumstances and c o n d i t i o n s which have been a s s o c i a t e d 
w i t h s u p p l i e r dependency. A s u b s i d i a r y aim i s to ensure 
t h a t the framework developed f o r understanding s u p p l i e r . 
dependency i s , i n a p r a c t i c a l sense, s u i t a b l e f o r r e l a t i v e l y 
uncomplicated i n v e s t i g a t i v e work. 
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The chapter "begins by t r a c i n g the concept of s u p p l i e r 
dependency from an i n d u s t r i a l s o c i o l o g i c a l context, 
through to a p r i m a r i l y , economic s e t t i n g . I n the p r o c e s s , 
a components of s u p p l i e r dependency matrix i s developed. 
The next s e c t i o n e l a b o r a t e s upon some f u r t h e r a s p e c t s of 
s u p p l i e r dependency, as r e v e a l e d both i n a number of 
e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s , and i n a b r i e f overview of s u b c o n t r a c t i n g 
r e l a t i o n s . I n the c o n c l u s i o n , the components of s u p p l i e r 
dependency matrix i s completed and a g e n e r a l a p p r a i s a l i s 
made of i t s u t i l i t y f o r i n v e s t i g a t i v e s t u d i e s . 
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The Emergence of Dependency i n Trading R e l a t i o n s 
Within the context of i n d u s t r i a l s o c i o l o g y , the 
concept of s o c i a l power and dependence forms a cornerstone 
i n the a n a l y s i s of r e l a t i o n s between formal o r g a n i s a t i o n s . 
One w r i t e r i n t h i s f i e l d , R.M. Emerson, has adopted 
an a n a l y t i c a l framework f o r the understanding of power-
dependence, r e l a t i o n s , . termed an exchange theory of power, 
which may be r e a d i l y t r a n s l a t e d i n t o economic c o n c e p t s . ( 2 ) 
Emerson begins w i t h tiie precept t h a t s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s u s u a l l y 
i n v o l v e ' t i e s of mutual dependence* between the p a r t i e s 
( i n t h i s case f i r m s ) engaged i n the r e l a t i o n s . 
O r g a n i s a t i o n 'A' depends upon o r g a n i s a t i o n 'B', i f 'A' 
a s p i r e s t o goals or ends whose achievement i s f a c i l i t a t e d 
by a p p r o p r i a t e a c t i o n s . b y 'B'. Mutual dependencs?-, he s t a t e s , 
r e q u i r e s t h at each o r g a n i s a t i o n be able to c o n t r o l or 
i n f l u e n c e the other's conduct, and t h i s i m p l i e s t h a t each be 
able to some degree, t o grant or deny, f a c i l i t a t e or h i n d e r , 
the other's achievement of i t s g o a l s . As P . i i n i ^ j r g r r a a -puts i t . . . 
/ . 
"Thus, i t would appear t h a t the power to 
c o n t r o l or i n f l u e n c e . t h e other r e s i d e s i n 
c o n t r o l over the t h i n g s he v a l u e s , 
which may range a l l the way, from o i l 
r e s o u r c e s to ego-suppcrt, w ( 3 ) 
I n more s u c c i e n t terms, ".«.. power r e s i d e s i m p l i c i t l y i n 
the other's dependency. " ( 4 ) 
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Having made the point that power flows from dependency, 
Emerson indicates that i t i s necessary to focus a t t e n t i o n 
upon the concept of dependence i t s e l f . Dependence, he 
po s i t s , appears t o be a ' j o i n t function' of two variables, 
and i n summary, these are as follows: the dependence of 
organisation 'A1 upon organisation 'B' i s ; 
1. d i r e c t l y proportional t o 'A's' motivational 
investment i n , or need to achieve goals 
mediated by 'B', and, 
2. inversely proportional to the a v a i l a b i l i t y 
of those goals to.'A' outside of i t s 
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h 'B'. 
Emerson defines 'goal' i n a broad sense to include 
g r a t i f i c a t i o n or benefits sought i n the re l a t i o n s h i p 
between 'A' and 'B', and ' a v a i l a b i l i t y ' i n terms of 
the a l t e r n a t i v e relationships available to the organis ations 
i n order t o achieve t h e i r goals. He notes that the costs 
of developing a l t e r n a t i v e relationships are important i n the 
assessment of dependency and c i t e s as an example the economic 
concept of 'opportunity costs', Emerson attaches an important 
caveat to his proposition, which also applies to the content 
t h i s chapter.(and i n fac t to the e n t i r e t h e s i s ) , and i t 
i s that the exact nature of t h i s ' j o i n t f u n c t i o n ' i s an 
empirical question, and his proposition can do no more 
than specify the d i r e c t i o n a l relationships involved,"(5) 
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The two concepts i n the ' j o i n t function' which Emerson 
uses t o define dependence have been translated i n t o simple 
economic constructs "by D. Jacobs. I n a paper concerned 
w i t h an organisation's general dependency upon components 
of i t s t o t a l operating environment, Jacobs concentrates upon . 
the r e l a t i o n s involved i n an organisation's a c q u i s i t i o n of 
the factors of production, and the disposal of i t s output.(6) 
Emerson's second variable was r e l a t e d to the a v a i l a b i l i t y 
of goals outside of the 'A-B' r e l a t i o n s h i p . This i s , 
inte r p r e t e d by Jacobs t o re f e r t o the number of a l t e r n a t i v e 
suppliers and buyers there are i n the market f o r a particula r 
resource. On the buying side of the market, t h i s economic 
inte r p r e t a t i o n follows a progression through various types 
of market conditions. The.progression begins'with a s i t u a t i o n 
i n vshich a unitary buyer may have great power; next, a 
few s i g n i f i c a n t buyers may be expected t o exert some 
oligopsonistic power; and f i n a l l y , many i n s i g n i f i c a n t buyers 
i n the market means that a single buyer w i l l probably be 
r e l a t i v e l y powerless. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between dependency 
and a v a i l a b i l i t y was postulated by Emerson to be an 
inverse one, and i t i s apparent that t h i s condition holds 
tru e , that i s , the greater the number of available a l t e r n a t i v e s , 
the lower the postulated degree of dependence, e«.g., of the 
s e l l e r upon a p a r t i c u l a r buyer. I n short, the more 
competitive the market s t r u c t u r e , the lower, the degree of 
dependence, and the narrower the buyer's range of power. 
This i s a f a i r l y s t r a i g h t forward construct which i s 
obviously a re-formulation of the message conveyed i n 
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Emerson's other component of dependence was 
organisation 'A's' motivational investment i n , or need, 
to achieve goals mediated by organisation 'Bf, or 
i n more simple.terms, the importance to 'A' of the 
resource mediated "by 'B'. Jacobs posits that t h i s 
second variable w i l l be a f u n c t i o n of 'A's' willingness 
t o substitute f o r the resource acquired from B, and 
t h i s includes a c t u a l l y doing without i t . The c r i t e r i o n 
of s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y , according to Jacobs, determines the 
e s s e n t i a l i t y of the resource i n question. This i s because 
a resource which can be e a s i l y substituted f o r cannot 
i n i t s e l f b& very e s s e n t i a l . However, a resource which the 
organisation cannot substitute f o r without i n c u r r i n g 
unacceptable costs, may be.considered very essential to 
i t s f unctioning. The second component was also postulated 
by Emerson as bearing a d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h dependence, 
and i t can be seen that i f 'A' i s a supplier s e l l i n g t o 
organisation 'B1, and i t cannot substitute f o r buyer 'B1. 
without i n c u r r i n g unacceptable costs, then i t s dependence 
upon 'B' w i l l be greater than i t would otherwise "be.(7) 
I n his discussion of s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y Jacobs makes two 
i n t e r e s t i n g observations. The f i r s t i s that what proves 
essential t o a f i r m may be l a r g e l y determined by ' h i s t o r i c a l l y 
i n h e r i t e d goals' . As an example, he states that organisations 
whose goals, or operating patterns t i e them to labour-
intensive technology, are l i k e l y to experience d i f f i c u l t y i n 
s u b s t i t u t i n g f o r labour. The second observation concerns 
the statement that s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y i s sub,"]set to time 
horizons. For his example, Jacobs c i t e s the case of short-run 
trade union power- which stems from an employer's i n a b i l i t y 
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to quickly automate. However, i n the long-run, the 
union's power may "become heavily circumscribed as the 
employer acquires labour saving c a p i t a l equipment. 
In general terms, Jacobs does provide an economic, 
framework f o r Emerson's p r i m a r i l y s o c i o l o g i c a l view of 
the l i n k between power and dependency i n trading r e l a t i o n s . 
The concept of a v a i l a b i l i t y c e r t a i n l y does agree w i t h what 
has been covered w i t h respect to various market structures, and 
e s s e n t i a l i t y does reasonably concur with the notion of 
costs of s u b s t i t u t i o n . However, as they presently stand, 
the two concepts may be said to lack substance and d e t a i l . 
and'it i s to t h i s deficiency which the analysis now turns. 
I n a paper dealing w i t h the types of special demands 
buyers may make of t h e i r suppliers, K.J. Blois presents an 
outline of the circumstances which may influence both 
the buyer's and the s e l l e r ' s conduct.(8) An i n i t i a l 
r e q u i s i t e f a c t o r i d e n t i f i e d by Blois i s that the buyer 
should be a 'large customer' of the supplier i n question. 
A 'large customer' i s defined by the author .as: 
"... a customer v/hich takes a s i g n i f i c a n t 
proportion of a supplier's output and not 
necessarily a f i r m which is large i n the 
sense of i t s number of employees, c a p i t a l 
employed or even large r e l a t i v e to the 
supplier."(9) 
The d e f i n i t i o n of what constitutes a ' s i g n i f i c a n t 
proportion' w i l l , according to Blois vary between f i r m s , and 
i n any one p a r t i c u l a r f i r m i t w i l l vary through time. . This 
l a s t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of sig n i f i c a n c e , that i s , i t s variance 
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w i t h the passage of time, p a r a l l e l s Jacob's view that 
s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y i s also subject to conditions of time. 
Thus, a 'large customer' may be s i g n i f i c a n t t o the s e l l e r , 
only f o r as long as i t takes the supplier t o acquire 
substitutes. 
Raving defined i n general terms what he means by the 
notion of a 'large customer', Blois considers a number 
of situa t i o n s which might serve t o more f u l l y explain the 
concept. For his f i r s t example, he c i t e s the s i t u a t i o n 
facing a f i r m w i t h only one product l i n e operating i n an 
industry with- excess capacity. Under such conditions any 
customer whose purchases are s u f f i c i e n t l y la rge th a t the 
supplier would be faced w i t h a loss i f that customer were 
to remove i t s business, would be considered a 'large 
customer'. However, i f the supplying industry were to 
change t o a condition of f u l l capacity and the supplier were 
to discover excess demand f o r i t s one product l i n e , then 
customers which might have been considered large, would no 
longer be. This turnabout occurs because- i f the customer 
removed i t s business, then i t could.be replaced, that i s , 
according to these hypothetical conditions. Blois points 
out that even w i t h excess demand, some buyers might r e t a i n 
t h e i r p o s i t i o n as 'large customers', especially, i f the 
supplier: takes a somewhat long-term perspective, and believes 
that by remaining l o y a l t o the customer at a time of 
shortage of supply, the customer may reciprocate when there i s 
excess supply. I f the supplier provides a range of products, 
Blois indicates that p a r t i c u l a r customers purchases of one 
product l i n e may "be unimportant, regardless of the supplying 
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industry's capacity; "but when a l l .of the "buyer's purchases, 
are aggregated across the e n t i r e range, then i t too may 
acquire the p o s i t i o n of a 'large customer 1. 
With the concept of the l a r g e customer' f i r m l y 
established Blois next considers i t s implications'as follows: 
"... i f a customer i s large i n t h i s sense, i t 
would seem l i k e l y t h a t a supplier would be 
especially sensitive to that customer's needs. 
Moreover," observation of business practice 
indicates that many large customers are 
equally sensitive to t h e i r a b i l i t y t o bring 
influence t o bear upon t h e i r suppliers and 
thus t o obtain from them special terms and 
conditions.'•( 10) 
I n b r i e f terms Blois appears; to be saying that when the 
buyer i s essential t o the supplier, f o r example, when there 
i s excess capacity and the costs of s u b s t i t u t i n g f o r 
ex i s t i n g buyers may be high, then the e x i s t i n g buyer's 
bargaining p o s i t i o n i s greater, as evidenced by t h e i r 
a b i l i t y to win concessions. I n t h i s respect B l o i s ' 
formulation of supplier dependency appears to be reasonably 
s i m i l a r to that of Jacobs. However, there i a an important 
d i s t i n c t i o n between the two approaches; for'while Jacobs 
expresses h i s argument i n terms of objective measures of 
market st r u c t u r e , f o r example, the actual number of buyers 
available i n a market # Blois instead concentrates upon 
the ' e f f e c t i v e market structure' facing the supplier. That i s to 
say, regardless of the number of buyers i n a market as 
measured i n objective terms, i t i s the number which may 
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"be e f f e c t i v e l y available t o replace the 'large customer', 
at any time, i r r e s p e c t i v e of the industry's capacity, 
which influences the buyer's and s e l l e r ' s conduct. As 
Blois implies i n his example of the multi-product f i r m , 
the costs of s u b s t i t u t i n g f o r a 'large customer' may be 
such t h a t , i n a given time period, the s e l l e r may 
display decision-making behaviour, or adopt a form 
of market conduct as i f i t considered i t s e l f to be facing 
an ' e f f e c t i v e market st r u c t u r e ' which consisted of 
r e l a t i v e l y few s i g n i f i c a n t buyers. Only under these 
conditions would i t be possible f o r the 'large customer'- to 
exert a major degree of influence upon the supplier. 
A r e l a t e d question which requires f u r t h e r elaboration 
i s how the 'large customer's' a b i l i t y t o bring influence 
i s determined; and i n h i s explanation, Blois f i r s t reminds 
the reader that the 'large customer' was defined i n terms such 
that the removal of i t s business represented a 'serious 
blow' to the supplier. Thus, "... the customer's a b i l i t y to 
bring pressure upon the supplier revolves around the 
question of how l i k e l y i t i s that the customer would be able 
to remove i t s business."(11) I n assessing the l i k e l i h o o d 
that the customer w i l l remove i t s business, Blois suggests that 
there are a l i m i t e d number of a l t e r n a t i v e s available. Assuming, 
that i s , that the large customer requires a p a r t i c u l a r 
input, and merely wants to change i t s source of supply. Each 
of the f i v e a l t e r n a t i v e s i d e n t i f i e d by B l o i s , and some 
pertinent related considerations, are presented below: 
The customer may o f f e r i t s business to another 
supplier w i t h i n the country, but the key f a c t o r 
i n t h i s respect w i l l be capacity s i t u a t i o n i n 
the supplying industry, For example, i f there were 
a severe shortage of capacity, the customer may 
have t o acquire the input.under disadvantageous 
terms. As Blois points out, the customer's 
current supplier would probably r e a l i s e that the 
demand conditions are l i k e l y to change, or that by 
guaranteeing orders, the customer would encourage 
one of the e x i s t i n g supplier's competitors t o 
expand capacity. I n e i t h e r case, the supplier 
stands to suffer i f i t antagonises the customer. 
The customer may o f f e r i t s business to a foreign 
supplier, but the key factors w i t h regards t o 
t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e are the t a r i f f s , import b a r r i e r s 
and transport costs involved f o r the input i n 
question. 
The customer may- encourage a new supplier to enter 
the industry, and the key factor i n t h i s case i s the 
nature of the technology of the supplying industry. 
Aside from such things as the existence of patents 
and licences, there are questions related to the 
technological expertise and scale economies 
required by the supplier to compete e f f i c i e n t l y . 
•km The customer may set up i t s own production unit,-
"but i t faces the same types of problems 
i d e n t i f i e d i n Number 3 above, as w e l l as, the 
natural tendency f o r firms to f e e l that t h e i r 
expertise l i e s outside of such a c t i v i t i e s . 
5. The customer may take over an e x i s t i n g supplier, 
and the problems involved include not only the 
search and appraisal of a suitable candidate, 
but the financing of the takeover. I n 
add i t i o n , there i s the problem of matching the 
acquired supplier's capacity t o the customer's 
requirements. 
E l o i s , i n a. manner s i m i l a r to Jacobs, points out that 
the supplier would consider both the short-term and 
long-term l i k e l i h o o d of a large customer adopting one 
of these a l t e r n a t i v e s . The f i r s t two options are open 
on a long-term basis t o most customers, but the l a s t 
three probably require that the large customer be of 
s u f f i c i e n t size t o support the necessary production 
economies, and these- are l i k e l y to be si m i l a r to the lev e l s 
of output of e x i s t i n g suppliers. However, the most 
s i g n i f i c a n t , s i m i l a r i t y w i t h Jacobs' analysis i s th a t , i n 
o u t l i n i n g the possible a l t e r n a t i v e s open t o the large 
customer, Blois not only quite e f f e c t i v e l y describes the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y of alternate supplies, but also some of t h e i r 
respective costs of s u b s t i t u t i o n which can confront the 
buyer. I n e f f e c t , i t may be concluded that K.J. Blois 
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is. working .with the same- two concepts of "buyer dependency 
which were employed by D. Jacobs, that i s , a v a i l a b i l i t y 
and s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y , but the former author i s using them 
i n a d i f f e r e n t guise. 
This re-formulaticn of b a s i c a l l y the same determinants 
of dependency i s also s t r i k i n g l y revealed i n B l o i s ' 
discussion of the supplying firm's f l e x i b i l i t y . Given 
that the large customer has the various al t e r n a t i v e s 
considered above, Blois states t h a t ; 
"... unless a supplier i s i n a p o s i t i o n t o produce 
some other product w i t h the spare capacity 
which would become available through the loss of 
a large customer, i t - w i l l f e e l , f o r i t s own 
security, that i t must t r e a t the requirements 
of i t s customers i n a sympathetic manner -
p a r t i c u l a r l y those customers which are i n a 
p o s i t i o n t o take up either the t h i r d , f o u r t h 
or f i f t h a l t e r n a t i v e . " ( 1 2 ) 
Whether the supplier i s i n a p o s i t i o n to t u r n t o an 
alternative, output w i l l be. a function of i t s f l e x i b i l i t y 
and Blois suggests that t h i s f l e x i b i l i t y may involve two 
separate dimensions. The f i r s t dimension concerns 
supplying firms which may be 'market s p e c i f i c ' , that i s , 
firms which s e l l a large proportion of t h e i r f i n a l output 
t o one industry on the basis that t h e i r products are s p e c i f i c t o 
the requirements of that industry.. The second dimension 
-concerns supplying firms which are 'product s p e c i f i c ' , 
that i s , firms which operate with plant and machinery 
th a t i s s o l e l y l i m i t e d t o , and capable of producing i t s 
e x i s t i n g range of products. Blois states, without 
supportive evidence, t h a t : 
":... i t i s not. infrequent to meet firms, 
where employees at a l l levels i n the f i r m 
only have experience i n that f i r m or 
industry and i t i s f a r from apparent that 
they could work s:o e f f e c t i v e l y i n an 
organisation making anything but t h e i r 
current product range."(13) 
Associated w i t h the f i r s t dimension are the costs of 
adapting old products or developing new ones f o r a 
d i f f e r e n t market. These costs may p o t e n t i a l l y l i m i t 
the a v a i l a b i l i t y of alternate sources of business f o r 
the supplier. The s e c o n d . f l e x i b i l i t y dimension involves 
not only the costs of acquiring a d i f f e r e n t form of 
expertise which i s not t i e d to the t r a d i t i o n a l product, 
but also the costs of obtaining the c a p i t a l equipment. 
Thus, Blois has simply re-formulated the costs of 
s u b s t i t u t i o n facing the supplying f i r m and has turned them 
i n t o supplier f l e x i b i l i t y . An obvious advantage of B l o i s ' 
presentation i s that the descriptive basis of the 
analysis i s much more detailed, and more closely r e l a t e d 
to measurable economic factors. 
K.J. Blois summarises h i s concepts and discussion: 
as f o l l o w s : 
"... i t i s suggested that i f a f i r m i s a large 
customer of a p a r t i c u l a r supplier, i t may 
"be i n a po s i t i o n to use as a bargaining 
weapon the threat of obtaining supplies 
.. elsewhere. I f the supplier i s market and/ 
or product specific t h i s threat i s of very 
great importance and w i l l g r e a t l y influence 
the responsiveness of the suppliers t o any 
requests such a customer may make."(li;) 
Within h i s summary are two concepts which.are reminiscent 
of ideas introduced at e a r l i e r stages of the thes i s . The 
f i r s t idea relates to Palamountain's statement that a 
primary weapon of economic power i s the boycott, and 
t h i s i f of course the threat which Blois suggests the 
'large customer' holds as a bargaining weapon.(15) The 
second idea concerns one of Joan Robinson's conditions 
for perfect competition among buyers, and that was: 
"... that s e l l e r s are i n d i f f e r e n t as t o whom they provide 
t h e i r wares."(16) Blois i s obviously suggesting that under 
the types of conditions outlined i n his analysis, s e l l e r s are very 
far from being i n d i f f e r e n t about t h e i r buyers.(17) 
When t h i s absence of s e l l e r i n d ifference i s juxtaposed w i t h 
a given time period i n which the s e l l e r perceives i t s e l f 
t o be operating i n a market which i s effectively.composed 
of one or a fev* 'large customers'j i t i s not unreasonable 
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to p o s i t that with such an i n d i v i d u a l buyer-seller r e l a t i o n -
ship, the opportunities f o r monopsonistic forms of market 
conduct do e x i s t . Moreover, such si t u a t i o n s may occur 
regardless of how the intermediate goods market structure i s 
defined i n aggregative economic terms i n r e l a t i o n to the 
number, of firms a c t u a l l y operating i n the market. 
I t i s now possible to p u l l a l l of the various threads ^ . 
together and summarise what has been discussed. Figure 4-1 
represents an attempt to organise the main concepts 
covered t h i s far and i t presents them i n a matrix form. . 
Sta r t i n g With the i n i t i a l precept th a t the a b i l i t y t o 
exercise bargaining power i n trading r e l a t i o n s i s a f u n c t i o n 
of dependency, the matrix.represents dependency i t s e l f as 
a fun c t i o n of two, i n t e r - a c t i v e concepts. The f i r s t i s 
av a i l a b i l i t y . ^ that i s , the a v a i l a b i l i t y of alternate sources 
of supply or buyers. The second i s s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y , that 
is, the costs associated w i t h s u b s t i t u t i n g f o r the contemporary 
trading r e l a t i o n s h i p * Contemporary i s used with i t s l i t e r a l 
meaning i n mind, that is- 'belonging t o the same time', and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y r e f l e c t s the contributory factors of industry 
capacity u t i l i s a t i o n , and the relevant time horizons which 
are considered for decision making purposes. The 
fundamental concepts outlined i n Figure 4-1 represent a basis 
f o r categorising some of the main components of dependency 
as they may emerge i n p a r t i c u l a r factor market trading-
r e l a t i o n s . However, other w r i t e r s hate i d e n t i f i e d some fu r t h e r , 
i n t e r e s t i n g aspects of supplier dependency and before a l i s t i n g 
of the i n d i v i d u a l contributory factors i s attempted, the 
analysis considers t h e i r s p e c i f i c c o n t r i b u t i o n s . 
Figure k-1 
.Components of Trading De-pendency Matrix 
BUYER 
DEPENDENCE 
SUPPLIER DEPENDENCE 
AVAILABILITY 
INTERACTIVE -
SUBSTITUTABILITY 
P(number of a l t e r n a t i v e 
sources of supply 
i n market) 
F(C6sts of s u b s t i t u t i n g 
contemporary 
suppliers) 
F(number of a l t e r -
native buyers i n 
market) 
F(costs of sub-
s t i t u t i n g 
contemporary 
buyers.) , 
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Some Further Aspects of Supplier Dependency 
I n t h i s section a review i s made of some empirical 
studies and t h e o r e t i c a l work which both d i r e c t l y , and 
somewhat i n d i r e c t l y , provide f u r t h e r information on some 
economic conditions of fact o r market supplier dependency* 
I n general terms, the aim of t h i s section i s to f u r n i s h 
some descriptive characteristics, which expand the 
background information contained i n the components of 
dependency matrix. 
The f i r s t b i t of broadly descriptive evidence t o be 
considered i s H..P. Lydall's i n v e s t i g a t i v e survey of 
small and medium-sized manufacturing businesses and aspects 
of t h e i r competitive behaviour.(18) L y d a l l was i n v e s t i g a t i n g 
the degree of competition v/hich firms i n h i s sample f e l t 
they were facing. I n the process of formulating his survey, 
he i d e n t i f i e d what proved to.be a fundamental d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the p a r t i c i p a t i n g f i r m s . The d i s t i n c t i o n revolved 
around a question which was rela t e d to the type <fi work 
which the firms might be engaged i n . The question was as 
fol l o w s : • 
"Do you mainly work f o r other firms on 
sp e c i f i c a t i o n orders or do you mainly 
produce a range of your own products which 
you then t r y and place on the market."(19) 
Those firms which were engaged mainly cn s p e c i f i c a t i o n , 
orders Lydall described as 'jobbers',, and those which 
produced p r i m a r i l y t h e i r own items he described as 
•marke ; t e r s ' . I n a t o t a l sample, consisting of 876 firms 
: L y d a l l found that Zj.ll classed themselves as jobbers, Aj.10 as 
marketers and 51 as. 'mixed!. (20) The f i r s t i n t e r e s t i n g 
difference between jobbers and marketers was tha t there 
was a higher proportion of jobbers among small firms 
than among large. However, a feature Y/hich was much 
more noteworthy was that over h a l f of the jobbers and 
mixed firms i n hisjample indicated that they were 
dependent f o r the bulk of t h e i r orders upon a ' f a i r l y ' 
siaall number of customers. Moreover, over 72 percent of 
these dependent jobbers s i g n i f i e d that i t would be 
d i f f i c u l t to replace t h e i r customers. B r i e f l y taking 
stock, i t i s not unreasonable to speculatively surmise 
t h a t among Lydall's jobbers were firms which met two 
conditions of supplier dependency. F i r s t l y , they were 
p o t e n t i a l l y involved i n 'large customer' trading 
s i t u a t i o n s , as evidenced by, a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y small 
size and s i g n i f i c a n t levels of sales going t o r e l a t i v e l y 
few customers. I n ad d i t i o n , a professed d i f f i c u l t y i n 
the replacement of customers could be interpreted asa 
proxy ind i c a t o r of an u n a v a i l a b i l i t y of a l t e r n a t i v e buyers 
and/or high costs of s u b s t i t u t i o n . I t would seem therefore, 
t h a t on the surface at l e a s t , jobbers, or more s p e c i f i c a l l y 
f i r i a s producing to t h e i r customer's sp e c i f i c a t i o n s , did 
reproduce circumstances which to a degree paralled those 
of supplier dependency. 
Lyd^.11 also offers some insight i n t o the market 
behaviour of jobber f i r m s , and he. does t h i s by examining 
how they assessed t h e i r competitive s i t u a t i o n . I n the 
absence of what he f e l t to be ob j e c t i v e l y based, measurable 
c r i t e r i a of the c o m p e t i t i v e s i t u a t i o n , L y d a l l used 
e s s e n t i a l l y s u b j e c t i v e proxy measures. A number of 
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l t h e o r i s t s have s t a t e d t h a t a f i r m ' s 
decision-making behaviour w i l l he determined by i t s 
c o g n i t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n towards, or p e r c e p t i o n of s t i m u l i 
or events, and so L y d a l l ' s approach may not have "been, 
e n t i r e l y unreasonable.(21) I n any case, L y d a l l asked 
t h e f i r m s i n h i s sample t o s u b j e c t i v e l y evaluate whether 
t l i e y were f a c i n g one of the f o l l o w i n g t h r e e types of 
c o m p e t i t i v e pressure; strong,moderate, or no c o m p e t i t i o n 
t o speak of. L y d a l l summarised h i s f i n d i n g s as f o l l o w s : 
"Jobbers are, on the whole, less conscious 
than marketers o f the existence of s t r o n g 
c o m p e t i t i o n , and a g r e a t e r p r o p o r t i o n o f 
^ " j o b b e r s s a i d t h a t they had 'no compet-
i t i o n t o speak o f . "(22) 
An e q u a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t f i n d i n g emerged from h i s question 
concerning the knowledge of competitor's p r i c e s : f o r 
L y d a l l found t h a t over t h r e e quarters of h i s marketers 
knew t h e i r competitor's p r i c e , w h i l e only h a l f of h i s 
jobbers had s i m i l a r i n f o r m a t i o n . I n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , 
L y d a l l concluded t h a t on almost every issue s i g n i f i c a n t 
d i f f e r e n c e s appeared between marketers and jobbers -
b u t w i t h regards t o market behaviour, jobbers tended t o be 
more dependent, and less atuned t o c o m p e t i t i o n . 
. The next piece of d e s c r i p t i v e evidence t o be . 
considered o r g i n a t e s from J.R. Davies and M. K e l l y ' s 
G-overnraeht i n q u i r y research r e p o r t on small f i r m s i n 
t h e manufacturing sector. (23) i n t h e i r general a n a l y s i s 
o f the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and r o l e of the small f i r m , the 
authors consider, under the subject heading of 
'Independence', some r a m i f i c a t i o n s o f the f a c t t h a t , 
"... l e g a l independence does n o t , however, 
imply "behavioural independence and many 
small l e g a l l y independent f i r m s are 
dependent i n some way on a l a r g e r concern."(2U.) 
W i t h i n the context suggested by the q u o t a t i o n , the authors 
r e p o r t t h a t the Government i n q u i r y ' s p o s t a l q u e s t i o n n a i r e 
survey o f small manufacturers revealed t h a t more than one 
t h i r d of them s o l d more than.25 percent of t h e i r output t o 
one customer, and t h a t over 13 percent s o l d more than 50 percent 
t o one customer.(25) This f i n d i n g was f e l t t o "be 
important because a small f i r m ' s independence may be 
endangered i f , i n su p p l y i n g l a r g e customers who also provide 
product s p e c i f i c a t i o n s , they come t o depend upon the 
customer f o r product- development. This type of s i t u a t i o n , 
t h e authors suggest, may lead t o an uneven d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
b a r g a i n i n g power between the buyer and s u p p l i e r . I n 
a d d i t i o n , the small s u p p l i e r may a l s o run the r i s k o f becoming 
so concerned w i t h the maintenance of a s p e c i f i c t r a d i n g r e l a t i o n 
s h i p , t h a t i t f a i l s t o develop other products and markets. 
I n e f f e c t , r e t u r n i n g t o the components of dependency m a t r i x , 
Davies and K e l l y are r e i t e r a t i n g Jacob's p o i n t about the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s associated w i t h overcoming h i s t o r i c a l l y i n g r a i n e d 
o p e r a t i n g p a t t e r n s and of course^ the co3ts i n v o l v e d 
i n doing so. 
With t h i s t h e o r e t i c a l "base i n mind, Davies and 
K e l l y i n t e r v i e w e d a sample o f t w e n t y - f i v e f i r m s which 
s u p p l i e d a s u b s t a n t i a l p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e i r output t o 
one customer. A l l of the f i r m s . ; i n the sample s o l d 
a t l e a s t UO ." percent of t h e i r output t o one buj rer, and 
i n a d d i t i o n , they conformed t o L y d a l l ' s d e f i n i t i o n of 
a jobber, i . e . ^ they worked mainly on s p e c i f i c a t i o n 
orders f o r other f i r m s . The authors i n d i c a t e t h a t they 
f e l t the jobber r a n the h i g h e s t r i s k of becoming dependent 
on a 'lar g e customer', f o r t h e reasons o u t l i n e d above. 
To begin w i t h t h e i r f i n d i n g s agreed w i t h those of L y d a l l ' s 
on the apparent d i f f i c u l t i e s which jobbers f e l t they faced 
i n r e p l a c i n g t h e i r major customer. Furthermore, Davies 
and K e l l y a l s o found"...a tendency f o r the d i f f i c u l t y of 
r e p l a c i n g one customer t o increase and the awareness of 
c o m p e t i t i o n t o decrease w i t h i n c r e a s i n g dependency on one 
customer."(26) On the reverse side of the c o i n , the 
i n t e r v i e w s revealed t h a t f i r m s which had g r e a t e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
f o r the development "of t h e i r product were a l s o l e s s 
dependent upon t h e i r l a r g e customers and were more c o n f i d e n t . 
about t h e i r a b i l i t y t o enter a l t e r n a t i v e markets. I n the 
l i g h t of t h e i r study, the authors concluded t h a t f i r m s which 
s u p p l i e d a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e i r output on a continuous 
b a s i s t o a r e l a t i v e l y s mall number of customers: 
"... almost i n e v i t a b l y get out of touch 
w i t h market developments.and consequently 
f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t t o f i n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s 
f o r t h e i r work i f they lose t h e i r e x i s t i n g 
customers ."(27) 
I n a t t e m p t i n g t o determine the kernels o f what Tooth 
L y d a i l , and Davies and K e l l y have s a i d about s u p p l i e r 
dependency, and t o r e l a t e them t o the m a t r i x , i t i s 
d i f f i c u l t t o separate cause from e f f e c t . However, i t i s 
apparent t h a t one f e a t u r e , which i s common t o "both the 
components of dependency m a t r i x and the t w o s t u d i e s , can 
be r e a d i l y i d e n t i f i e d , and t h i s i s the existence o f a * 
'large customer'. On the other hand, v/hile "both o f the 
studies r e l a t e t o sma l l f i r m s , B l o i s ' f o r m u l a t i o n does 
not make i t a necessary c o n d i t i o n , and gi v e n his 
d e f i n i t i o n of a 'large customer', i t i s not immediately 
apparent why i t should he. Of more s i g n i f i c a n c e was the 
f a c t t h a t there was a t r a n s f e r of i n f o r m a t i o n i n v o l v e d i n 
"both s t u d i e s , and t h i s t o o k the form of product s p e c i f i c a t i o n s . 
I t i s here t h a t cause may "become entwined w i t h e f f e c t , "but 
i t seems l i k e l y t h a t " t h i s t r a n s f e r of i n f o r m a t i o n was 
p a r t i a l l y the cause of the f i r m s ' loss o f touch w i t h the 
market as a whole, as evidenced i n p a r t "by the low l e v e l s 
of competitive awareness. The other element which appeared 
t o have also p a r t i a l l y c o n t r i b u t e d . t o the same e f f e c t , was 
the c o n t i n u i t y i n the t r a d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p . I n simple 
terms, dependency emerges because the s u p p l i e r ' s usual 
market feedback mechanisms are superseded by the customer's 
p r o v i s i o n of the p r o d u c t / p r o d u c t i o n i n f o r m a t i o n . Moreover 
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. i f the s u p p l i e r i s t o v o l u n t a r i l y "abrogate i t s own 
f u n c t i o n a l c a p a c i t y i n t h a t p a r t i c u l a r area, then the 
t r a d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p should continue unbroken f o r some 
app r o p r i a t e p e r i o d of t i m e . Thus, i n essence, there are 
two more f a c t o r s which may "be added t o the m a t r i x : the 
t r a n s f e r of. i n f o r m a t i o n and c o n t i n u i t y i n the t r a d i n g 
r e l a t i o n s h i p . With due allowance f o r the i n t e r - a c t i v e 
nature of the f a c t o r s , i t i s f e l t t h a t they should he 
placed i n the s u b s t i t u t a h i l i t y quadrant f o r they 
undoubtedly r e v e a l themselves i n the costs of s u b s t i t u t i n g 
f o r contemporary buyers. 
Vi/hile these two a d d i t i o n a l f a c t o r s make i n t e r e s t i n g 
and v a l i d c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o . t h e understanding of dependent 
r e l a t i o n s , the s t u d i e s explored thus f a r have not f u l l y 
r e f l e c t e d the extent t o which t h e i r co-exist6nce may under 
c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s lead t o v i r t u a l l y complete s u p p l i e r 
dependency and domination. I n order t o e x p l a i n how i n 
combination, the tra n s f e r of i n f o r m a t i o n and c o n t i n u i t y 
may generate such r e s u l t s , i t . i s necessary t o examine a 
unique type of t r a d i n g r e l a t i o n which i s widespread i n 
f a c t o r markets and which i n v o l v e s e s p e c i a l l y close buyer-
s e l l e r t i e s , t h a t i s , s u b c o n t r a c t i n g . L i t e r a l l y d e f i n e d 
as the s u b l e t t i n g of work through a c o n t r a c t which i s 
subordinate to another c o n t r a c t , s u b c o n t r a c t i n g i s relevant 
because, as one w r i t e r on tbs t o p i c p o i n t s out, i t d i f f e r s 
from the mere purchase of ready-made p a r t s and components i n 
t h a t t h e r e i s an a c t u a l c o n t r a c t between t h e two p a r t i e s 
s e t t i n g out the s p e c i f i c a t i o n s , of the o r d e r . " ( 2 8 ) 
I n e f f e c t , the above statement appears t o roughly-
approximate the d e s c r i p t i o n given t o j o b b i n g , b u t 
i n what are t e c h n i c a l l y known as s u b c o n t r a c t i n g r e l a t i o n s , 
t h e l i n k a g e between buyer and s e l l e r can become 
con s i d e r a b l y more complex. 
I n a paper devoted t o the t o p i c of s u b c o n t r a c t i n g . • 
Susumu Watanahe i d e n t i f i e s f o u r reasons why an i n d u s t r i a l 
market purchaser might use subcontractors . ( 2 9 ) The f i r s t 
reason c i t e d i s t h a t the purchaser i s able t o economise 
upon c a p i t a l and l a b o u r . By s u b c o n t r a c t i n g a p a r t of i t s 
p r o d u c t i o n process the purchaser is ; able t o apply i t s a v a i l a b l e 
resources i n a l i m i t e d f i e l d , and i n theory, i t w i l l 
be the f i e l d i n which i t f e e l s i t holds a comparative 
advantage. A second reason advanced by Watanabe i s so t h a t 
the purchaser may take advantage of the lower wages 
g e n e r a l l y p a i d i n smaller f i r m s . This obviously assumes 
t h a t the buyer i s l a r g e and t h a t the s u p p l i e r s are small 
f i r m s , which may w e l l occur i n many instances. Watanabe 
q u a l i f i e s t h i s reason by mentioning the 'dual i n d u s t r i a l 
s t r u c t u r e ' f e a t u r e o f developing c o u n t r i e s . However, 
recent evidence on small f i r m wage r a t e s i n the United 
Kingdom(30) and the p r e v i o u s l y c i t e d , l o o s e l y s u b s t a n t i a t e d 
views of J.K. Galbraith ( 3 1), would tend t o also support the 
p o t e n t i a l relevance of t h i s advantage f o r f i r s t w o r l d 
c o u n t r i e s such as the United Kingdom. A t h i r d important 
reason r e l a t e s t o the advantage t o the purchaser of being 
a b l e t o use the subcontractor's s p e c i a l i s e d technology; f o r 
'example, t o acquire items.covered by patents and t o o b t a i n ••: 
items f o r which the purchaser may not f i n d i t . f e a s i b l e t o 
develop the r e q u i s i t e technology i n order t o enter 
p r o d u c t i o n i t s e l f . F i n a l l y , Ytetanabe s t a t e s t h a t 
purchasers may subcontract p a r t o f t h e i r work: 
"To serve as. a buffer against business 
f l u c t u a t i o n s , or t o be i n a p o s i t i o n 
t o meet peak demands w i t h o u t keeping 
on redundant c a p a c i t y d u r i n g off-peak 
periods."(32) 
Out of these reasons f o r s u b c o n t r a c t i n g Watanabe i d e n t i f i e s 
two d i s t i n c t types. The f i r s t type emerges from purchaser's 
use of the s u b c o n t r a c t o r 5 s . s p e c i a l i s e d technology and i t 
i s designated as being ' s p e c i a l i s a t i o n o r i e n t e d ' . 
The second type stems from the f i n a l reason l i s t e d above and 
i s termed as being 'capacity o r i e n t e d ' . VVatanabe p o i n t s 
out t h a t i n some of the French l i t e r a t u r e on the subject 
of subcontracting the two v a r i e t i e s are r e s p e c t i v e l y known 
as ' s t r u c t u r a l s u b c o n t r a c t i n g 1 and ' c y c l i c a l s u b c o n t r a c t i n g ' . 
(33) He also i n d i c a t e s , as a. matter o f i n t e r e s t , t h a t w h i l e 
i n d u s t r y t o i n d u s t r y s i t u a t i o n s vary, i n general terms, the 
former type o f s u b c o n t r a c t i n g abounds i n the United States 
and the l a t t e r i s more f r e q u e n t i n Europe. 
I n the case o f s p e c i a l i s a t i o n o r i e n t e d or s t r u c t u r a l 
s u b c o n t r a c t i n g , the u n d e r l y i n g m o t i v a t i o n f o r trade a l s o 
tends t o f o s t e r a complementary r e l a t i o n s h i p between th e 
purchaser and subcontractor. This i s because the 
subcontractor i s u s u a l l y a t t e m p t i n g t o f u . l .f i l one of 
the requirements i n i t s purchaser's various phases or 
.stages o f p r o d u c t i o n . When t h i s s i t u a t i o n occurs, the 
p o t e n t i a l e x i s t s f o r the development of a h i g h degree 
of mutual pr o d u c t i o n p r o c e s s . c o n t i n u i t y , and t h i s 
may i n t u r n l e a d t o the establishment of an a s s o c i a t i o n 
between buyer and s u p p l i e r which i s described as 
* q u a s i - i n t e g r a t i o n ' . The ' q u a s i - i n t d p g r a t i o n ' o f a 
s u p p l i e r ' s p r o d u c t i v e a c t i v i t i e s w i t h those of i t s 
customer may o r i g i n a t e i n the l a t t e r ' s need t o ensure t h a t 
the c o n t i n u i t y o f i t s p r o d u c t i o n process i s not d i s r u p t e d 
as a r e s u l t of component b o t t l e - n e c k s . I n some instances, 
1 q u a s i - i n t e g r a t i o n ' may develop out of the customer's 
d e s i r e t o t r a n s f e r the need t o i n v e s t i n component 
i n v e n t o r i e s and storage f a c i l i t i e s t o the subcontractor. 
I r r e s p e c t i v e of the reason, the u l t i m a t e e f f e c t i s t h a t 
t h e buyer's and s u p p l i e r ' s operations become c l o s e l y 
l i n k e d and h i g h l y i n t e g r a t e d . V/atanabe i n d i c a t e s t h a t 
the buyer may t h e r e f o r e come to i n f l u e n c e the subcontractor 
i n a number of s i g n i f i c a n t ways, and t o i l l u s t r a t e the 
p o i n t , he c i t e s as evidence the f o l l o w i n g examples of 
subcontractor d i r e c t e d assistance from buyers which he 
has. recorded: 
- supplies of raw m a t e r i a l s . 
- guidance on c o n t r o l o f p r o d u c t i o n processes, 
- guidance on q u a l i t y c o n t r o l . 
- guidance on machinery. 
- guidance on b l u e - p r i n t techniques. 
- f i n a n c i a l a i d . 
There can be l i t t l e doubt t h a t under these kinds of c o n d i t i o n s 
the s u p p l i e r cannot f o r long remain i n d i f f e r e n t t o i t s ' l a r g e 
j.K. Davies and M. K e l l y also touch upon the subject 
of s u b c o n t r a c t i n g i n t h e i r r e p o r t concerning s m a l l f i r m s 
i n the manufacturing sector(3U), and the essence of t h e i r 
view i s t h a t the small f i r m can become e s p e c i a l l y 
v u l n e r a b l e i f i t i s dependent upon a. su b c o n t r a c t i n g 
r e l a t i o n s h i p * V u l n e r a b i l i t y i s d e f i n e d i n terms of lo s s 
of independence by the su b c o n t r a c t o r . I n support of t h i s 
view they quote from evidence submitted by the N a t i o n a l 
Economic Development Cou n c i l t o the e f f e c t t h a t many: 
"... small f i r m s l i v e as subcontractors i n 
the shadow of l a r g e f i r m s , sometimes as a 
s p e c i a l i s t f u n c t i o n but o f t e n simply 
p r o v i d i n g a r e s e r v o i r o f surplus c a p a c i t y 
which the l a r g e f i r m can c a l l on i n times 
of boom and which can be shed i n times of 
recession."(35) 
I n a r a t h e r i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y based statement Davies and 
K e l l y sum up t h e i r treatment of the t o p i c by reproducing 
the f o l l o w i n g q u o t a t i o n : 
"... whenever s u b - c o n t r a c t i n g i s p r a c t i s e d , 
the a c t u a l f u n c t i o n of the small manufacturer 
seems t o become t h a t of the manager of a 
branch plant."(36) 
C e r t a i n l y , whenever the types of assistance and c o - o r d i n a t i o n 
of a c t i v i t i e s reviewed above occur i n a b u y e r - s e l l e r 
r e l a t i o n s h i p , the emergence of a type o f branch p l a n t syndrom 
seems t o bs one of the p o s s i b l e , but obvi o u s l y not necessary, 
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r e s u l t s . Watahabe p o i n t s out t h a t such r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
have the p o t e n t i a l t o p r o v i d e a guaranteed* market f o r 
the subcontractor, and by s h e l t e r i n g under the purchaser's 
umbrella, the subcontractor may be able t o develop the 
a b i l i t y to overcome the subordinate r e l a t i o n s h i p and 
evolve i n t o an independent producer. 
An e s s e n t i a l element t o be e x t r a c t e d from t h i s review 
of s p e c i f i c a l l y buyer-subcontractor trade r e l a t i o n s i s t h a t . 
under c e r t a i n general circumstances(3 7): there may not only 
be an exchange comprised o f a payment and end-product(s), 
t h a t i s , the t r a n s a c t i o n between t h e two p a r t i e s , and an 
exchange or t r a n s f e r of i n f o r m a t i o n concerning the 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s o f the end-product, b u t a l s o an exchange 
between the e n t e r p r i s e s of a c t u a l f a c t o r s of product ion.(38) 
To the subcontractor, the l a t t e r form of exchange may i n v o l v e 
the continuous r e c e i p t of p r o d u c t i v e resources and t h i s 
must i n e v i t a b l y become a s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a b l e when i t 
equates the costs of s u b s t i t u t i n g i t s m u n i f i c i e n t customer. 
For t h e purchaser, t h i s t r a n s f e r of resources i n the form 
of e i t h e r t a n g i b l e s u p p l i e s o f m a t e r i a l s , f i n a n c e , e t c , 
or i n t a n g i b l e s such as t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e , may be thought 
of i n terms o f an investment which i t has made i n the 
r e c i p i e n t s u p p l i e r . I n c o n s i d e r i n g the replacement of 
t h a t s u p p l i e r , the buyer may consider the nature and extent 
of the investment as a cost of s u b s t i t u t i o n . Therefore, 
two more aspects may be added t o the components o f dependency 
m a t r i x as p o t e n t i a l f a c t o r s i n the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the 
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-of the costs o f s u b s t i t u t i o n ; f o r the buyer i t i s the 
'cost of e x t r a o r d i n a r y investment' made i n i t s s u p p l i e r ( s ) , 
and f o r the s u p p l i e r i t i s the 'costs of r e p l a c i n g 
e x t r a o r d i n a r y investment'. (39) The investment has been 
termed 'ext r a o r d i n a r y ' . t o i n d i c a t e t h a t i t i s o b v i o u s l y 
not an investment i n the usual economic sense. 
Conclusion 
The broad approach of t h i s chapter has been t o o u t l i n e 
a conceputal basis f o r e x p l a i n i n g and understanding 
the emergence of s u p p l i e r dependency. I n the process, 
because t h e r e are two sides t o a market, the a n a l y s i s 
has also had something t o say about buyer dependency. 
However, the focus has been upon th e s u p p l i e r ' s p o s i t i o n , 
f o r i t i s upon f a c t o r s u p p l i e r s t h a t the emergence of l a r g e 
buying u n i t s , and the use o f s u p e r i o r b a r g a i n i n g power, 
has a most t e l l i n g e f f e c t . The an a l y s i s has shown 
t h a t one way of understanding the emergence o f superior, 
b a r g a i n i n g power may l i e i n t h e e x p l o r a t i o n of two p o s s i b l e 
determinants of dependency, and they were designated as 
' a v a i l a b i l i t y ' and ' s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y ' . I n order t o add 
substance t o these two i n t e r a c t i v e concepts, which 
together y i e l d e d a rough equation o f dependency, a 
review was made of some s e l e c t e d studies and a number 
of associated c o n t r i b u t o r y f a c t o r s were i d e n t i f i e d . Figure 
k-2 summarises the main components of dependency and 
the major, associated c o n t r i b u t o r y f a c t o r s . I n ess.ence, i t 
i s these s o r t s of concepts and f a c t o r s v/hich may provide t h 
p r a c t i c a l under p i n n i n g f o r understanding b a r g a i n i n g power. 
But the question which t h e y i n t h e i r t u r n beg, i s t o what 
ext e n t these types of c o n d i t i o n s a c t u a l l y e x i s t i n 
p a r t i c u l a r f a c t o r markets, and the answer o b v i o u s l y w a i t s 
e m p i r i c a l study. 
Figure k-2 
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i n t e g r a t i o n . ' g) C o n t i n u i t y i n 
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h ) Costs of r e p l a c i n g 
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The s u b s i d i a r y aim of. t h i s chapter was t o develop 
a.conceputal found a t i o n which-also prov i d e d a r e l a t i v e l y 
simple, and reasonably workable i n v e s t i g a t i v e framework 
f o r the examination o f s u p p l i e r dependency. The 
i n f o r m a t i o n summarised i n Figure i+-2 appears t o l e n d i t s e l f 
t o i n v e s t i g a t i v e w ork on at l e a s t two l e v e l s . On a 
rigdfcrous l e v e l i t may be p o s s i b l e to o b j e c t i v e l y 
determine and measure the market s t r u c t u r e , c a p a c i t y 
s i t u a t i o n , and r e l e v a n t costs of s u b s t i t u t i o n f o r buyers 
and s e l l e r s i n a p a r t i c u l a r market, and the m a t r i x 
c e r t a i n l y provides a s k e l e t o n o u t l i n e of the v a r i a b l e s 
t o be examined.(kO) On a lees s o p h i s t i c a t e d l e v e l , the 
f a c t o r s also appear s u i t a b l e f o r the use of i n t e r v i e w 
techniques i n order t o o b t a i n estimates o f the s i g n i f i c a n c e 
of the various f a c t o r s from informed decision-makers 
op e r a t i n g i n a p a r t i c u l a r m a r k e t . ( k l ) 
The f i n a l comment of t h i s chapter concerns a t o p i c 
which has already been a l l u d e d t o i n the d i s c u s s i o n of 
subcontractor/buyer r e l a t i o n s . I t was i n d i c a t e d t h a t i t 
was p o s s i b l e f o r a buyer's and i t s s u p p l i e r ' s a c t i v i t i e s 
t o become so entv/ined, t h a t a c o n d i t i o n of ' q u a s i - i n t e g r a t i o r i ' 
r e s u l t e d . This c o n d i t i o n has p o t e n t i a l l y serious 
i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r at l e a s t two reasons; f i r s t l y , because i t 
i n f l u e n c e s the exercise o f b a r g a i n i n g power: and secondly, 
because of the serious repercussive e f f e c t s the a c t i o n s of 
l a r g e buyers may have upon t h e i r s u p p l i e r s , and the economic 
sectors i n which t h e i r s u p p l i e r s operate. I n l i g h t of t h i s , the 
next chapter considers the e n t i r e concept i n more d e t a i l . 
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CHAPTER 5 .  
VERTICAL QUASI-INTEG-RAT10 H 
" I t does not always f o l l o w that formal 
v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n i s necessary t o 
achieve the apparent "benefit of t h i s 
form of i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e . I n 
some cases, .... customer and supplier 
may work closely v/ith each other, 
co-operating over questions of qua n t i t i e s , 
prices and delivery dates, and on 
techn i c a l m a t t e r s . " ( l ) 
Introduction 
I n Chapter 3 a review was made of some of the effect s 
which may arise when a large f i r m buys d i f f e r e n t i a t e d goods 
from i t s suppliers. I t was shown t h a t "by discriminating "between 
suppliers, the "buyer may "be able to eliminate 'economic rents' 
and push the price down to the l e v e l which, i n the long run, 
merely maintained the supplier i n business. Moreover, not only 
was the large buyer able t o exert the type of pressure which 
would force suppliers to abandon t h e i r attempts t o achieve some 
form of product d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and r e t u r n them t o pric e 
competition - but i f the buyer's p o s i t i o n was very strong., i t 
might pay only cost plus a f i x e d percentage, and be i n a po s i t i o n 
t o ensure that costs were not 'padded'. M.A. Adelman sums up 
the semblance of t h i s s i t u a t i o n by s t a t i n g t h a t ; "... the large 
buyer gains the advantages of v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n without 
assuming the r i s k s or r i g i d i t y cf ownership."(2) I n Chapter k 
i t v/as. aiso shown that c e r t a i n types of close trading r e l a t i o n s 
may approach a p o s i t i o n described as the 1 q u a s i - i n t e g r a t i o n 1 
of suppliers w i t h t h e i r "buyers. The suggestion that 
independently owned enterprises may be linked i n such a 
way th a t they behave or operate as integrated production 
units once again raises f a m i l i a r questions i n a number of 
areas, f o r example, what are the implications i n terms of 
monopsonistic e x p l o i t a t i o n , managerial independence, the 
inter-relatedness of i n d u s t r i a l sectors, and measures of 
economic power and concentration? I n attempting t o formulate 
even the most t e n t a t i v e responses t o these questions i t is 
necessary to consider and establish the v a l i d i t y of the 
i n i t i a l suggestion. Therefore, the primary aim of t h i s 
chapter i s to i d e n t i f y the general precepts associated w i t h 
the v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n or productive a c t i v i t i e s and to 
r e l a t e them to 1 quasi-integration'. I n other words, to examine 
whether conditions of v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n may be met or 
approximated, not through formal i n t e r n a l i s a t i o n , but through 
the exercise of superior bargaining power and through the 
existance of those factors which are rela t e d t o supplier 
dependency. 
By way of.organisation, the reraairder of the chapter 
begins with an over view of some basic d e f i n i t i o n a l elements 
t o be found i n the economic l i t e r a t u r e on underlying motivation 
f o r v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n . I t then considers a number cf 
implications generally associated w i t h v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n . 
I n the process cf reviewing both motivations and implic a t i o n s , 
an attempt i s made t o discuss the relevance of 'quasi-integratio 
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The conclusion presents a summary of the main points. 
Because t h i s thesis i s concerned w i t h factor•market "buyer/ 
supplier r e l a t i o n s , the analysis i s l i m i t e d p r i m a r i l y t o 
"backward i n t e g r a t i o n . The reasons underlying the pre-
occupation with v e r t i c a l relationships was explained i n the 
previous chapter, and stem from Palamountain's statement 
th a t i t i s i n these types of relationships that r e l a t i v e 
"bargaining strengths play a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e . 
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Motives Behind V e r t i c a l I n t e g r a t i o n ! A General Theoretical 
" Review 
The aim of t h i s section i s to b r i e f l y review some 
fundamental, t h e o r e t i c a l motives f o r v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n 
and to comment i n "broad terms on how they "bear upon "buyer/ 
supplier.dependent r e l a t i o n s . 
The examination of motivations fo r v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n 
generally reveals three types of considerations\ the 
desire f o r e f f i c i e n c y through technologically "based production 
economies; the desire to avoid markets, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
imperfect ones; and, the desire f o r security. Each one of 
these considerations w i l l "be reviewed i n t u r n . 
The f i r s t motivation t o he considered can "be described 
as the pursuit of 'production savings 1, and these 'savings' . 
are "based upon the . fact that an integrated f i r m may be able 
t o perform a series of successive productive functions on a 
more e f f i c i e n t basis than they could be f u l f i l l e d by a number 
of separate f i r m s . There are two types of 'production savings' 
which may be i d e n t i f i e d . The f i r s t , and most r e a d i l y understood 
type, occur .... "... i n cases where technologically 
complementary productive processes can be brought together i n 
a single plant."(3) J.S, Bain cites as an example of t h i s type 
the i n t e g r a t i o n of making pi g i r o n , converting i r o n i n t o s t e e l 
and the shaping of s t e e l i n t o semi-finished products. Pickering 
adds as another example the a b i l i t y to t u r n wood pulp i n t o 
newsprint.(U) I n essence, t h i s type of production saving requires 
the completion of successive processes quickly, thus, avoiding 
the i n c u r r i n g of intermediate costs and r e l a t e d disadvantages. 
The second type of production saving ocours^ not from technological 
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complementarity, "but from the easier consultation, planning 
and co-ordination of adjacent processes that i s made possible 
i n a v e r t i c a l l y integrated organisation 5) The. p o t e n t i a l 
benefits are widespread and Pickering l i s t s such factors as: 
(a) easier forward scheduling. 
(b) economies associated w i t h longer runs and 
uninterupted patterns of production. 
( c ) intensivecapacity u t i l i s a t i o n . 
(d) wider spread of overheads. 
(e) reduction of intermediate inventories. 
( f ) e limination of expense of purchase 
transactions, and, 
(g) r e l i a b l e influence upon product q u a l i t y . 
While benefits (c) and (d) seem to be more closel y a l l i e d t o 
taking advantage of increasing returns to scale, and benefit ( f ) 
t o a di r e c t cost of using the market, i t is clear that the 
remaining benefits d i r e c t l y r e l a t e to a firm's needs f o r 
cons.ultation, planning and co-ordination. 
Given the assumptions of product/process s i m p l i c i t y and 
a p e r f e c t l y s t a t i c environment, i t has been posited that a 
once-for-all contract "between buyer and s e l l e r may be a l l 
that is. required to ensure continuous production and that 
v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n may hold few of the above advantages. 
(B) However, i f "... conditions be enriched t o include the 
s t i p u l a t i o n that the product i n question i s t e c h n i c a l l y complex 
and that periodic redesign and/or volume changes are made i n 
response to changing environmental conditions . . . " ( 7 ) , then 
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the requirements change, that i s , the firm's planning/co-
ordination needs, and so may the appeal of v e r t i c a l 
i n t e g r a t i o n . I n a paper concerned w i t h v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n , 
O.E. Williamson suggests that i n SOEE instances, where there 
_ i s 'ex-ante' uncertainty attached t o purchasing decisions, 
the usual tools of the market, i . e . contracts, may "be 
unsuitable. Ke labels t h i s condition, 'contractual 
incompleteness', and i n b r i e f terms i t materialises because 
the three usual kinds of contract ( o n c e - f o r - a l l , short-term 
. and long-term) are unable t o specify, due to p r o h i b i t i v e 
costs or n o n - f e a s i b i l i t y , the e n t i r e range of contingencies, or. 
s t i p u l a t e the appropriate actions. Dynamic environments may 
therefore lead to contractual incompleteness, and once "... the 
contracting parties are locked i n t o a b i l a t e r a l exchange, the 
divergent interests betwen the parties w i l l predictably lead to 
i n d i v i d u a l l y opportunistic behaviour and j o i n t losses."(8) Such 
negative r e s u l t s may not, of course, necessarily occur, but 
v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n , according t o Williamson, would permit 
sequential adaptation t o environmental changes upon a basis 
of, co-operative adjustment between productive units and 
non-opportunistic bargaining.(9) 
I t i s reasonable to conclude that production savings of 
the f i r s t s o r t , that i s , of technological complementarity, do 
lend themselves almost exclusively to formal i n t e g r a t i o n . However, 
as the review of subcontracting r e l a t i o n s suggested, the 
second type cf production saving, that i s , consultation, 
planning and cc-ordination, may i n some oases be paralied t o 
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an extent by 1 quasi-integration*. Moreover, at least 
one researcher i n t h i s f i e l d has presented evidence, already 
covered e a r l i e r i n Chapter 3, that suppliers may be so bound 
t o and involved w i t h t h e i r customers, t h a t . t h e i r actions, 
and willingness t o absorb unforeseen contingencies, extend 
beyond the conditions set out i n t h e i r contracts.(10) 
Thus, while dynamic environments may lead to 'contractual 
incompleteness', some of the resultant deficiencies and 
uncertainties may be overcome through 'non-contractual 
f l e x i b i l i t y ' . This proposition may be especially true i n 
a 'large customer' trading r e l a t i o n s h i p , i n which i t has 
here been theorised, the f a c t o r market buyer's a b i l i t y to 
influence the outcomes of the re l a t i o n s h i p i s i n part 
determined by the degree of supplier dependency involved. 
I n a paper dealing w i t h the subject of v e r t i c a l quasi-
i n t e g r a t i o n , K.J. Blois c i t e s three examples of how elements 
of the second type of production saving may be captured by 
'large customers': (.11) 
1. Stocks and d e l i v e r y : 'Lafcge customers' often r e l y upon 
suppliers to have s u f f i c i e n t stocks and t o o f f e r 
f l e x i b l e delivery so that unexpected demand surges 
can be met. On the other side, they may also 
expect suppliers t o hold d e l i v e r i e s when production 
i s delayed, e.g., due to s t r i k e s . I n the f i n a l 
analysis/, such requirements may add. t o the suppliers' 
costs. 
2 . Materials 'Large customers' may arrange f o r the 
purchase and timed d i s t r i b u t i o n of materials or inputs, 
t h i s ensures q u a l i t y , timing, and i f there are purchase 
economies involved, also e f f e c t s the costs of the suppliers. 
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3. Technical Service Suppliers may provide consultation 
i n the form of technical service and advice, and, 
" t h i s often occurs w e l l i n advance of the time when a 
supplier knows whether or not i t w i l l receive an 
order f o r t h i s item from the customer and t h i s means 
that t h i s technical advice, i f provided free (as 
i t t y p i c a l l y i s ) , i s very much an investment w i t h 
a d e f i n i t e p o s s i b i l i t y of a zero r e t u r n i n the 
immediate future."(12) 
The essential point to he gathered from the above i s that both 
the elements behind production savings and the advantages t o 
be gained, may not exclusively require formal i n t e g r a t i o n and 
unit a r y ownership. 
A second motivation f o r v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n l i e s i n 
what J.P. Pickering c a l l s 'avoidence of the market'(13), 
but what may, i n more basic terms, be r e l a t e d to what 
D, Needham c a l l s an avoidance of ce r t a i n costs of using the 
market. (13) I n e f f e c t , these market costs concern not only 
purchasing and s e l l i n g functions, but also the costs of 
information c o l l e c t i o n , hedging and promotion which may 
be diminished or eliminated through formal i n t e g r a t i o n . 
Avoidance cf the market also underlies what O.E, Williamson 
e n t i t l e s 'strategic misrepresentation r i s k ' , and by which he 
refers to the risks which r e s u l t not only from 'ex-ante' and 
'ex post' uncertainty i n trading r e l a t i o n s , but also from the 
suppliers' vested i n t e r e s t s i n misrepresenting conditions,(15) 
As examples of what he means, Williamson c i t e s three occasions 
favouring i n t e g r a t i o n : 
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- 1. Moral Hazard. The 'conjoining of inharmonious 
incentives w i t h uncertainty' occurs, f o r example,, 
when contracting f o r an item f o r which the f i r a 1 
cost i s uncertain. A cost-plus contract s h i f t s 
the development and production r i s k s t o the buyer, 
"but may "... impair the incentives of the supplier 
t o achieve least-cost performance."(16) 
2. Externali ties/Imputation. Occurs when the 
accounting and monitoring of imputing costs 
and benefits are inadequately performed, and thus, 
assigned i n the transaction. I n t e r n a l i z a t i o n 
also avoids protracted disputes over these issues. 
3. Variable Proportions D i s t r o r t i o n s . Relates t o the 
s u b s t i t u t i o n of monopolistically priced factors w i t h 
competitively priced ones, through i n t e g r a t i o n . 
Williamson's case can be summed up as fo l l o w s : 
. "The advantages of i n t e r n a l i s a t i o n reside i n the 
fadts that the firm's 'ex post' access to the 
relevant data i s superior, i t attenuates the 
incentives to e x p l o i t uncertainty o p p o r t u n i s t i c a l l y , 
and the co n t r o l machinery that the f i r m i s able to 
activate i s more selective."(17) 
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One possible method of overcoming some of these 'strategic 
misrepresentation r i s k s ' can "be seen i n what M.A.. 
Adelman terms ' p a r t i a l integration',(18) Through incomplete 
i n t e g r a t i o n , a large "buyer i s i n a p o s i t i o n t o check on the 
cost and p r o f i t s of i t s suppliers, i t has .access t o much more 
information, and can therefore, exert downward pressure on 
prices. I n addition, 
"The large buyer i s able to keep his own supplying 
department near the optimum l e v e l of operations, 
and transfer the r i s k of f l u c t u a t i o n s , i . e . 
the cost of maintaining i d ^ i l ) capacity, to his 
suppliers."(19) 
i n t h i s case, 'large customer' t a c t i c s can be seen t o work 
towards a lowering of the costs of using the market by 
elimi n a t i n g some of the 'expost' uncertainties involved. 
Also i n r e l a t i o n t o the subject of market avoidance, 
Bain suggests that pecuniary economies materialise i f by 
in t e g r a t i n g i t i s possible to eliminate the payment to 
suppliers, "... of p r o f i t s i n excess of a basic r e t u r n on 
the added investment required t o integrate.""(20) The 
analysis of buyer/supplier r e l a t i o n s dealt with i n Chapter 3 
and p a r t i c u l a r l y M.A. Adelman's work, have already shown 
that i n large buyer, or 'large customer', and r e l a t i v e l y 
smaller supplier r e l a t i o n s s i m i l a r kinds of pecuniary 
economies may be attained without formal i n t e g r a t i o n . 
Naturally, to follow Bain-s^ statement, the p o s s i b i l i t y does 
exist that even at an extreme minimum pric e l e v e l of costs 
plus a f i x e d percentage, a supplier may s t i l l be producing 
at a l e v e l of costs which exceeds the "basic i n t e r e s t charges 
on the added investment required f o r i n t e g r a t i o n . Thus, f o r 
the buyer, formal i n t e g r a t i o n would be the best strategy. 
However, i f the supplier conforms to the Galbraithian model 
of a small f i r m , that i s , i t pays lower than average wages to 
i t s labour force, and has an entrepreneur who i s w i l l i n g t o 
be exploited by accepting a lower than p r e v a i l i n g rate of 
re t u r n , then 'quasi-integration* may prove to be the best 
'least-cost' strategy available.(21) Accurate conclusions 
would of course require empirical data, but i n t o t a l , the 
general t h e o r e t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n regarding t h i s motive, i s that 
large buyer/small supplier r e l a t i o n s may e f f e c t i v e l y reduce 
some of the costs of using the market, and thereby, roughly 
duplicate another incentive behind v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n . 
The. t h i r d and f i n a l motivation t o be considered i s one 
of sec u r i t y , that i s , the firm's desire f o r security of 
timely supply at rea d i l y , guaranteed prices and q u a l i t i e s . 
This desire f o r security may be r e f l e c t e d i n several s p e c i f i c 
forms. For example, the ownership of productive capacity 
ensures tha t i t i s always available when needed,. However, 
i t can be seen that a t i e d supplier which is both market and 
product s p e c i f i c , and which faces a l i m i t e d a v a i l a b i l i t y of 
alternate.buyers, with high costs of s u b s t i t u t i o n , may be so 
i n f l e x i b l e i n the short to medium term, as to make ownership, f o r 
security purposes v i r t u a l l y unnecessary. Another basis upon which 
the need f o r security may lead to formal i n t e g r a t i o n concerns 
a buyer's desire to maintain a regular, unbroken flow of supplies. 
Predictably, quasi-integration may also meet t h i s need, f o r 
example, Blois c i t e s cases i n which large customers have attempted 
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t o influence suppliers experiencing labour r e l a t i o n s problems 
by e i t h e r o f f e r i n g them the services of the buyers' own 
s p e c i a l i s t labour r e l a t i o n s s t a f f s , or by pressurising 
the suppliers to end a dispute quickly - regardless of 
the terms.(22) Both t a c t i c s are, of course, usually 
considered to be head o f f i c e perogatives which are employed 
when branch plants encounter di s r u p t i v e and generally, 
l o c a l i s e d problems. Closely a l l i e d to the necessity f o r 
supply c o n t i n u i t y , i s the buyer's desire to ensure 
consistent q u a l i t y and high p r o d u c t i v i t y , and i n many cases, a l l 
three of these hinge upon the supplier's management. I n 
l i g h t of t h i s , Blois states that many big firms expect to vet 
a supplier's senior management and: 
" I f the management is.not considered competent, 
then either the f i r m w i l l not be accepted as 
a supplier or suggestions w i l l be made as t o 
how the management fceam might be strengthened."(23) 
Blois: indicates that i n some cases these suggestions may run 
to the buyer's s p e c i f i c a t i o n that an i n d i v i d u a l from i t s own 
organisation should be -employed by the supplier. The d e s i r a b i l i t y 
of delving i n t o the i n t e r n a l operations, of suppliers i s w e l l 
established i n the conventional l i t e r a t u r e concerning e f f e c t i v e 
purchasing behaviour, and i n one study the w r i t e r not only 
c i t e s cases of customers 'on-hand' control over t h e i r 
suppliers' production methods and q u a l i t y systems, but he 
concludes w i t h the f o l l o w i n g statement: 
"The resul t s of t h i s study suggest that there is a 
d e f i n i t e need f o r better techniques and more formal 
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procedures f o r evaluating management, i n major 
supplier selections. Such improved techniques 
would help the purchaser 
(1) t o eliminate poorly-managed vendors from 
further c o s t l y consideration. 
( 2 ) t o apply proper weight t o t h i s factor i n 
choosing among several q u a l i f i e d suppliers, 
and, 
( 3 ) t o avoid or reduce supplier problems by 
developing an awareness of managerial 
trouble spots."(2^) 
A recent material example of one major U.K. buyer's 
attempts t o achieve a higher l e v e l of security, or c e r t a i n t y 
i n r e l a t i o n t o the a c q u i s i t i o n of i t s inputs, is povided by 
the Central E l e c t r i c i t y Generating Board. The C.E.G.B. has 
announced a policy.of conducting audits of 1000 of i t s power 
s t a t i o n construction suppliers. I n order to minimise the 
r i s k of c o s t l y delays, The Financial Times reports t h a t : 
"The f u l l a u d i t , by C.E.G.B. engineering services 
d i v i s i o n , w i l l cover the managerial and 
f i n a n c i a l competence as w e l l as the technical 
competence of the companies."(25) 
The Times adds that the audit, "... i s coupled w i t h a 
more thorough checking of the a b i l i t y of suppliers t o 
maintain high q u a l i t y and to provide e f f e c t i v e programme 
managementc"(26) I n order to obtain a ' c e r t i f i c a t e of 
compliance'j the supplier must 'cooperate' and permit the 
auditors to examine i t s practices, and of course, correct 
any 'inadequacies* found* I n r e l a t i o n t o the buyer's need 
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f o r s e c u r i t y the advantages of such 'audits' are apparent, cut 
more than t h i s , they also overlap, i n terms of t h e i r a b i l i t y 
t o generate information and exercise i n t e r n a l c o n t r o l , w i t h 
the motivations f o r production savings ('exaate' uncertainty 
included) and f o r avoidance of the market (>'exa.nte' 
and 'ex post' uncertainty included). Therefore, on the 
surface at l e a s t , the G.E.G.B. appears to be on i t s way 
to gaining some of the benefits of formal i n t e g r a t i o n 
without any of the associated formal paraphernalia ascribed 
i n conventional economic theory. The fundamental condition 
underlying i t s a b i l i t y to conduct such a programme, may 
be concisely summarised by the fol l o w i n g comment from 
The Financial Times: "... so commanding i s the s i t u a t i o n 
of the customer here, even i t s major contractors are 
u n l i k e l y t o protest very loudly."(27) 
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Implications of V e r t i c a l I n t e g r a t i o n ; Some Relevant Consequences 
The primary purpose of t h i s section i s t o review some 
of the implications usually associated w i t h formal i n t e g r a t i o n , 
and i n the process, to assess t h e i r relevance t o postulated 
conditions of quasi-integration of "buyers and suppliers i n 
facto r markets. The "broad framework t o "be used f o r t h i s review 
has "been borrowed from J.F. Pickering, and i t consists of 
two major types of implications: managerial, and economic.(28) 
I n h i s discussion of the managerial implications of 
v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n Pickering indicates that the major 
advantages usually ascribed t o i t i n fa c t stem from three 
i m p l i c i t , assumptions: 
(a) that i n t r a - f i r m communication i s better 
than i n t e r - f i r m communication. 
(b) that i n t e r n a l parts of an organisation 
have common, non- c o n f l i c t i n g goais, 
and, 
(c) that wherever possible, intra-group 
trading occurs. 
The assumption related to intra-versus i n t e r - f i r m 
communication p a r t i a l l y revolves around the economies of 
information exchanage and consequent reduction of uncertainty 
covered i n the previous section. O.E. Williamson adds a 
fu r t h e r dimension t o the communication assumption by suggesting 
that there are 'information processing e f f e c t s ' attached to 
v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n and these can be seen i n at least 
two areas: . 
(a) 'information impactedness'; where low 
cost information at>out r i s k s involved i n 
a transaction i s not available to "both 
p a r t i e s , but is believed to be s u f f i c i e n t 
by the party (e.g., an entrepreneur) who 
resorts, to i n t e g r a t i o n because of the 
unwillingness of others to. contract i n t o 
the transaction. I n simple terms, the 
entrepreneur's assessment of the risks 
w i l l be based upon useful information 
which does not have the same 'impact' 
on others, and thus to obtain the resource(s) 
required, he integrates; 
(b) 'observational economies'; because the 
acq u i s i t i o n of information may involve 
a f i x e d 'set-up cost', the returns from 
a commitment of the r e q u i s i t e resources 
may be more e f f e c t i v e l y spread i f there 
were a wider range of a c t i v i t i e s involved, 
that i s , "... i f a single set of 
observations can be made that i s of relevance 
t o a related series of production stages, 
v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n may be e f f i c i e n t . " ( 2 9 ) 
Thus, because a f i x e d commitment has already 
been made f o r one part of the production stage, 
i t may be e f f i c i e n t to move i n t o 
other stag'es and spread the commitment. 
I n general, then the s u p e r i o r i t y of the i n t r a - f i r m 
communications assumption i s based upon the premise that 
w i t h i n the f i r m there i s an unrestricted, continuous flow of 
useful, homogenous information, The second assumption of 
common, non-conflicting goals Williamson describes; as the 
'convergence of expectations'. This issue, he argues, v / i l l 
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be of p a r t i c u l a r relevance when there exists a high degree of 
interdependence between successive production stages, as w e l l 
as, some degree of d i f f i c u l t y i n specifying a l l of the 
appropriate conditional resonses to changes which may occur. 
Co-ordination of the a c t i v i t i e s i s l i k e l y to "be less 
e f f i c i e n t between independent units because the costs of 
negotiation and the time required are probably greater than 
i f the successive stages were integrated under one administrative 
process, w i t h i t s associated r e f i n e d 'reward and penalty 
instruments'. 
The s u p e r i o r i t y of an integrated administrative process 
i s i n f a c t a basic tenet of Williamson's analysis, and as 
the above i l l u s t r a t e s , he confirms the general v a l i d i t y of 
the f i r s t two i m p l i c i t assumptions. Not only does he suggest 
that the firm's information processing is. more e f f e c t i v e , but 
the f i r m , "... .possesses a comparatively e f f i c i e n t c o n f l i c t 
r e s o l u t i o n machinery" (30) For example, he states: 
"Interorganisatlonal c o n f l i c t can be s e t t l e d by 
f i a t only r a r e l y , i f at a l l ... By contrast, 
i n t r a - o r g a n i s a t i o n a l settlements by f i a t are 
common."(31) 
I t i s worth noting that the two preceding chapters have shown 
that i n c e r t a i n kinds of trading relationships f i a t , i n the . 
form of superior bargaining power, does exist and therefore, 
may be useful i n c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n . Moreover as Blois 
convincingly i l l u s t r a t e s w i t h evidence from Monopolies 
Commission reports, many large customers obtain information by 
making i t a condition of business that they have access to 
a supplier's plant and records.(252) Thus, i t i s apparent that 
t o dichotomise trading r e l a t i o n s i n t o the polar opposities of 
•either 'arms length 1 transactions,. or v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n 
represents a gross under estimation of the capacity of 
firms to duplicate the underlying conditions associated 
w i t h these two i m p l i c i t assumptions. Returning t o the main 
argument, there is a vast l i t e r a t u r e i n the f i e l d of 
organisational behaviour which deals "both w i t h the deficiencies 
of i n t r a o r g a n i s a t i o n a l information flows and with the problems 
of i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t resolution.(33) What i s more, t h i s 
l i t e r a t u r e tends to lend credence to J.F. Pickering's 
contention that i n some cases the generation of i n t e r n a l 
problems can negate the cost benefits derived from v e r t i c a l 
i n t e g r a t i o n . These problems may take many d i f f e r e n t forms but 
mainly r e l a t e t o an over-extension of the management team e i t h e r 
i n terms of i t s a b i l i t y or know-how,. an i n f l e x i b i l i t y of 
operations, a f a i l u r e t o subject i n t e r n a l units to the objective 
c r i t e r i a of economic performance, and the need to maintain 
an harmonious balance between d i f f e r e n t parts of the 
organisation. Because these managerial problems are b a s i c a l l y 
i n t e r n a l , they would not occur to the same degree w i t h 
quasi-integration. 
The f i n a l i m p l i c i t assumption i d e n t i f i e d by Pickering 
wa3 that of intra-grcup t r a d i n g . Pickering points out t h a t 
i n some instances intra-group trading i s forbidden because i t 
may create d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n and tensions, and also lead t o a 
loss of f l e x i b i l i t y . Aside from these problems.7 which emerge 
from such areas as transfer p r i c i n g nsgotations., there i s the 
fundamental disadvantage t h a t , "... i t may "be more d i f f i c u l t 
t o cease trading w i t h an i n e f f i c i e n t part of the same 
organisation than to drop an independent i n e f f i c i e n t 
supplier."(34) I n addition to the managerial problems i n 
intra-group t r a d i n g , there i s also an associated technical 
one of ensuring that the e f f i c i e n t operating scales of 
d i f f e r e n t production functions are matched. As Bain 
puts i t : 
"... there must he an integrated operation a 
' r e c o n c i l i a t i o n ' of the horizontal-scale 
optima of the related stages, generally-
r e q u i r i n g f o r "best e f f i c i e n c y an increase 
of the scale of operations above the 
minimum optimal f o r the stages w i t h 
the smaller minimum optimal scales."(35) 
Once again the quasi-integration of a supplier can he seen as 
a possible means of avoiding some of these intra-group 
disadvantages. 
The next type of implications to be linked t o v e r t i c a l 
i n t e g r a t i o n have been described as 'economic', and they r e l a t e 
t o two main issues: entry b a r r i e r s and anti-competitive e f f e c t s . 
Entry b a r r i e r s e s s e n t i a l l y involve two problem areas. The 
f i r s t of these occurs i f the s i t u a t i o n materialises where 
e x i s t i n g firms i n an industry either c o n t r o l a l l of the 
available sources of supply of p a r t i c u l a r facors, or they w i l l 
only supply them to competitors at uneconomic prices. The 
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second problem area applies i n situations i n which the entrant 
to an industry faces constraints i n obtaining c a p i t a l funds, 
and thus, "... v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n by established firms which 
makes i t necessary f o r the entrant to enter more than one 
stage ( o f the production process) i n order to be just as 
e f f i c i e n t as established firms w i l l make entry more d i f f i c u l t . " ( 3 6 ) 
The other type of economic implications concern a n t i -
competitive e f f e c t s , f o r as Pickering points out, a v e r t i c a l l y 
integrated f i r m , which also supplies i t s competitors, may 
resort t o a price 'squeeze' either through d i f f e r e n t i a l p r i c i n g 
p o l i c i e s (or as Williamson more accurately describes i t , 
p r ice d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ) , or by influencing the terms of sale i n 
such areas, as product q u a l i t y , speed of service, and frequency 
of supply (especially at times of excess demand). The 
assessment of how entry b a r r i e r s may apply to quasi-integration 
suffers from an absence of r e a d i l y available empirical 
data. However, i t is^ possible to speculate that while suppliers 
which are 'quasi-integrated' obviously possess more p o t e n t i a l 
trading m o b i l i t y or f l e x i b i l i t y than integrated production 
departments; the existence of an array of ' t i e d suppliers', A 
that i s , t i e d to established firms, must present an a d d i t i o n a l , 
even i f indeterminate, obstacle or cost f o r new entrants t o 
overcome. On the issue of anti-competitive e f f e c t s , Blois 
does provide some i n t e r e s t i n g empirical evidence that large 
customers often attempt to i n t e r f e r e w i t h a supplier's r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h i t s other customers. He states that t h i s interference: 
"... may take many forms including, for example, 
s t a t i n g that the supplier must not also act as 
a supplier to c e r t a i n of the customer's 
immediate competitors, or informing the supplier 
that a proprosed advertising campaign i n 
conjunction w i t h a competitor i s not to he 
carried out."(37) 
While categorical conclusions are not possible, i t does seem 
l i k e l y that quasi-integration may also offer some of the 
advantages associated with these economic consequences, 
To summarise, the managerial consequences of formal 
i n t e g r a t i o n , which may often act as dis-incentives or 
constraints upon i n t e g r a t i o n , can be avoided, and the 
economic, consequences may be moderately duplicated, f o r 
large customer/supplier r e l a t i o n s i n which 'quasi-
i n t e g r a t i o n ' occurs. 
Conclusi on 
I n discussing v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n D. Needham states 
that regardless of the objective which a f i r m pursues, that 
i s , whether i t be p r o f i t maximisation, sales revenue 
maximisation, or maximisation of i t s growth r a t e , because 
i n t e g r a t i o n reduces the costs of the firm's f i n a l product, 
i t would be a desirable strategy to follow,(38) Another 
economist, R.N. McKean, elaborates upon t h i s bayic notion 
of simple cost reduction by i n d i c a t i n g t h a t a s i g n i f i c a n t 
reason f o r v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n l i e s i n the attempt to 
reduce transaction costs.(39) As the preceding sections have 
suggested these transaction costs involve such diverse elements 
as:"... information exchange, product purchase, r e d i s t r i b u t i o n 
of r i s k bearing, e l i m i n a t i o n of i n e f f i c i e n t input combinations 
by the processor because of monopoly prices charged by 
component manufacturers, and achievement of technological 
economies by arranging lower cost transfer of components to 
the processor (e.g. molten i r o n t o the steel m i l l ) . " ( i ; 0 ) 
Moreover, the assessment of transaction costs may also consider 
the opportunity and propensity f o r protracted st r a t e g i c 
bargaining and the exchange of questionable, or dubious 
information. Thus, in'general terms, McKean reasonably 
concludes that v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n i s concerned with 
e x t e r n a l i t i e s , e i t h e r i n the form of costs being imposed, or 
po t e n t i a l benefits being denied. 
Costs and benefits have appropriately been the key c r i t e r i a 
i n t h i s review of the motivations and implications associated 
Y f i t h v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n , and the a b i l i t y of quasi-integration 
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t o a t t a i n p a r a l l e l conditions. I t has been reasonably shown 
that i n most respects quasi-integration has the p o t e n t i a l t o 
achieve many of the cost reductions, or capture many of the 
be n e f i t s of v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n . I t was shown i n Chapter 3 
that i n i t treatment of the precuniary advantages of 
large size and superior buyer power conventional economic theory 
has been p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h monopsonistic e x p l o i t a t i o n . 
I t i s now apparent that t h i s approach overlooks some s i g n i f i c a n t 
dynamic aspects of fact o r market behaviour which may 
encourage the large buyer to use i t s superior buying power i n 
a more arca&e fashion, and thus, attempt to gain many of 
the benefits of v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n without assuming the 
ri s k s or r i g i d i t y of ownership. 
•A number of organisational t h e o r i s t s have postulated 
that the modern d i v e r s i f i e d i n d u s t r i a l enterprise i s 
increasingly confronted by a progressively more dynamic and 
complex operating environment.(Ul) Such environmental 
conditions imply that the large enterprise must often face 
high levels of uncertainty i n respect of i t s various a c t i v i t i e s , 
and thus, may be expected t o attempt to reduce t h i s 
uncertainty wherever possible. I n r e l a t i o n t o the 
enterprise's factor market behaviour, K.J. Arrow has 
developed a simple model which emphasises the r o l e of 
uncertainty i n the supply or a c q u i s i t i o n of an upstream good 
( i . e . a f a c t o r of production), and the need f o r information by 
the downstream firms ( i . e . i n d u s t r i a l buyers ), (1+2) Given 
his not. exceptionally complex assumptions, Arrow shows that 
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"because the buyer is motivated to reduce the uncertainty 
concerning the supply of the upstream good i n order to improve 
i t s a b i l i t y to choose the l e v e l of c a p i t a l appropriate to i t s 
own output, there .exists an incentive for i n c i p i e n t 
v e r t i c a l - i n t e g r a t i o n . This chapter has e f f e c t i v e l y shown 
that under conditions broadly equivalent t o Arrows', and 
w i t h i n the context of general uncertainty i n trading 
r e l a t i o n s , there are also strong incentives f o r v e r t i c a l , 
'quasi-integration*. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SPATIAL APPROACHES TO FACTOR MARKET TRADING RELATIONS 
"One expects t o f i n d some r e l a t i o n s h i p "between 
the f u n c t i o n a l structure of an industry and 
i t s geographical structure .... Loca l i s a t i o n 
is one method of increasing the economic 
size of an industry and achieving the gains 
of s p e c i a l i s a t i o n . The a u x i l i a r y and 
complementary industries that must operate 
i n intimate co-operation can seldom do so 
e f f i c i e n t l y at a distance."(1) 
I n t r o d u c t i on 
Given the above quotation, i t i s not unreasonable t o 
speculate that G.J. S t i g l e r ' s expression must operate 
i n intimate co-operation...' may possibly be another way 
of characterising what the previous chapter described as 
the need f o r f a c t o r market buyers and s e l l e r s to consult, 
plan, and co-ordinate. That i s , e s s e n t i a l l y those conditions 
associated with dependency i n general, and w i t h either formal v e r t i c a 
i n t e g r a t i o n , or quasi-integration i n p a r t i c u l a r . However, S t i g l e r 
adds a new element to t h i s analysis, and i t is that there may 
also be c e r t a i n s p a t i a l implications. I n f a c t , trading 
r e l a t i o n s between fa c t o r market buyers and s e l l e r s represents an 
important area of study for regional economists, and t h e i r 
p r i m a r i l y s p a t i a l o r i e n t a t i o n , has led them to examine the 
l c c a t i o n a l aspects of these r e l a t i o n s , under the r u b r i c of 
i s - — 
of i n d u s t r i a l linkage patterns. Moreover, some of t h e i r 
work has "been conceptualised upon the basis that there i s a 
•relationship between the proximate l o c a t i o n of f i r m s , or 
agglomeration, and the need f o r technical or specialised 
production u n i t s . I f some of the conditions c o n t r i b u t i n g 
toward i n d u s t r i a l agglomeration p a r a l l e l some of those 
conditions associated w i t h the dependency of supplier units 
and the quasi-integration of suppliers w i t h dominant buyers, 
then the r o l e or importance of key large i n d u s t r i a l u n i t s , 
which may also happen to be geographically concentrated, may 
i n e f f e c t be behaviourally more complex and pervasive than 
the linkage patterns shown i n input-output models, which are 
based upon the q u a n t i t a t i v e flow of physical goods and 
services alone, suggest. I t i s the aim of t h i s chapter t o 
b r i e f l y explore, i n general terms, the l i k e l i h o o d that 
i n some, but c e r t a i n l y not a l l , s i tuations overlapping 
conditions may occur i n both dependent trading r e l a t i o n s and 
i n agglomerative linkage patterns i n v o l v i n g a master industry 
or f i r m . 
The chapter begins by examining the notion that the 
process of i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n , that i s , i n d u s t r i a l growth, may 
lead to the creation of highly t i e d ' s a t e l l i t e ' industries.-
The analysis then b r i e f l y touches upon the concept of regional 
growth poles and economic dominance. I n t h i s analysis, the need 
to acquire.an understanding of the external economics involved 7 
i n industrial-geographic concentration, or p o l a r i s a t i o n i s i d e n t i f i e d . 
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This need is-confirmed by an overview of some of the 
•general agglomerative forces e f f e c t i n g linkages and 
loca t i o n , and then some s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of i n d u s t r i a l 
linkage are presented. Wherever i t i s possible to do so* 
an attempt i s made t o r e l a t e the analysis t o the various facets 
of supplier dependency and quasi-integration covered i n 
previous chapters. The conclusion draws the chapter together 
and summarises. Within the broad framework of the thesis the 
chapter adds another dimension to the understanding of how 
the i n d u s t r i a l structure is effected, by dominant factor ' 
market trading r e l a t i o n s . 
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S a t e l l i t e s ' and Growth Poles 
The purpose of t h i s section i s to present some 
fundamental ideas, which have been taken from l i t e r a t u r e on 
i n d u s t r i a l development or growth, and which r e l a t e t o the 
general concept that amongst the various 'inducement mechanisms' 
involved i n the process of i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n , the r o l e 
of a dominant, master industry has "been assigned a 
degree of importance. That i s to say, the active 
encouragement of large f a c t o r market "buyers might be 
a worthwhile economic p o l i c y t o pursue because they may act 
as s t i m u l i to i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and growth. I t should be 
noted that most of the concepts introduced i n t h i s section 
are relevant to a national context and not necessarily a 
regional one. 
The f i r s t topic i n t h i s section concerns A.O. Hirjehman' s 
formulation of the notion of backward linkage, and his. related 
description of ' s a t e l l i t e i n d u s t r i e s ' . ( 2 ) I n his discussion 
of inducement mechanisms, HirBihman describes a process by * 
which one product or industry stimulates the production of 
other products, or the creation of other i n d u s t r i e s , and i n 
so doing, encourages economic growth. One such mechanism, 
termed 'backward linkage e f f e c t s ' , p a r t i c u l a r l y relates t o 
f a c t o r markets because: 
"Backward linkages occur when an industry 
needs inputs and creates such a strong 
demand f o r them that new industries 
spring i n t o being to s a t i s f y i t . " ( 3 ) 
Thus., 'linkage e f f e c t s ' emanate from one industry 
towards, another, and i n order t o understand the ' t o t a l ' 
e f f e c t which may occur, i t i s necessary to examine i t s two 
underlying elements: 'importance' and 'strength'. The 
'importance' of the effect stems from the net output of the 
newly created i n d u s t r i e s , and the 'strength', from the 
p r o b a b i l i t y that the new industries w i l l be created. 
Elaborating upon these two elements, Hirschman indicates 
that the t o t a l e f f e c t can be measured by the sum of the 
products of 'importance' and 'strength', as expressed 
by the fo l l o w i n g equation: 
w = S x i P i 
1 
v/here, W= the t o t a l linkage e f f e c t of the establishment of 
industry W, 
n= the number of addit i o n a l industries created, 
( i = 1, 2..,n) = the net outputs of 'n' in d u s t r i e s , and, 
p^ ( i = 1, 2 ...n) = the p r o b a b i l i t y that each one of the 
'n' industries w i l l be set up as a 
r e s u l t of the establishment of 
industry V/, 
The p r o b a b i l i t i e s measure the ' s t r e n g t h ' of the stimulus 
and i t is. possible t o 'roughly' measure t h i s s t r e n g t h 
provided c e r t a i n other v a r i a b l e s are known. The f i r s t of 
these other v a r i a b l e s r e l a t e s t o the f a c t t h a t the 
e s t a b l i s h i n g i n d u s t r y , 'W , r e q u i r e s known annual p h y s i c a l 
i n p u t s designated as: y 1 ? y 2... y n« Secondly, the 
'minimum economic size', i n terms o f annual p r o d u c t i v e c a p a c i t y , 
of the f i r m s which would produce the i n p u t s , y n , y 0 , ... y 
i — n, 
i s known and designated as: a,, a 0... s . Given these 
1 2. n 
two v a r i a b l e s the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t the establishment of 
i n d u s t r y 'W' w i l l s t i m u l a t e the c r e a t i o n of f i r m s t o produce i t s 
i n p u t s , i s equal t o the r a t i o o f the annual p h y s i c a l i n p u t s 
t o the f i r m s ' annual p r o d u c t i v e c a p a c i t y : 
P. = l 
Hirschman p o i n t s out t h a t t h e 'y's' are equivalent t o the 
gross output o f the f i r m s i n p h y s i c a l terms and should not be 
confused w i t h the 'x's', or 'importance.' element, which 
represents the net output i n value tei'ms. F i n a l l y , Hirschman 
s t a t e s t h a t 'minimum economic s i z e ' i s not a t e c h n i c a l concept 
but i s defined i n economic terms by c o n s i d e r i n g normal p r o f i t s 
and "... e f f i c i e n t f o r e i g n s u p p l i e r s " : 
"... i t i s the s i z e at which the domestic f i r m w i l l 
be able t o secure normal p r o f i t s and t o compete 
w i t h e x i s t i n g f o r e i g n s u p p l i e r s , t a k i n g i n t o 
account l o c a t i o n a l advantages and disadvantages 
as w e l l as perhaps., some i n f a n t i n d u s t r y 
p r o t e c t i o n . " { k ) . 
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Having " b r i e f l y e s t a b l i s h e d h i s basic framework and 
described t h e two component elements i n the l i n k a g e e f f e c t , 
i t . i s . now p o s s i b l e t o i n t r o d u c e the concept of a ' s a t e l l i t e 
i n d u s t r y 1 . Hirschman i n d i c a t e s t h a t not only can 'importance' 
and ' s t r e n g t h ' be i n v e r s e l y r e l a t e d , but when 'importance' 
i s small ( t h e *x's' or net output i n value terms) and 
the p r o b a b i l i t y i s great ( t h e 'p's'), the i n d u s t r i e s which 
are created may be c a l l e d ' s a t e l l i t e i n d u s t r i e s ' . This i s 
because the ' s a t e l l i t e i n d u s t r y ' i s h i g h l y t i e d t o the 
e s t a b l i s h i n g 'master i n d u s t r y ' , and i s "... almost c e r t a i n 
t o be e s t a b l i s h e d once the master i n d u s t r y i s i n place."(5) 
Moreover, s a t e l l i t e i n d u s t r i e s g e n e r a l l y possess a number 
of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n r e l a t i o n t o backward l i n k a g e 
c o n d i t i o n s and these are as f o l l o w s : 
"... a) i t enjoys a s t r o n g l o c a t i o n a l advantage 
from p r o x i m i t y t o the master i n d u s t r y ; 
b) i t s p r i n c i p a l output i s a - u s u a l l y minor -
i n p u t of the master i n d u s t r y ; and, 
c ) i t s minimum economic size i s smaller than 
t h a t of the master i n d u s t r y . " ( 6 ) 
I n simple terms, Hirschman's s a t e l l i t e c o n d i t i o n appears t o 
reduce t o a s i t u a t i o n i n which a b i g purchasing u n i t i s s u p p l i e d 
by r e l a t i v e l y small s e l l e r s . This i s because a small l e v e l 
of 'importance', t h a t i s , 'x' or the value of net output, when 
combined w i t h the f u r t h e r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the output being 
a 'minor.' i n p u t , and the f i r m being of a smaller minimum 
economic s i z e , tends t o suggest the involvement of r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l , 
scale p r o d u c t i o n and s e l l i n g units., While a h i g h l e v e l of 
p r o b a b i l i t y , i n its t u r n , i m p l i e s t h a t the p h y s i c a l q u a n t i t y 
taken by the master f i r m as i t s i n p u t represents a l a r g e 
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p r o p o r t i o n of the suppl y i n g f i r m ' s t o t a l , full-employment 
p r o d u c t i v e c a p a c i t y , and t h i s s i t u a t i o n q u i t e reasonably 
approximates the d e s c r i p t i o n o u t l i n e d e a r l i e r of a 'large 
customer' t r a d i n g . r e l a t i o n s h i p . I t can he.seen, t h e r e f o r e , 
t h a t almost i m p l i c i t l y behind Hirschman's r a t h e r s t a t i c 
d e f i n i t i o n of ' s a t e l l i t e i n d u s t r i e s ' , there are the more 
dynamic concepts o f customer domination, s u p p l i e r dependency 
and s u p e r i o r b a r g a i n i n g power. Depending upon the .'master 
i n d u s t r y ' s c a p a c i t y and p r o p e n s i t y t o use i t s p o s i t i o n t o 
e x p l o i t i t s ' s a t e l l i t e s ' , i . e . i n the monopsonistic sense 
explored e a r l i e r , the po s s i b l e long run i n f l u e n c e of backward 
l i n k a g e e f f e c t s as an inducement mechanism, by f o s t e r i n g 
the development of small scale e n t e r p r i s e , may be somewhat 
abrogated. However, s p e c u l a t i o n aside, such matters are 
beyond the scope of t h i s simple a n a l y s i s which has been 
aimed at merely p r e s e n t i n g an i d e n t i f i a b l e t h e o r e t i c a l 
framework i n which l a r g e buyers and small s u p p l i e r s have 
been a t t r i b u t e d a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the growth o f 
i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t y , and i n which some of the dynamic aspects 
of b u y e r / s u p p l i e r r e l a t i o n s discussed i n previous chapters, 
may be cf p o t e n t i a l relevance. 
I n Hirschmah's a n a l y s i s of growth t h e r e was, i n the case 
of s a t e l l i t e i n d u s t r i e s , an associated c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
i n v o l v i n g the master i n d u s t r y and the existence of a l o c a t i o n a l 
advantage a t t r i b u t a b l e t o s u p p l i e r p r o x i m i t y . The l i n k i n g of 
l o c a t i o n a l f a c t o r s w i t h i n d u s t r i a l growth has been a t o p i c o f 
concern i n r e g i o n a l economic s t u d i e s , and since the concept o f 
a dominant f i r m also emerges i n t h i s work, there e x i s t , some 
areas of over-lap w i t h dynamic bixyev/supp 1 j.er r e l a t i o n s „ A 
seminal a r t i c l e i n t h i s f i e l d , "by Perroux, presents the 
n o t i o n o f development poles (pftles de croissance) by p o s i t i n g 
t h a t the fundamental f a c t of s p a t i a l development i s t h a t : 
"... growth doea not appear everywhere and a l l 
at once; i t appears: i n p o i n t s or development 
po l e s , w i t h v a r i a b l e i n t e n s i t i e s ; i t spreads 
along di v e r s e channels and w i t h v a r y i n g 
t e r m i n a l e f f e c t s f o r the whole of the 
economy."(7) 
While the above tends t o suggest some k i n d of geographical 
p a r a m e t e r s , N.M. Hansen, warns t h a t Perroux was not o f f e r i n g 
a t h e o r y of l o c a t i o n , but r a t h e r centred h i s a n a l y s i s upon 
complex economic r e l a t i o n s , and not upon the types of 
geographical co n s i d e r a t i o n s g i v e n t o Perroux's work by other 
w r i t e r s . ( 8 ) Thus, Hansen suggests, Perroux's a n a l y s i s 
r e l a t e s t o h i s o v e r a l l concept o f economic space which i s 
comprised of three elements: 
"... economic space as d e f i n e d by a pl a n , economic 
space as a f i e l d of forces,.and economic space 
as a homogeneous aggregate."(9) I t i s not 
necessary t o ' e l a b o r a t e .upon a l l of these elements, f o r only 
the second one i s r e l e v a n t t o t h i s a n a l y s i s , a rd i n Perroux's 
words, i t "... consists of centres ( o r poles or f o c i ) from which 
c e n t r i f u g a l forces emanate and t o which c e n t r i p e t a l forces are 
a t t r a c t e d . Each centre being a centre of a t t r a c t i o n and 
r e p u l s i o n , has i t s proper f i e l d , which i s set i n the f i e l d of 
other centres."(10) Hansen p o i n t s out t h a t o t h e r s , i n the 
a p p l i c a t i o n , of Perroux's concepts, have stressed the ' r e g i o n a l 
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character- of economic space' and have thus l i n k e d economic 
space w i t h geographic space. However, he a l s o s t a t e s t h a t t h i s 
l i n k has o f t e n "been made w i t h o u t an adequate d e f i n i t i o n of the 
r e l e v a n t t o p i c s and he proceeds t o e x p l a i n the "basis upon 
which the l i n k should occur. The e x p l a n a t i o n of t h i s l i n k 
r e q u i r e s the i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h e subject of economic 
dominance t o the a n a l y s i s , and i s t h e r e f o r e of d i r e c t 
relevance t o t h i s t h e s i s . 
Hansen suggests t h a t Perroux was concerned w i t h the dynamic 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f economic a c t i v i t y and so f o r him, the e f f e c t 
of domination "... c o n s i s t s o f an i r r e v e r s i b l e or p a r t i a l l y 
r e v e r s i b l e i n f l u e n c e exercised by one u n i t upon another. An 
economic u n i t exercises t h i s e f f e c t by reason of i t s s i z e or 
dimension, i t s n e g o t i a t i n g s t r e n g t h , the nature of i t s a c t i v i t y , 
or because, i t belongs t o a zone of dominant a c t i v i t y . " ( 1 1 ) 
I n s p i t e of the vagueness surrounding what- c o n s t i t u t e s a 
'zone', i t i s nevertheless noteworthy t h a t Perroux has also 
i d e n t i f i e d s i z e and b a r g a i n i n g power as important elements i n 
h i s a n a l y s i s . Returning t o Perroux: domination may be. seen as 
o c c u r r i n g when "... a f i r m c o n t r o l s an a b s t r a c t economic 
space, the market f o r a product or a s e r v i c e or a group of 
products or s e r v i c e s . " ( 1 2 ) I n c o n t r o l l i n g one economic space, 
the f i r m may also be able t o exercise i t s i n f l u e n c e on another 
economic space "... e i t h e r i n a permanent and s t r u c t u r a l manner 
(a commercial bank), or i n an a c c i d e n t a l f a s h i o n (a f i r m becomes 
dominant by the presence of temporary b o t t l e n e c k s ) " ( 1 3 ) 
Moreover, "... as soon as. any i n e q u a l i t y among f i r m s appears, 
the breach i s opened by which the cumulative e f f e c t of 
domination i n s i n u a t e s i t s e l f . " ( l h . ) Hansen s t a t e s t h a t g i v e n 
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the preceding, "... i t f o l l o w s t h a t the dominant, or 
p r o p u l s i v e , f i r m g e n e r a l l y w i l l be o l i g o p o l i s t i c and l a r g e , 
and w i l l e x e r t ah important i n f l u e n c e on the a c t i v i t i e s of 
s u p p l i e r s and c l i e n t s . " ( 1 5 ) A co n c l u s i o n which i s confirmed 
by the m a t e r i a l covered i n previous: chapters but which 
continues t o leave unsolved the problem of e s t a b l i s h i n g a 
geographic s p a t i a l framework. Hansen s t a t e s t h a t through the use 
of i n p u t - o u t p u t models, the existence of dominant economic A 
sectors has been giv e n e m p i r i c a l v e r i f i c a t i o n f o r the e n t i r e 
i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e of a n a t i o n , but t h a t these techniques 
make i t o p e r a t i o n a l l y u n f e a s i b l e t o r e g i o n a l i s e the a n a l y s i s . 
I n any case, as he p o i n t s out, i n p u t - o u t p u t data do not r e a l l y 
p r ovide much i n s i g h t i n t o the process of change i n i n d u s t r i a l 
i nterdependences v/hich explains- economic development. 
Quoting J. Paelinck, Hansen suggests t h a t : 
"... i t i s not enough f o r the economist working 
on r e g i o n a l development problems t o l i m i t 
a n a l y s i s t o 'the c l a s s i c a l interdependences 
( o f e i t h e r the V/alras - or L e o n t i e f - t y p e ) o f 
economic f l u x , whether i n q u a n t i t y or i n value 
terms. He must be able, i n a d d i t i o n , t o 
recognise the ' t e c h n i c a l o r i g i n ' of t h i s . 
interdependence, which explains i t s every 
i n c r e a s i n g complexity."(16) 
To recap: the concepts of economic space and growth poles, 
p l u s , the dominance of a p r o p u l s i v e i n d u s t r y are, i t has, been 
shown, i n Perroux's approach not g i v e n a concrete s p a t i a l l o c a t i o n , 
i . e , i n a geographic sense. This then remains the outstanding 
question t o which the a n a l y s i s now t u r n s , h e a r i n g i n mind.the 
f a c t the - answer may i n v o l v e the types o f dynamic elements of 
i n d u s t r i a l inter-dependencies described above. 
N.M. Hansen i n d i c a t e s t h a t a number of w r i t e r s have 
attempted t o i d e n t i f y the e f f e c t s generated by a p r o p u l s i v e 
i n d u s t r y which, would q u a l i f y i t as a growth or development 
p o l e , and from t h e i r work, he presents th r e e b a s i c 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a p r o p u l s i v e i n d u s t r y or f i r m : 
a. "... i t must be r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e i n order 
t o assume t h a t i t w i l l generate s u f f i c i e n t 
d i r e c t and p o t e n t i a l l y i n d i r e c t e f f e c t s 
t o have a s i g n i f i c a n t impact upon the 
economy; 
b. "... i t must be a r e l a t i v e l y f a s t growing 
s e c t o r ; and, 
c. "... the q u a n t i t y and i n t e n s i t y of i t s 
i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s w i t h other sectors should 
be important so t h a t a larg e number of 
induced e f f e c t s w i l l i n f a c t be 
t r a n s m i t t e d . " ( 1 7 ) 
The f i r s t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , i t can be r e a d i l y seen, p a r a l l e l s 
what has already been discussed i n terms of the c r e a t i o n 
of l a r g e economic u n i t s through i n d u s t r i a l c o n c e n t r a t i o n , 
and the associated i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t r a d i n g r e l a t i o n s . The 
need f o r h i g h l e v e l s o f expanding demand, c h a r a c t e r i s t i c b.,. 
i s an obvious p r e r e q u i s i t e i n the context of growth poles. 
However, i t i s the t h i r d c r i t e r i o n t h a t Hansen focuses 
upon, t h a t is., i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s w i t h other s e c t o r s , and i t i s 
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i n t h i s area t h a t l o c a t i o n or agglomeration cons i d e r a t i o n s 
emerge. R e f e r r i n g t o another v / r i t e r on the s u b j e c t , 
P. A y d a l o t , Hansen i n d i c a t e s t h a t a simple d e f i n i t i o n of 
a p r o p u l s i v e i n d u s t r y may be t h a t i t i s a producer of 
e x t e r n a l economies: 
" P o l a r i s a t i o n , ' i s the process by which 
the growth of an economic a c t i v i t y termed 
p r o p u l s i v e sets i n motion t h a t of other 
economic a c t i v i t i e s by the channel of 
e x t e r n a l economies'." (18) 
I n e f f e c t tfee,. the ' q u a n t i t y and i n t e n s i t y of i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s ' 1 
may be assessed i n terms of the e x t e r n a l economies generated 
by the p r o p u l s i v e i n d u s t r y . However, w h i l e the p r o p u l s i v e 
i n d u s t r y may have a geographic l o c a t i o n , t h i s does not mean 
t h a t the process of p o l a r i z a t i o n n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e s one. 
I n order t o understand the process of ' i n d u s t r i a l - g e o g r a p h i c 
p o l a r i z a t i o n ' , t h a t i s , the r e g i o n a l i s a t i o n of a dominant a c t i v i t y 
and r e l a t e d i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t i e s , the u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e , i t 
i s i n t u r n necessary t o understand the agglomerative f o r c e s 
which are operating upon both the p r o p u l s i v e i n d u s t r y and 
other, l i n k e d economic a c t i v i t i e s . I n Hansen's words: 
"Therefore, any adequate treatment of t h i s 
phenomenon ( i n d u s t r i a l - g e o g r a p h i c p o l a r i s a t i o n ) 
should take account of the pronounced tendency 
f o r i n d u s t r i a l growth t o be o r i e n t e d p r i m a r i l y 
toward already i n d u s t r i a l i z e d areas because of 
the e x t e r n a l economies which the l a t t e r generate,-
i n c l u d i n g a wide range of t e r t i a r y s e r v i c e s , 
close p r o x i m i t y t o buyers and s u p p l i e r s , labour w i t h 
necessary s k i l l s and t r a i n i n g ; and p l e n t i f u l p u b l i c 
over-head cap i t a l . . " ( 1 9 ) 
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To summarise, i n t h i s s e c t i o n an attempt has been made 
t o p l a c e . f a c t o r market t r a d i n g r e l a t i o n s between l a r g e 
buying u n i t s and r e l a t i v e l y small s u p p l i e r s i n t o a wider, 
more macroeconomic context, t h a t i s , i n d u s t r i a l 
development and r e g i o n a l growth. I t was shown t h a t t h e ' 
establishment of master i n d u s t r i e s could, through backward 
lin k a g e e f f e c t s , serve as an inducement mechanism, but 
t h a t i n the process ' s a t e l l i t e ' , or h i g h l y t i e d proximate 
supp l y i n g i n d u s t r i e s / f i r m s might be created. This 
inducement e f f e c t was then re-conceptualised so t h a t 
growth was conceived of as occuring unevenly, t h a t i s , 
at poles or f o c i , i n the form of centres of forces a c t i n g 
w i t h i n economic space. I n e f f e c t , i t was p o s t u l a t e d t h a t 
l a r g e , o l i g o p o l i s t i c buying u n i t s could dominate or 
c o n t r o l an economic space, and conco m i t a n t l y , i n f l u e n c e 
o t h e r s , f o r example, s u p p l i e r s . A dominant f i r m , defined i n 
a dynamic sense, could be a p r o p u l s i v e f i r m which also 
acquired the r o l e of a growth p o l e . The a c q u i s i t i o n of 
t h i s r o l e was t o some extent dependent upon three c o n d i t i o n s : 
l a r g e s i z e , growth of op e r a t i o n s , and intense i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h other s e c t o r s . The l a t t e r c o n d i t i o n could i n p a r t be 
described i n terms of the generation of e x t e r n a l economie3, 
and i t was through the i n f l u e n c e of these economies t h a t i t 
was a l s o f e l t p o s s i b l e to describe the agglomerative forces which 
g e n e r a l l y u n d e r l i e the process of i n d u s t r i a l - g e o g r a p h i c 
p o l a r i z a t i o n . I n essence, dynamic, micro aspects of f a c t o r market 
r e l a t i o n s may, under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s , have broad r e g i o n a l 
i m p l i c a t i o n s . However, t h e - i n t r i g u i n g p o i n t which has been 
l e f t outstanding i s how w e l l i n t e n s e r e l a t i o n s , d e f i n e d i n 
terms of e x t e r n a l economies, match the close t i e s which t h i s 
thesis, has considered w i t h i n the context of s u p p l i e r dependency 
and q u a s i - i n t e g r a t i o n . Leaving t h i s question aside f o r the 
moment, i t is; p o s s i b l e t o conclude t h a t Hansen's e x p l a n a t i o n 
of how Perroux's concepts, as d e f i n e d w i t h i n economic 
Bpace, may be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o geographic space has served 
the u s e f u l purpose of p o i n t i n g out the d i r e c t i o n which 
should be f o l l o w e d i n order t o understand the l o c a l i s a t i o n , 
or geographic aspects of the growth pole concept. 
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Ind us t r i a l Linkage and Agglomerative Forces 
I n t h i s s e c t i o n , the o b j e c t i v e i s t o present a 
s e l e c t i v e overview of" v a r ious conceptual explanations as 
t o why some types' of economic l i n k a g e are associated w i t h 
i n d u s t r i a l agglomeration i n a l o c a l i s a t i o n sense, and t o do. 
t h i s , the ana l y s i s focuses upon s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t kinds 
of e x t e r n a l economies. 
The f i r s t concept t o be d e a l t w i t h concerns what 
P.M. Townroe c a l l s 'agglomeration economies', and 
what he describes as f o l l o w s : 
"Agglomeration economies occur when a f i r m can 
p r o f i t by l o c a t i n g i n close p r o x i m i t y t o 
other f i r m s , or when i f i s p r o f i t a b l e f o r 
one f i r m t o grow very l a r g e by combining 
many d i f f e r e n t but associated processes 
i n a s i n g l e o r g a n i s a t i o n . " ( 2 0 ) 
Townroe i n d i c a t e s t h a t agglomeration economies may be 
subdivided i n t o f o u r d i f f e r e n t c a t e g o r i e s . The f i r s t , i n t e r n a l 
economies o f s c a l e , i n f a c t r e l a t e s t o the simple v e r t i c a l 
i n t e g r a t i o n of op e r a t i o n s , and since these economies, may work 
f o r managerial economies, which transcend the need f o r 
one establishment or u n i t , as w e l l as t e c h n i c a l coats per u n i t , 
t hey may not n e c e s s a r i l y also lead t o geographic c o n c e n t r a t i o n . 
The second category, e x t e r n a l economies of scale t o the f i r m 
t h a t are i n t e r n a l t o the i n d u s t r y , occurs "... when p l a n t s of 
a complementary or- r e l a t e d range of i n d u s t r i e s , or w i t h a 
s i m i l a r range of products, aggregate i n one area, economies 
of l o c a l i s a t i o n are s a i d t o be a f a c t o r i n the a t t r a c t i o n of 
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the p l a n t s t o that area."(21) Examples of s p e c i f i c aspects 
would include the a v a i l a b i l i t y of a common pool o f unique l y 
s k i l l e d labour or s e r v i c e s , or the geographic c o n c e n t r a t i o n of 
buyers. A t h i r d category, e x t e r n a l economies of scale t o an 
i n d u s t r y , are c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o l o c a l i s a t i o n economies, but are 
termed urban economies because "... they evolve v/hen u n l i k e 
p l a n t s congregate, using common f a c i l i t i e s of commerce and 
banking, of t e c h n i c a l s e r v i c i n g , of education, of su b c o n t r a c t i n g 
and a wide range of adaptable s k i l l e d labour".(22) The f i n a l 
category i n v o l v e s t r a n s f e r economies, and these r e l a t e t o 
the m i n i m i s a t i o n of t r a n s p o r t costs through adjacent 
l o c a t i o n . I n general terms, these f o u r categories describe 
the types of f a c t o r s which Hansen i n d i c a t e d explained the 
p o l a r i z a t i o n of p r o p u l s i v e , or dominant i n d u s t r y l i n k a g e , b u t 
they have now been placed i n t o a r e g i o n a l c o n t e x t . 
Looking more c l o s e l y a t i n d u s t r i a l l i n k a g e , and p a r t i c u l a r l y 
at i t s e v o l u t i o n , Townroe suggests t h a t two processes are a t 
work on the s t r u c t u r e of manufacturing i n d u s t r y . The f i r s t 
he describes as ' i n t e g r a t i v e 1 , f o r t h i s i n v o l v e s the 
abso r b t i o n o f small a c t i v i t i e s i n t o l a r g e u n i t s so as 
t o generate the de s i r e d economies of scale, and c o i n c i d e n t a l w i t h 
t h i s i s need f o r investment levels/wHith) can only be maintained 
w i t h l a r g e f i r m resource l e v e l s . This process leads 
Townroe i n t o the f a m i l i a r argument f o r v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n : 
"As the need f o r c o o r d i n a t i o n i n t h i s investment 
spreads; back from the marketing estimates and 
the s e l l i n g e f f o r t t o the p r o d u c t i o n process and 
the s u p p l i e r s of m a t e r i a l s and components, so 
those companies w i t h f u l l c o n t r o l throughout 
the process w i l l b e n e f i t i n time and p r o f i t 
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over those companies t r y i n g t o synchronize 
the c o n t r i b u t i o n s of other companies t o 
t h e i r own i n d u s t r i a l o u t p ut."(23) 
The second process a f f e c t i n g s t r u c t u r e Townroe believes- t o 
be one of ' d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and s p e c i a l i z a t i o n - i n i n d u s t r i a l 
a c t i v i t y , and t h i s b r o a d l y i n v o l v e s Adam Smith's notions of 
in c r e a s i n g r e t u r n s t o s p e c i a l i s e d f a c t o r s of p r o d u c t i o n ; 
assuming t h a t a s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e market e x i s t s . I n 
essence then, the types of l i n k a g e which emerge should be 
predominately determined by t h i s l a t t e r process, t h a t i s , 
i n a t e c h n i c a l f l o w of goods and services sense. 
I t i s apparent from the preceding t h a t f a c t o r market 
t r a d i n g l i n k s - belong, i n Townroe's c o n t e x t , to the second 
process, and t h a t i f t h e r e are any l o c a t i o n a l requirements 
i n v o l v e d i n these l i n k s , they should p r i m a r i l y r e l a t e e i t h e r 
t o economies which are e x t e r n a l t o the f i r m and which are of 
the l o c a l i s a t i o n or u r b a n i s a t i o n v a r i e t y , or t o t r a n s f e r 
economies. This conclusion i s t o some degree confirmed by 
J.?. B l a i r who f i r s t of a l l s t a t e s t h a t the most important 
of the agglomerative forces examined by A l f r e d Weber, 
"... i s the l o c a t i o n of f i r m s so as t o share t e c h n i c a l or 
s p e c i a l i s e d equipment ,..",(2U) and provides the f o l l o w i n g 
q u o t a t i o n i n support: 
"The complete t e c h n i c a l equipment which i s 
necessary t o c a r r y out a process of p r o d u c t i o n 
may. i n h i g h l y developed i n d u s t r i e s , "become so 
s p e c i a l i s e d thr.t minute p a r t s of t h e process 
of p r o d u c t i o n u t i l i z e s p e c i a l i s e d machines. 
and even q u i t e l a r g e - s c a l e p l a n t s are not 
able t o make use o f such equipment. "(25') 
B l a i r then f o l l o w s t h i s up w i t h a reference t o R. Vernon's 
statement t h a t e n t e r p r i s e s f a c i n g u n c e r t a i n t y w i l l be 
r e l u c t a n t t o acquire s p e c i a l i s e d c a p i t a l and w i l l t h e r e f o r e 
l o c a t e where t h i s i s a v a i l a b l e ; u s u a l l y , the r e s u l t w i l l 
be urban growth: 
"Businessmen i n l i n e s of t h i s ( r a p i d l y changing) 
s o r t must s u i t t h e i r methods of o p e r a t i o n t o 
such u n c e r t a i n t i e s . They cannot commit 
themselves t o . s p e c i a l i s e d machinery: f o r 
s p e c i a l i s e d machinery, though w e l l able t o 
t u r n out long runs a t low costs, u s u a l l y i s 
not e a s i l y adapted t o s w i f t l y changing 
products ... Instead , each must r e l y on 
outside s p e c i a l i s t s who can f i l l h i s needs 
as-- the needs a r i s e " . ( 2 6 ) 
This p o i n t i s r e i n f o r c e d and extended even f u r t h e r by 
Townroe, who indicates, t h a t many e x t e r n a l l y l i n k e d f i r m s 
operate i n i n d u s t r i e s where the nature of "what i s produced i s 
unstable, "... e i t h e r because of s w i f t l y changing products or 
non-standard products, or because of r a p i d l y changing p a t t e r n s 
of demand."(27) Summarising the above, th e r e emerge two 
reasons why ' d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and s p e c i a l i s a t i o n ' may p e r s i s t , 
and why a l l f i r m s do not r e s o r t t o f o r m a l v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n . 
The f i r s t , suggested i n Leber's statement, emphasises the 
t e c h n i c a l c o n d i t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o c o s t s and 
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economies of scale ( 2 8 ) , and the second, focuses upon a 
need f o r f l e x i b i l i t y and a d a p t a b i l i t y i n the face of 
u n c e r t a i n t y and change. 
B r i e f l y s t a t e d , i t has been suggested t h a t the 
p o l a r i z a t i o n of dominant i n d u s t r y l i n k a g e , and indeed 
the l o c a t i o n o f the f i r m i t s e l f , may be explained by the 
workings of e x t e r n a l economies. These economies r e f l e c t 
the two processes of i n t e g r a t i o n and d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of 
i n d u s t r i a l l i n k a g e , and i n the l a t t e r process, two 
elements maybe apparent; the t e c h n i c a l c o n d i t i o n s of 
pr o d u c t i o n and the need f o r a d a p t a b i l i t y . A f u r t h e r 
refinement of t h i s basic concept of li n k a g e and 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n which may be made i s found i n P. Sargant 
Florence's d e l i n a t i o n of what he terms the ' t e c h n i c a l 
l i n k a g e between i n d u s t r i e s and s u b - i n d u s t r i e s ' I n t o three 
d i f f e r e n t types.(29) Before p r e s e n t i n g these, i t i s w e l l 
t o remember t h a t i n i t s o r i g i n a l form Sargant Florence used 
the expression ' t e c h n i c a l l i n k a g e ' w i t h respect t o the 
exchange o f s e m i - f i n i s h e d goods or components between 
manufacturing p l a n t s and i n d u s t r i e s , and the concept was 
r e s t r i c t e d t o flows between p l a n t s l o c a t e d w i t h i n a 
common i n d u s t r i a l area.(30) More recent w r i t e r s have 
attempted a wider d e f i n i t i o n of l i n k a g e , f o r example, 
D.E. Heebie terms these s h o r t - d i s t a n c e flows ' l o c a l 
i n d u s t r i a l l i n k a g e s ' and d i s t i n g u i s h e s them from simple 
'linkag e s ' which represent flows between separate p l a n t s , 
regardless of the distances i n v o l v e d . ( 3 1 ) Returning t o 
-181 -
Sargant Florence, f o r i t ;is h i s d e f i n i t i o n s which concern 
t h i s a n a l y s i s , the t h r e e types of l i n k a g e are as f o l l o w s : 
a. . V e r t i c a l . Represents a s i t u a t i o n i n which 
the "... flows i n v o l v e successive operations 
on i n i t i a l m a t e r i a l s "by d i f f e r e n t f a c t o r i e s . . . " 
(32) and Sargant Florence c i t e s as examples 
non-ferrous r e f i n i n g and non-ferrous wares such 
as p l a t e and j e w e l l e r y . ( 3 3 ) 
b. L a t e r a l or Convergent. Involves the f l o w of 
diverse components from d i f f e r e n t p r o d u c t i o n u n i t s 
or p l a n t s t o one p a r t i c u l a r p l a n t f o r assembly, 
and an example i s t h a t of motor v e h i c l e s . 
c. Diagonal. Represents a s i t u a t i o n i n which "... the 
products or services of a p a r t i c u l a r f a c t o r y 
are used by p l a n t s , sometimes i n d i f f e r e n t 
i n d u s t r i e s , a t d i f f e r e n t stages i n the process 
of end-product manufacture ..,"(34) and examples 
are c o n s t r u c t i o n engineering, engineering t o o l s 
and f o u n d a r i e s . ( 3 5 ) 
Given the d i v e r s i t y of the above, i t i s understandable t h a t Townroe 
places so much emphasis on the problematic nature of "... 
companies t r y i n g t o synchronize the c o n t r i b u t i o n s of other 
companies t o t h e i r own i n d u s t r i a l o u t p ut." Moreover, the 
above also h i g h l i g h t s the premium which buyers might place on 
t h e . a b i l i t y t o c o n s u l t , p l a n and co-ordinate w i t h i n the 
framework of l o c a t i o n a l s u p p l i e r l i n k a g e . I n s h o r t , Weber's and 
Vernon's s p e c i a l i s t supplying u n i t s , o p e r a t i n g i n respect 
o f Sargant Florence's d i f f e r e n t type of l i n k a g e f l o w s , q u i t e 
e f f e c t i v e l y e s t a b l i s h a number of p r e - c o n d i t i o n s which 
may be l i n k e d t o the p o t e n t i a l advantages to be gained from 
customer domination. 
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I t i s p o s s i b l e t o v e r i f y the existance of a number of 
these p r e - c o n d i t i o n s of dominance and s u p p l i e r dependency 
by re v i e w i n g these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of f i r m s and t h e i r 
p a r t i c u t ^ r markets which may have the e f f e c t , of s t r e n g t h e n i n g 
t i e s , or p a t t e r n s o f l i n k a g e between f i r m s . I n h i s paper 
deal i n g w i t h the subject of l i n k a g e Townroe i d e n t i f i e s 
a number of f a c t o r s which may be. associated w i t h strong 
n 
l i n k a g e tendencies as f o l l o w s : 
a, "... processes t h a t are f a i r l y s p e c i a l i s e d 
by the s k i l l r a t h e r than the c a p i t a l machinery 
i n v o l v e d , and which produce non-uniform 
and custom-built goods." (36) 
The r o l e of s p e c i a l i s a t i o n as a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of close 
t r a d i n g r e l a t i o n s or strong l i n k a g e p a t t e r n s i s g e n e r a l l y 
w e l l documented. For example, i n h i s Birmingham study 
Sargant Florence i n d i c a t e s t h a t a g a t h e r i n g of small 
"... s p e c i a l i s e d p l a n t s reproduces the main advantages of 
the large p l a n t , namely, the p h y s i c a l j u x t a p o s i t i o n of 
consecutive processes and a u x i l i a r y services i n the making 
of a product or a l l i e d products which reduces costs of 
t r a n s p o r t , communication and contacts . ''(31) I^eeble found 
what he termed 'product s p e c i a l i s a t i o n ' i n h i s study 
o f l o c a l i n d u s t r y l i n k a g e i n n o r t h west London, and c i t e d 
as an example, a small f i r m which manufactured lead s h i e l d i h g s 
t o customer's s p e c i f i c a t i o n s . Bu-t, besides the reduced costs 
a t t r i b u t a b l e t o the p r o x i m i t y of p r o d u c t i o n u n i t s , i t is 
noteworthy t h a t another one of Townroe's e x t e r n a l economies 
can come i n t o p l a y , and. t h i s i s t h a t there may be cost 
r e d u c t i o n s r e s u l t i n g from economies of scale which become 
r e a l i s a b l e because of the existence of a l o c a l concentrated 
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demand a v a i l a b l e t o the s p e c i a l i s t s , i n any case, r e t u r n i n g 
t o Sargant Florence, he describes the f i r s t phenomenon.in 
the f o l l o w i n g words:"... s e v e r a l s p e c i a l i s e d p l a n t s , i f 
close enough toge t h e r , may have much the same economies 
as the separate departments o f a larg e p l a n t " . (38) From 
the preceding, i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to speculate t h a t i f the 
s p e c i a l i s e d p l a n t s i n t h e i r p r o x i m i t y do serve a f u n c t i o n 
s i m i l a r t o those of a c t u a l departments i n l a r g e p l a n t s , 
then i t may not he unreasonable t o consider t h a t a l a r g e 
customer.mi git attempt to i n f l u e n c e t h e i r important s u p p l i e r s , 
or 'departments', because f o r instance they may represent 
s t r a t e g i c sources of supply, and i n the process, b r i n g 
them i n t o the locus o f the buyer's c o n t r o l and d e c i s i o n -
making. I n f a c t , the d i s c u s s i o n o f 'jobbers' and ' q u a s i - i n t e g r a t i o n ' 
has shown t h a t t h i s i s , a t the very l e a s t , a p o s s i b l e , but 
obv i o u s l y not necessary, t a c t i c f o r the buyer t o adopt. I t 
i s understandable, but none the less remarkable, t h a t t h i s 
'separate departments of a l a r g e p l a n t ' phenomenon-should 
be presented w i t h o u t comment concerning i t s l i k e l y dynamic 
i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d , and t h e r e f o r e f o r the 
i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e of the r e l e v a n t r e g i o n . 
b. "... the process has to be s p e e d i l y adaptable 
and s e n s i t i v e t o t e c h n i c a l change."(39) 
A d a p t a b i l i t y was seen as important by R. Vernon above, and 
i t was described not only as a reason why a f i r m miyht want t o 
avoid f o r m a l v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n , but due t o the corresponding 
u n c e r t a i n t y u s u a l l y associated w i t h change,-why a f i r m might 
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a l s o want t o exercise a h i g h degree of i n f l u e n c e over i t s 
s u p p l i e r s . On the e m p i r i c a l s i d e , Keeble i n h i s study, 
found several manufacturers, of s m a l l , h i g h p r e c i s i o n , 
instrument components t o be h i g h l y l i n k e d l o c a t i o n - a l l y , 
and t o also he i n i n d u s t r i e s which might he considered 
p a r t i c u l a r l y s u s c e p t i b l e t o h i g h r a t e s of t e c h n o l o g i c a l 
change.. 
c. "The s t r o n g l y l i n k e d f i r m tends t o be 
small i n s i z e , t o be housed i n a 
s i n g l e p l a n t and t o have, an owner-
manager, w i t h a h i g h l e v e l of d i r e c t 
management involvement i n production."(UO) 
Probably i n a d v e r t e n t l y , Tov/nroe has presented the c l a s s i c 
d e s c r i p t i o n o f the average small f i r m i n the United Kingdom.(q-1) 
A l l t h a t i s r e a l l y r e q u i r e d i s to r e c a l l t h a t Davies and 
K e l l y ' s work, aspresented i n Chapter 1+, i n d i c a t e d t h a t 
s p e c i a l i s t , jobber small f i r m s were prone t o domination, 
and i n any case, against l a r g e f i r m s , and t h i s must i n c l u d e 
p r o p u l s i v e f i r m s , they tended t o l a c k b a r g a i n i n g s t r e n g t h , 
thereby making them vul n e r a b l e t o e x p l o i t a t i o n . 
d. "The s t r o n g l y l i n k e d f i r m s come from sectors 
o f an i n d u s t r y vmere the sum of c a p i t a l 
r e q u i r e d t o set up as an independent u n i t 
tends t o be f a i r l y small and where 
r e s t r i c t i o n s on e n t r y are few, "•(l\2 ) 
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These two c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s seem t o almost l o g i c a l l y f o l l o w 
from the f a c t t h a t s t r o n g l y l i n k e d f i r m s are s m a l l . I n h i s 
review of why small f i r m s s u r v i v e , J.F. P i c k e r i n g confirms 
t h a t they are found i n i n d u s t r i e s where there e x i s t s f a i r l y . 
easy e n t r y , and furthermore t h a t : "... f r e q u e n t l y t h i s occurs 
i n i n d u s t r i e s or p a r t i c u l a r product markets where c a p i t a l 
i n t e n s i v e technology i s not a p p r o p r i a t e , and where 
t h e r e f o r e c a p i t a l / o u t p u t r a t i o s are low. "(1+3) I n a s i m i l a r 
v e i n E d i t h Penrose s t a t e s t h a t there are c e r t a i n markets 
which r e q u i r e investment expenditures not only i n la r g e - s c a l e 
p r o d u c t i o n f a c i l i t i e s but a l s o i n marketing and research, 
f o r example, o l i g o p o l i s t i c markets, and these a c t i v i t i e s are. 
not g e n e r a l l y the domain of the small f i r m . (1+1+) I n e f f e c t , 
r e t u r n i n g t o Bain's c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of market s t r u c t u r e s , the 
s e l l i n g side i s a t o m i s t i c , and due t o the e n t r y c o n d i t i o n s , 
many a l t e r n a t i v e sources of supply are a v a i l a b l e . These 
would he e x c e l l e n t p r e - c o n d i t i o n s of s u p p l i e r dependency 
according to the m a t r i x of dependency f a c t o r s presented i n the 
conclusion t o Chapter 1+, 
Another c h a r a c t e r i s t i c r e l e v a n t t o the s t r e n g t h of l i n k a g e 
"between f i r m s has already "been discussed, and i t concerns buyers 
and s u p p l i e r s engaged i n s u b c o n t r a c t u r a l t r a d e . This i s due 
to t h e r e l a t i v e l y high degree o f l i a i s o n r e q u i r e d between 
a sub-contractor and i t s c l i e n t f o r the f o l l o w i n g purposes: 
a. p r e l i m i n a r y drawings, plans, d i s c u s s i o n s . 
b. t e c h n i c a l assistance by c l i e n t f i r m s . 
c. s u p e r v i s i o n and c o n t r o l by the c l i e n t f i r m s , 
d. supply of s p e c i f i c m a t e r i a l s by c l i e n t f i r m s , and, 
• e. perhaps the supply of q u a l i t y c o n t r o l equipment. 
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as o u t l i n e d p r e v i o u s l y . Thus, the s u b - c o n t r a c t i n g l i n k a g e 
i s u s u a l l y considered.to he much more complex than the simple 
s e l l e r ' s , and t h i s is- because i t i n v o l v e s more i n f o r m a t i o n 
exchange, i n a d d i t i o n t o the exchange of goods. I n a r e g i o n a l ' 
context s u b - c o n t r a c t i n g i s considered t o be an important, 
a c t i v i t y , f o r example, Keeble found t h a t among f i r m s i n the 
n o r t h west of London a s i g n i f i c a n t p r o p o r t i o n of the linkages 
were s u b - c o n t r a c t u a l i n nat u r e . I t was suggested i n 
Chapter k t h a t such r e l a t i o n s are h i g h l y s u s c e p t i b l e t o the 
adoption o f a 'branch p l a n t ' syndrome, and t h a t f o r the s u p p l i e r , 
they may represent another cost of buyer s u b s t i t u t i o n due t o 
the need t o replace the ' e x t r a o r d i n a r y investment' made by the 
customer. 
The f i n a l l o c a . t i o n a l f a c t o r t o be b r i e f l y considered 
concerns what might be termed i n f o r m a t i o n a l l i n k a g e s . 
B. Thorngren has p o s t u l a t e d t h a t p r o d u c t i o n u n i t s f a c i n g a 
hi g h p r o b a b i l i t y of t r a n s i t i o n r e q u i r e a r a p i d access t o 
complex fac e - t o - f a c e contacts and a p o o l i n g of p r o d u c t i v e 
resources (as i n d i c a t e d by Vernon).(U-5 ) B u i l d i n g upon 
Thorngren's theory, Klaassen has p o s i t e d t h a t the c o n c e n t r a t i o n , 
i n a geographic sense, -of groups of a c t i v i t i e s may take place 
as a consequence of the need f o r communication and because 
the costs of communication increase, the gre a t e r the distance.(i|6) 
G. TBrnguist, i n h i s studies; of communications and d e c i s i o n 
making, has i n d i c a t e d t h a t f a c e - t o - f a c e , d i s t a n t dependent, 
and more freq u e n t communications u s u a l l y i n v o l v e problem 
s o l v i n g , p l a n n i n g , m o n i t o r i n g events and reconnaissance. (i;7) 
I n essence, the same types of c o n d i t i o n s which i n v o l v e A'ex ante'; 
and *ex post*' u n c e r t a i n t y and t h i s may be reduced through 
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the exercise of the kinds, of i n f l u e n c e or power-based 
acti o n s described i n the previous a nalysis-on 'quasi-
i n t e g r a t i o n ' . 
I t i s apar-ent from the preceding t h a t there i s a great 
deal of i n t e r a c t i o n between the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of l i n k a g e 
described. For instance, a small s u p p l i e r f i r m may be 
a s p e c i a l i s t sub-contractor i n a dynamic or v o l a t i l e 
i n d u s t r y , thus, generating a. h i g h need f o r i n f o r m a t i o n 
exchange. However, the main c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s not t h a t 
each s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c should be e x c l u s i v e l y and 
i n t e r n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t i n t h a t i t n e c e s s a r i l y p r e d i c t s 
agglomeration, but simply t h a t a tendency t o i n d u s t r i a l 
agglomeration should be revealed - as i t unquestionably i s . 
Thus, i n d u s t r i a l l i n k a g e evolves through the process of 
s p e c i a l i s a t i o n and d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , and under c e r t a i n 
c o n d i t i o n s , some of which were described above, may 
i n v o l v e the l o c a t i o n a l c o n c e n t r a t i o n or agglomeration of 
a c t i v i t i e s . 
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Conclusion 
I n a paper d e a l i n g w i t h i n d u s t r i a l l o c a t i o n and l i n k a g e 
P.A. Wood makes the f o l l o w i n g observation: 
"The processes of manufacturing w i t h i n agglomerated 
i n d u s t r i a l , areas also i n v o l v e dynamic f e a t u r e s , 
such as a v a r i e t y of c o n t r a c t s changing over 
time, the need f o r r a p i d change i n response t o 
supply requirements and the maintenance of speed 
and frequency of contacts . "(1+8) 
I n t h i s chapter an attempt has been made t o place the dynamic 
f e a t u r e s of f a c t o r market l a r g e buyer/small s u p p l i e r r e l a t i o n s 
i n t o a wider context i n v o l v i n g i n d u s t r i a l growth through 
p r o p u l s i v e , master u n i t s , and the general complex of 
r e g i o n a l l i n k a g e p a t t e r n s . I n the i n t r o d u c t i o n i t was 
p o s t u l a t e d t h a t overlaps e x i s t e d between c o n d i t i o n s of 
customer domination and s u p p l i e r dependency, and those 
i n v o l v e d i n i n d u s t r i a l growth, and i n t r a - r e g i o n a l t r a d e . 
Based upon t h i s b r i e f overview of the fundamental concepts of 
t h i s l a t t e r area of study, the p r o p o s i t i o n has not been 
r e f u t e d , and has i n f a c t , making the r e q u i s i t e allowances 
f o r the s u p e r f i c i a l i t y of the a i i a l ^ . ^ , be shown t o be 
reasonably v a l i d . Thus, the s i t u a t i o n , which t h i s c onclusion 
s u b s t a n t i a t e s , may be represented i n the form of a simple 
Venn diagram as f o l l o w s i n Figure 6-1. 
F i g u r e 6-1 
Regional Dependency 
F a c t o r Market Trade R e l a t i o n s 
Between A l l Buyers and A l l 
S u p p l i e r s 
S p a t i a l l y Concentrated 
Buyer/Supplier Trade 
Re l a t i o n s 
U 
B: A 
J \v 'f \ 
Dominant Customer/Dependent 
Sup p l i e r Trade R e l a t i o n s 
S p a t i a l l y Concentrated 
Dependent Trade R e l a t i o n s 
Where 'U' i s the u n i v e r s e , and 'A' and 'B' represent r e s p e c t i v e 
sub-sets of that u n i v e r s e ; so that the i n t e r s e c t i o n of sub-sets 
'A' and 'B', i n turn represents the subject matter of t h i s chapter, 
that i s , s p a t i a l l y defined, dependent buyer/supplier r e l a t i o n s . 
o-
The t h e o r e t i c a l existence of such phenomenCj-must of course be 
supported by e m p i r i c a l evidence, and i n t h i s respect Wood o f f e r s 
an appropriate concluding comment: 
" I f a view of the i n d u s t r i a l plant as a communicating 
e n t i t y were adopted as the b a s i s f o r investigation,, 
i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p s and l i n k a g e s v?ith other organisations 
might be regarded simply as s t r u c t u r a l f e a t u r e s of i t s 
operation, . T h e y allow the plant to operate 
s u c c e s s f u l l y by e x t r a c t i n g profit& from the surrounding 
economic and s p a t i a l system through ejcnte,cts with 
m a t e r i a l and semi-finished goods s u p p l i e r s , wholesalers, 
r e t a i l e r s , consumers, transport operators, government, 
competitors and so forth. !'(49) 
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CHAPTER. 7 
SOME CONCLUDING COMMENTS ON LARGE SCALE ENTERPRISE AMD 
FACTOR CARETS 
".,.the modern i n d u s t r i a l system i s a concatenation 
of processes which have much of the character 
of a s i n g l e comprehensive, balanced mechancial 
process, A disturbance of the balance a t any 
p o i n t means a d i f f e r e n t i a l advantage ( o r 
disadvantage) t o one or more of the owners o f 
the sub-processes between which the disturbance 
f a l l s ; and i t may also f r e q u e n t l y mean ga i n or 
lo s s t o many remoter members i n the concatenation 
of processes, f o r the balance i s a d e l i c a t e one, 
and the tr a n s m i s s i o n of a disturbance o f t e n 
goes f a r . I t may even take on a cumulative 
character, and may t h e r e f o r e s e r i o u s l y c r i p p l e 
or accelerate branches of i n d u s t r y t h a t are out 
of d i r e c t touch w i t h those members o f the 
concatenation upon which the i n i t i a l disturbance 
f a l l s . " (T. Veblen, l^Ok) ( 1 ) 
I n t r o d u c t i o n 
I n t h i s chapter the i n t e n t i o n i s t o summarise some of the 
main p o i n t s made i n the preceding chapters, and i n so doing, a l s o 
suggest how, w i t h i n a 'concatenation o f processes' c o n t e x t , 
they are of relevance t o some wider economic concepts. The 
f i r s t s e c t i o n deals w i t h some of the p o t e n t i a l , advantages of 
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s i z e , or more p a r t i c u l a r l y l a r g e s i z e , and u l t i m a t e l y r e f e r s 
back t o the G a l b r a i t h i a n dual economy t h e s i s . The next 
s e c t i o n looks a t the l a r g e scale e n t e r p r i s e as a general 
purveyor o f r e g i o n a l economic grov/th through i t s f a c t o r . 
market l i n k s . There i s a l s o an appendix which b r i e f l y 
considers a p o s s i b l e i n v e s t i g a t i v e framework which might 
be ap p r o p r i a t e f o r the study of some of the questions r a i s e d 
d u r i n g the progress of t h i s t h e s i s . This appendix i s preceded 
by a b r i e f c onclusion. 
Factor Market Operations and the Advantages of Size 
I n c o n s i d e r i n g the advantages of size a customary 
s t a r t i n g p o i n t i s t o examine s i z e i n terms of t e c h n i c a l 
economies of sc a l e . Obviously, f o r a s p e c i f i c i n d u s t r y or 
l i n e of p r o d u c t i o n there may be a c e r t a i n , t e c h n i c a l l y determined, 
minimum l e v e l of operations, or t h r e s h o l d , which must, i n any 
economic s e t t i n g be a t t a i n e d i n order t o make p r o d u c t i o n 
w o r t h w h i l e . An example i s when costs per u n i t produced f a l l i n 
r e l a t i o n t o increases i n the s i z e of the p r o d u c t i o n u n i t . This 
c o n d i t i o n i s u s u a l l y thought of as an advantage of ab s o l u t e 
s i z e , b u t as Aaronovitch and Sawyer i n d i c a t e : 
"The exact nature of the advantages w i l l not be 
t o t a l l y independent of the p a r t i c u l a r economy, 
as r e l a t i v e f a c t o r and product p r i c e s may 
i n f l u e n c e the worthwhile minimum t h r e s h o l d and v 
the r a t e of decline of u n i t c o s t s " . ( 2 ) 
This i m p l i e s t h a t bound up w i t h i n what appears t o be o b j e c t i v e , 
t e c h n i c a l l y determined economies of absolute s i z e , there i s 
the question of v a r i a t i o n among r e l a t i v e f a c t o r costs, and 
th a t t h i s v a r i a b i l i t y may a l t e r the c o n d i t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n from 
one economic s e t t i n g t o the next. I t f o l l o w s t h a t the a b i l i t y 
t o i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i v e f a c t o r p r i c e s through, f o r example, the 
use of su p e r i o r b a r g a i n i n g power, would a l s o elf f e e t t h i s *. 
t h r e s h o l d , and thus a l t e r the p o i n t at which some of the advantages 
of. s i z e m a t e r i a l i s e and are reaped by an enterprise., I n sh o r t -
two f i r m s producing the same good but i n d i f f e r e n t q u a n t i t i e s , 
one less- than the other, may face the same cos t s , and thus 
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c e t e r i s p a r i b u s , p r o f i t margins, thanks t o the exe r c i s e of 
i m p e r f e c t l y c o m p e t i t i v e purchasing t a c t i c s . One obvious 
example occurs w i t h m u l t i - p r o d u c t producers o p e r a t i n g 
c e n t r a l i s e d buying f u n c t i o n s ; these may possess the 
a b i l i t y t o demand, and o b t a i n , unearned q u a n t i t y discounts 
or s i m i l a r b e n e f i t s from s e l l e r s which also supply i n p u t s 
f o r others product ranges s o l d by the same producers. 
This type of occurence has been documented by various w r i t e r s . ( 3 ) 
I t i s apparent t h a t w h i l e absolute s i z e may indeed y i e l d c e r t a i n 
t e c h n i c a l economies o f scale i n respect of a s i n g l e market, t h i s 
t h e s i s has argued, upon th e basis of e x i s t i n g t h e o r y , t h a t 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f absolute s i z e should move beyond the confines 
o f u n i t a r y markets. This view was i n i t i a l l y i n t r o duced by 
Aaronovitch and Sawyer i n Chapter One, and i l l u s t r a t e s the 
need f o r a r e d e f i n i t i o n of the boundaries of i n f l u e n c e 
associated w i t h absolute s i z e . An important aspect of any new 
approach would be the r e c o g n i t i o n tha 1: l a r g e s c a l e , m u l t i -
product e n t e r p r i s e may, by combining t h e i r b a r g a i n i n g e x p e r t i s e 
w i t h t h e i r t a c i t t h r e a t of bo y c o t t extending over s e v e r a l 
markets, be capable of a l t e r i n g the cost c o n d i t i o n s which they 
f a c e , i r r e s p e c t i v e o f output l e v e l s . For i n an economy 
populated by o l i g o p o l i s - t i c , m u l t i - p r o d u c t / m u l t i - m a r k e t 
e n t e r p r i s e , i t may be assumed t h a t i n a d d i t i o n t o the 
advantages inherent i n the t e c h n i c a l cost e f f i c i e n c i e s which 
can accrue t o l a r g e f i r m s , the development of 'purchasing 
and b a r g a i n i n g e f f i c i e n c i e s ' may a l s o come t o p l a y a s i g n i q a n t 
r o l e i n the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of r e l a t i v e f a c t o r c o s t s . 
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Another advantage of absolute size considered i n 
t h i s thesis relates to the f a c t that large firms are also 
capable of a l t e r i n g the 'boundaries' of t h e i r productive 
a c t i v i t i e s . Aaronovitch and Sawyer i l l u s t r a t e the formal 
aspects of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r advantage by i n d i c a t i n g that 
i n a s i t u a t i o n i n which there are decreasing returns t o 
scale i n a p a r t i c u l a r a c t i v i t y , the large f i r m may he 
able t o 'hive i t o f f , and thus, a l t e r the extent t o wnich 
the f i r m i s v e r t i c a l l y integrated.(1+) Instead of producing 
i t s e l f , the f i r m i s able t o benefit by purchasing from 
several r e l a t i v e l y small suppliers. Indeed, Aaronovitch 
and Sawyer suggest that when the f i r m , 'r..e finds that the 
co-ordination oS the a c t i v i t i e s of several f a c t o r i e s i s 
more cost l y than co-ordination through the market", and 
"... i f t h i s a c t i v i t y i s subject t o decreasing returns; .." 
such t h a t , "... the f i r m could operate several fa c t o r i e s 
producing at or near the optimal l e v e l . . . " ; then, "... i t 
can be expected that the supplying firms are heavily 
dependent f o r t h e i r s u r v i v a l on the custom of one or a few 
firms J "(5)i.e |ASsuming that they supply the bulk'of t h e i r t o t a l 
output. I n addition t o obviously being able to avoid a c a p i t a l 
commitment, the large f i r m i s able to burden i t s suppliers 
w i t h some of the costs associated with f l u c t u a t i o n s i n 
demand. Another, hybrid form of t h i s form of conduct i s 
known as 'tapered i n t e g r a t i o n ' , and i t occurs when the large 
f i r m remains i n production f o r some of i t s needs, but buys.-
the remainder of i t s requirements from suppliers. This s i t u a t i o n 
i s described by R.E, Caves as one way i n which large f i r m 
.Ear Ice* conduct reduces uncertainty a t the expense of 
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independent suppliers. ( 6 ) 
Closely associated witK the idea that large firms are 
able t o a l t e r the • '"boundaries1 of t h e i r productive a c t i v i t i e s 
through the use of formal i n t e g r a t i v e t a c t i c s , i s the concept of 
v e r t i c a l quasi-integration. Out of a review of the various 
aspects of 'quasi-integration' there emerged the vie-// that 
the large f i r m may not only "be able to a l t e r the boundaries 
which circumscribe i t s spheres of co n t r o l , but a l l i e d to t h i s , 
also i t s access; to information. So that aided by i t s r o l e 
as a 'large customer', and i n conjunction w i t h i t s dependency-
based bargaining power, i t would appear that the large f i r m 
i s strongly motivated to pursue a va r i e t y of t a c t i c s , and many 
of these are e f f e c t i v e l y intended t o reduce or minimise i t s 
transactions costs. 
Tv/o s a l i e n t points emerge from the above. The f i r s t 
echos the sentiments expressed i n the quotations c i t e d at. 
the beginning of the thesis, and i s that i n examining both the 
advantages of absolute size and the significance of concentration 
trends, i t i s important that economic analysis not overlook the 
t*/o closely l i n k e d concepts of r e l a t i v e f i r m size and economic 
power, and t h e i r dynamic implications w i t h i n f a c t o r markets. 
The second point i s suggested by Aaronovitch and Sawyer, and 
postulates that because the large f i r m i s able to change the 
a c t i v i t i e s used i n producing a given product, and since firms of 
a l l sizes survive, "... w i t h many smaller ones earning less than 
normal p r o f i t s , . " , then, " I t may mean that large firms are 
l i v i n g o f f smaller firms." ( 7 ) 
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The extent to which large firms, do l i v e o f f smaller 
ones cannot of course "be e a s i l y proven. However, following . 
the arguments and predictions presented i n a review of 
economic theory, i t would seem that i n imperfectly 
competitive f a c t o r markets, prices are determined "by 
"bargaining, and under most conditions, the market tends to 
reward, the concentrated larger f i r m . I n general terms, the 
review of the various imperfect buyer market structures, 
ranging from simple monopsony to " b i l a t e r a l oligopoly, yielded 
the f o l l o w i n g performance pr e d i c t i o n s : 
- price determination is e i t h e r u n i l a t e r a l or 
c o n t r o l l e d , 
- p r i c e l e v e l is usually below a competitive l e v e l , 
- quantity .tsff^produced i s usually r e s t r i c t e d , and, * 
- on p r o f i t side, surpluses are usually absorbed 
by the buyer,, 
I n a d d i t i o n , i t was f u r t h e r snown that i t may be possible t o 
explain the existence of bargaining power as being a function 
of the dependency which can occur i n exchange r e l a t i o n s . Upon 
examining some postulated i n t e r - a c t i v e determinants of dependency, 
i . e . , a v a i l a b i l i t y and s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y , i t was postulated that 
many forms of factor market conduct prevalent i n large buyer/ 
supplier relations may contribute towards, or reinforce various 
dependency forming conditions. I n e f f e c t , under c e r t a i n 
conditions, the conduct implications associated w i t h large 
buyer/small supplier market structures carry a heavy bias i n 
favour of the buyer, and m i l i t a t e against the supplier achieving 
s a t i s f a c t o r y leveils of performance, and remaining outside of 
i t s buyer's locus of c o n t r o l . 
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I n e v i t a b l y , the s o l u t i o n to the problem must remain 
outstanding pending the a r r i v a l of some raoher extensive 
empirical evidence, 
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the pervasiveness 
of the dual economy, the fa c t cannot be overlooked that 
on a micro-level, when a small f i r m supplier s e l l s a 
s i g n i f i c a n t proportion of i t s output, on a continuous 
basis, to a concentrated large buyer; th e r e . i s , at the very 
least, the opportunity, and, i n some cases, the unmistakeable 
tendency, f o r e x p l o i t a t i o n t o occur, and f o r the supplier's 
conduct t o be al t e r e d i n a manner which reduces the buyer's 
transactions:, costs. Given t h i s not unpredictable conclusion, 
and the imperfections wnich i t connotes, i t i s d i f f i c u l t , to 
comprehend why fact o r market study remains so d i s j o i n t e d and 
r e l a t i v e l y under deveiop"2jd|ar. 
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The Large Enterprise as,a Propulsive Industry: 
A Re-conceptualisation 
The proposition that large enterprises may act as 
purveyors of regional economic growth has already been 
discussed i n Chapter Six. There i t was shown that i n some 
respects, c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of close i n d u s t r i a l linkage may 
tend to p a r a l l e l various conditions which can themselves 
.'set the stage' f o r dominance by large i n d u s t r i a l buyers, 
and for supplier dependency, and of course, a l l that t h i s 
might e n t a i l . The assumption which underlies the 
propulsive industry concept i s that, i n a regional context, 
large enterprise supply linkages w i t h i n factor markets are 
p o t e n t i a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t venues f o r i n d u s t r i a l growth. However, 
recent thought has moved towards a re-conceptualisation of the 
r o l e of the giant corporation and of i t s o v e r a l l a c t i v i t i e s 
i n a s p a t i a l context. This new approach promises to 
m a t e r i a l l y ,ftffect. not only the general view of factor market 
i n d u s t r i a l structures i n which large buyer and supplier exchange 
r e l a t i o n s may be considered, but also our understanding of the 
substance of these r e l a t i o n s . For these reasons, i t i s f e l t 
t o be an appropriate topic f o r t h i s concluding chapter. 
Returning to the o r i g i n a l formulation, i t w i l l be 
remembered that the concept of a 'growth pole 1 was closely 
associated with the notion of propulsive industry. I n Professor 
J.3. Bo.udevilie's terras, propulsive industry has tv/o essential 
*' c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : 
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"(a) a d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t dominating influence 
over a l l other a c t i v i t i e s ; and (b) an 
o l i g o p o l i s t i c concentration of industry, w i t h 
price leadership and a keen sense of a n t i c -
i p a t i o n i n the moves of i t s own sector as w e l l 
as i n related branches" .(10) 
Thus., as Boudeville continues, the increase i n the output 
of a propulsive industry may induce or lead t o the creation 
of other a c t i v i t i e s which have not previously been 
lo c a l i z e d i n the region. I n the case of f a c t o r markets, t h i s 
would involve what he terms the 'upstream mechanism' of 
growth. Essentially then, t h i s part of the concept concerns 
dominant, concentrated o l i g o p o l i s t i c industry, that i s to 
say large firms and t h e i r demand for inputs. 
However, large firms are considerably more complex 
than the rather simple, and e f f e c t i v e l y one dimensional 
concept of single-plant, single-enterprise used above 
w.oula suggest. I n a paper dealing w i t h s p a t i a l structure 
and i n d u s t r i a l organisation, G.J. Karaska paints, what i s 
fundamentally, a rather more diverse p i c t u r e of the large 
firm. (11 ) He s t a r t s by p o i n t i n g out that a feature of w e l l 
developed p o s t - i n d u s t r i a l societies i s the c o n t r o l of 
production by e i t h e r large corporations, or large state 
controlled organisations. These large firms, he continues 
consist of numerous, f u n c t i o n a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d units which 
may be widely dispersed i n space. These dispersed 
organisational units represent many d i f f e r e n t forms of a c t i v i t y , 
e.g. main and branch plants, administrative o f f i c e s , 
warehouses and d i s t r i b u t i o n o f f i c e s , research u n i t s , 
sales o f f i c e s , etc. Moreover, Karaska states t h a t : 
"Typically, these units are controlled or 
linked i n a h i e r a r c h i a l decision s t r u c t u r e , 
as w e l l as being found i n hfc&rarchial 
s p a t i a l form, e.g., n a t i o n a l , regional, 
and l o c a l sites." ( 1 2 ) 
The c o n t r o l l i n g administrative units are usually concerned 
w i t h non-programmed or non-routine decisions, and are 
usually located i n a national c i t y . The lower-level 
administrative units are usually given routine decisions or 
problems t o handle„ and are generally situated i n regional, 
metropolitan centres. While l o c a l units are usually 
concerned w i t h production and warehousing sites and sales 
o f f i c e s . Karaska terms t h i s approach an organisational/ 
management structure view of i n d u s t r i a l l o cation, and points 
out that while previously, i n d u s t r i a l geography and regional 
development have considered the f i r m e n t i r e l y i n terms of 
i t s product and production f u n c t i o n ; i t i s apparent that 
industry may be characterised by a increasely large number 
of non-manufacturing a c t i v i t i e s . Obviously, the regional 
economic consequences of t h i s s i t u a t i o n may be s i g n i f i c a n t . 
One noteworthy consequence i d e n t i f i e d by Karaska 
i s the f a c t that the linkages associated w i t h t h i s revised 
view of the large f i r m take on a network which i s d i f f e r e n t 
from the one commonly associated with the flows of products 
between in d u s t r i e s . As he puts i t : 
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" I n the p o s t - i n d u s t r i a l society, the flow of 
products have almost "been t o t a l l y freed from 
the costs of. transportation and f r i c t i o n 
of. distance. A.ndy while informational or 
message flows predominate, the 'action space' 
of society or face-to-face contacts become 
an every increasingly important a t t r i b u t e 
of success and negotiation."'(13 ) 
The r e l a t i v e importance of information flows w i t h i n factor 
markets i s a topic which was presented i n the thesis, and what 
Karaska has dene i s to provide another useful, contextual 
framework. 
Closely a l l i e d to the organisational/management 
structure approach, i s a l i n e of thought which conceives 
of modern i n d u s t r i a l organisations v/ithin a 'systems 
framev/ork'. This l a t t e r approach, ".0. emphasizes a 
symbiotic r e l a t i o n s h i p of the i n d u s t r i a l f i r m w i t h the 
t o t a l environment1'. (1U), and i n f a c t , was also the 
approach used by D. Jacobs, as the basis of his analysis 
of organisational power and dependency discussed i n Chapter 
Four. (15) I n i t s simpl©st form, the approach views changes xr 
i n the f i r m as being e s s e n t i a l l y determined by environmental 
forces, and t h i s stems from the fac t that the firm's decision-
makers a l t e r the organisation i n an adaptive manner, that i s , 
i n response to t h e i r perceptions of environmental changes. 
I n metaphoric terms, the f i r m i s likened to an adaptive 
organic system which responds to s t i m u l i from i t s b i o l o g i c a l 
environment. Relating the above to t h i s thesis, t h i s approach 
considers the f i r m to possess, or have r e l a t i o n s w i t h a 
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number of d i f f e r e n t environments, or environmental agents.. 
Karaska describes these as follows: 
"... a supply environment, a consuming 
environment, a regional economy or 
i n t e r urban environment, and a 
developmental or i n t e r n a l environment ."(16) 
Furthermore, he states t h a t , with a l l of the evironments 
the f i r m is i n e x t r i c a b l y bound by information Plows and 
contact fields." ( 1 7 ) Simply defined, contact f i e l d s 
r e l a t e to the theory that there is an increasing need f o r 
contacts i n the exchange of information between the highly 
specialised work functions i n society, and these 'fields' 
f a c i l i t a t e the process. Given the above, i t i s apparent that f a c t o r 
market considerations belong t o a firmfe^ supply environment, 
and moreover, they may thus be seen to icpinge upon the 
organisation across the entire range or i t s h i e r a r c h i a l decision 
structure, and also therefore, across the e n t i r e spectrum of 
it$© h i e r a r c h i a l s p a t i a l form. Obviously, t n i s i s a v a s t l y * 
d i f f e r e n t form of i n d u s t r i a l organisation from the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
homogeneous single-plant, single-enterprise propulsive industry, 
f i r m , and as a consequence, the implications f o r regional 
i n d u s t r i a l growth may also be considerably d i f f e r e n t . 
One w r i t e r , C.F. Parsons, has published some survey 
information about the purchasing patterns of 221+ giant 
corporations, predominantly engaged i n manufacturing, which 
confirms that large f i r m demands do tend to follow the 
complexities of organisational structures, and the geographic 
d i s t r i b u t i o n s or operating versus control units.(3-8) B r i e f l y . 
summarised, the survey data revealed the f o l l o w i n g 
general p o i n t s : 
- i n the a c q u i s i t i o n of professional services, 
e«g. accountancy, advertising, computers, 
l e g a l services, marketing and p r i n t i n g 
f a c i l i t i e s , the large corporation often 
transferred a section.of i t s demand to 
a head o f f i c e or s p e c i a l i s t d i v i s i o n 
usually located i n another region from 
the f a c t o r y , 
- i n the a c q u i s i t i o n of maintenance labour, the 
majority of corporations i n t e r n a l i s e d tne 
functions, and - f o r investment decisions 
and the purchasing of c a p i t a l equipment 
ana raw materials, c e n t r a l buying 
divisions were involved most often i n the 
purchase of heavy c a p i t a l equipment, and while 
d i r e c t factory purchasing was more l i k e l y 
f o r raw materials and fuels purchasing, 
ce n t r a l buying d i v i s i o n s were once again 
often used. 
I n the f i n a l analysis, Parsons concluded that giant manufacturing 
c o r p o r a t i o i ^ supply p o l i c i e s generated s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
d i f f e r e n t implications, i n terms of balanced regional growth, 
than might be predicted under a single-plant, single-establishment 
i n d u s t r i a l structure. 
I n drawing together the various topics considered i n t h i s 
section, two fundamental points may be i d e n t i f i e d . The f i r s t 
point is that the nature of many acquisitions and disposals i n 
f a c t o r markets, and t h i s i s not exclusive to the large 
enterprise supply environment, may not be f u l l y understood without 
considering the possible associated complex flows of 
information. Moreover, a p o t e n t i a l c o r o l l a r y to t h i s point i s 
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th a t access to information of the v a r i e t y which reduces 
transactions costs, may have "become r e l a t i v e l y more 
important than i t was as a determinant of commercial 
success. . The second point i s that with supply 
environment decisions dispersed throughout the 
organisation, depending upon the type of decision 
required,. i t follows that the f i r s t - r o u n d , regional 
spi n - o f f s attained by the d i r e c t purchasing of f a c t o r s , 
that i s , the 'upstream mechanism', may be s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
obviated. This would be a primary r e s u l t of the a l l o c a t i o n 
of solely routine decisons to the regional l e v e l of 
operations. I n essence, the re-conceptualisation of the 
r o l e of the giant corporation reviewed i n t h i s section 
suggests that not only may the major a c t i v i t i e s of large 
enterprise have changed so that products and production 
represent only one of a number of other a c t i v i t i e s f o r which 
informational demands predominate; but i t i s these 
informational demands which may i n the future determine 
the l o c a t i o n of propulsive industry-growth pole a c t i v i t y , 
and not necessarily the exigencies of the production 
function or department. 
Conclusion 
I n the f i r s t chapter i t was stated that t h i s thesis 
was e s s e n t i a l l y a n a l y t i c a l , and therefore, the exact 
nature of, and reiationsnips "between, the topics considered 
would "be subjects f o r empirical study, "but would not "be 
the major focus of the review. I n the course of analysing 
the various topics i n t h e o r e t i c a l terms, i t has become 
increasingly apparent that f u r t h e r empirical study i s highly 
desirable f o r at least three e a s i l y discernable, and 
important reasons: 
a. F i r s t of a l l , i t v/ould broaden our understanding 
' of buyer conduct i n fact o r markets, and 
p o t e n t i a l l y , improve our 'awareness 
concerning some of the motives underlying 
buyer behaviour. I n t h i s respect, f u r t h e r 
study might provide a fund of information 
which would go some way towards remedying 
the r e l a t i v e neglect of i n d u s t r i a l markets 
i n economic analysis, alluded to by M.A. 
Adelman i n Chapter One. 
b. Secondly, a more comprehensive study of 
facto r markets may add f u r t h e r dimensions 
to our knowledge concerning the pervasiveness 
and nature of the influence which may be exercised 
by concentrated, large enterprise, and thus, to 
some extent reply t o the portentous warnings 
about large corporations offered by w r i t e r s such 
as Professor G-albraith, and Aaronovitch and Sawyer 
c. F i n a l l y , more extensive study of i n d u s t r i a l 
markets may enable us to expand the scope 
of our present measures of the degree of 
inter-relatedness between i n d u s t r i a l 
enterprises, and thus move beyond the 
somewhat r e s t r i c t e d approach invol v i n g 
the proportional flow of physical goods 
and services, t o the type of dynamic 
methodology suggested by J. Paelinck i n 
Chapter Six. 
I n the f i n a l analysis, i t appears that there i s indeed a need 
f o r a deeper understanding of the dynamics which underlie 
the concatenation process i n Veblen's, "...modern i n d u s t r i a l , 
system". 
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APPENDIX 7-1 
A-Note on a Possible Inve s t i g a t i v e Framework .for Large Enterprise 
Supply Environments 
During the progress of the thesis a l l u s i o n has been made 
to relevant questions posed and to possible means of c o l l e c t i n g 
what was considered to be appropriate information. I n t h i s section, 
a rough review i s made of a proposed broad i n v e s t i g a t i v e 
framework which a researcher might use as a general reference 
point f o r the empirical study of large enterprise supply 
environment a c t i v i t i e s . The framework b a s i c a l l y follows the 
or i e n t a t i o n of t h i s thesis, which was to examine various forms 
of conduct to be found w i t h i n f a c t o r market structures, i n which 
f a i r l y large concentrated buyers confront r e l a t i v e l y smaller 
suppliers. While the management/structure and systems approach 
described i n the preceding section presents a compelling supply 
model, f o r the sake of s i m p l i c i t y , and on the premise that i t 
i s b e t t e r to s t a r t w i t h fundamentals and b u i l d outwards, the 
framework discussed below has been developed w i t h i n the context 
of a unitary product markets. 
The framework i s designed to move progressively from 
greater to lesser degrees of aggregation, and may be divided-
i n t o two d i s t i n c t parts: a macro and a micro. Within each 
p a r t , the types of data required are i d e n t i f i e d , and relevant 
questions are posed. 
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Part A 
Macro Data 
1. The f i r s t step requires the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a 
concentrated industry, that i s , i n forward market 
terms, i n which an o l i g o p o l i s t i c , or s i m i l a r l y 
imperfect market structure p r e v a i l s . This to he 
followed "by an analysis of the industry's factor 
input markets i n order to answer two questions: 
a. Are there s p e c i f i c input markets i n 
which the industry's firms are 
s i g n i f i c a n t "buyers i n volume terms, 
or i n wiiich t h e i r future growth would 
lead them to take a s i g n i f i c a n t l y greater 
share of output? 
b. 'That forms of market structures e x i s t i n 
these input markets? 
i . What are the general size d i s t r i b u t i o n s ? 
i i . How do the size d i s t r i b u t i o n s of suppliers 
compare with t h e i r geographic dispersions? 
2. Having defined the markets, the next step requires the 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s or nature of the 
'problematic 1 or relevant inputs i d e n t i f i e d by the 
above c r i t e r i a . 
a. Given the input, what is the nature of the 
linkage, i . e . v e r t i c a l , l a t e r a l or diagonal? 
b, Does the input require any degree of supplier 
specialisation? 
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c . Given the f i n a l good and the production 
p r o c e s s , i s the use and/or a c q u i s i t i o n of 
the input l i k e l y to demand c l o s e c o - o r d i n a t i o n , 
planning and c o n t r o l ? 
P a r t B 
Micro Data 
1. I n g e n e r a l terms, the o b j e c t i v e of t h i s p a r t i s to 
hone i n on the purchasing f i r m ' s t r a n s a c t i o n s c o s t s 
by a n a l y s i n g i t s purchasing p o l i c i e s and conduct 
w i t h r e s p e c t to the 'problematic' i n p u t s . 
a . The buyer's i n t e r n a l context. 
i„ What are the major c r i t e r i a of s u p p l i e r 
s e l e c t i o n ? 
i i . What, i f any, are the formal s e l e c t i o n 
procedures used, e.g., c a p a b i l i t y 
assessments, vendor management a p p r a i s a l s ? 
b. The buyer's e x t e r n a l relations„ 
i . 77 hat i s the extent and nature of c o n t r o l 
e x e r c i s e d by the buyer over such a r e a s 
as design and s p e c i f i c a t i o n ; q u a l i t y of 
. m a t e r i a l s and end products; production 
scheduling, processes and c o n t r o l ; and 
c o s t s and p r o d u c t i v i t y standards and 
r e l a t e d r e p o r t s a 
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. i i . Beyond v/hat i s a c t u a l l y "bought and s o l d 
i n a p h y s i c a l sense, are there any demands 
made i n terms of the flow of information 
or other r e s o u r c e s ? 
2. The f i n a l step r e p r e s e n t s a s y n t h e s i s process 
i n v o l v i n g a l l of the data c o l l e c t e d above at the 
v a r i o u s l e v e l s of aggregation. 
a. B u i l d i n g upon the components of t r a d i n g 
dependency-contributory f a c t o r s matrix 
o u t l i n e d i n the c o n c l u s i o n t o Chapter Four 
( F i g u r e 2+-2), to v/hat extent do buyers 
dominate t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r input markets? 
b. Taking a l l of the preceding i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n , 
i n g e n e r a l terms, what c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n s might 
be' appropriate to d e s c r i b e the r o l e and 
conduct of buyers w i t h i n t h e i r f a c t o r markets, 
e.g., e x p l o i t i v e , domineering, p r o p u l s i v e , e t c . ? 
Summarised i n diagrammatic form, the progress of the 
t o t a l framework would appear as f o l l o w s : 
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F i g u r e 7-1 
An I n v e s t i g a t i v e Framework f o r F a c t o r Market S t u d i e s 
Input Market S t r u c t u r e 
Nature of Input 
A c q u i s i t i o n of Inputs 
Buyer I n t e r n a l 
F a c t o r s 
Buyer E x t e r n a l 
F a c t o r s 
Nature of Buyer / S u p p l i e r 
R e l a t i o n s 
Assessment of Buj^er's 
Role 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Aaronovitch, 3. and Sawyer, M.C., "The Concentration of B r i t i s h 
Manufacturing", Lloyds'Bank' Review, 1974- 20. 114, pp. 14-23. 
Aaronovitch, S. and Sawyer, M.C., Big Business: Theoretical and 
Empirical Aspects o f Concentrations and Mergers i n the United 
Kingdom,. Macmillan, London, 1975• 
Adelman, M.A., "The Large Firm and i t s Suppliers", Review of 
Economics and S t a t i s t i c s , 1949» v o l . 31, pp.. 113-118. 
Archibald., G.C., ed.,. The Theory of th'e Firm, Penguin Books, 
Earmondsworth, 1971* 
Armstrong, A. and S i l h e r t s o n , A., "Size o f Plant, Siae of Enter-
p r i s e and Concentration i n B r i t i s h Manufacturing Industry 
1935-58", Journal of the Royal S t a t i s t i c a l Society,. 1965? 
Series A, v o l . 128.. 
Arrow, K.J.,. " V e r t i c a l I n t e g r a t i o n and Communication". B e l l Journal 
of Economics and Management Science, 1975, v o l . 6 ( l ) , pp. 175-83* 
Aydalot, P., "Note sur le s economies externes et quelques notio n 
connexes", Revue e^conomique, 1965* v o l . 16. 
Bain, J.S., B a r r i e r s to Hew Competition, Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1956. 
Bain, J.S., I n d u s t r i a l 0 r g a n i s a t i o n , Second E d i t i o n , John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., I968. 
Bannock, G., The Juggernauts; The Age of the Big Corporation, 
V/eidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1971 • 
Berle, A.A., and fijeans, G.C., The Modern Corporation and Privat e 
Property; Revised E d i t i o n , Harcourt, Brace & World, N.Y., 19'67. 
B i l a s , R,A., Microeconomic Theory; A Graphical Analysis, McGraw-
H i l l , 1967. 
B l a i r , J.P., " I n d u s t r i a l Decline, V e r t i c a l I n t e g r a t i o n , and 
Geographic Concentration", Growth and Change. 1975? v o l . 6, no. 3 
Blaug, H.. Economic Theory i n Retrospect, Richard D. I r w i n , I n c . , 
Homewoodj I l l i n o i s , I96S. 
B l o i s . K.J., " V e r t i c a l Quasi-Integration", Journal o f I n d u s t r i a l 
Economics,. 1972, v o l . 20, no. 3, F?. 253-~272.™ 
B l o i s , K.J., "Supply Contracts i n the G a l h r a i t h i a n Planning System" 
Journal o f I n d u s t r i a l Economics,. 1975? v o l . 24, no. 1, p"c. 29-39* 
Bluden, J., et a l , Regional Analysis and Development, Harper and 
Row, London, 1973. 
Board o f Trade, Report on the Census of Production 1935, E.M.S.O., 
1945. . 
Boudeville, J.R., Problems o f Regional Economic Planning, 
PJdinburgh U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1966. 
Burns, T. and Stal k e r , O.K., The Management of Innovation, 
Second E d i t i o n , Tavistock Publications Limited, London, 1966. 
Caves, R.E., "Uncertainty, Market Structure and Performance: 
Galbraith as Conventional Wisdom", i n Markham and Papanek, 1970«: 
Cmnd. 4 8 I I , Small Firms; Report of the Committee _of I n q u i r y on 
Small Firms,'H.K.S.O., 1972. 
C o l l i n s , N.R. and Preston, L.E., "Price-Cost Margins and Industry 
Structure",. The- Review of Economics and S t a t i s t i c s , - 19^9, v o l . 
51, no. 3, PP. 271-286. 
Cunningham, H.T. and White, J.G., "The Behaviour of I n d u s t r i a l 
Buyers i n Their Search f o r Suppliers of Machine Tools", Journal 
of Management Studies, 1974, v o l . 11, no. 2, pp. 115-128. 
Davies, J.R. and K e l l y , M., "Small Firms i n the Manufacturing 
Sector", Research Report No. 3, Committee o f I n q u i r y on Small 
Firms, H.M.S.O., 1972. 
Department o f Indu s t r y , Analyses of United Kingdom Manufacturing 
(Local) Units by_ Employment Size 1972,- Business Monitor PA 1003, 
H.M.S.O., I975". 
Edwards, Ki.G., "Supplier Management Evaluation", Journal of 
Purchasing, 3 rd February, 3-967, pp. 28-4'i. 
Emerson, R . I ' . , "Povrer-Dependence Relations", American So c i o l o g i c a l 
Review,. 1?62, v o l . 27, PP. 31 -41 . 
Emery, F.E. and T r i s t . H.L., "The Ca.usal Texture of Organisational 
Environments". Human Relations, 1965, vol.. 18, pp. 21-32. 
Evely, P. and L i t t l e , I.K.D., Concentration i n B r i t i s h I n d u s t r y , 
Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, I96O. 
- 219 -
Ferguson, C .E.., Micro economic Theory, Richard D. I r w i n , I n c . , Home-
wood, I l l i n o i s ; , 196S. 
F i n a n c i a l Times, "CEGB Audits 1000 Suppliers", 20th February, 1976. 
Fishlock, 33., "Audits t o Boost E f f i c i e n c y " , F inancial Times, 24th 
February, 1976. 
Florence, P. Sargant, Investment, Location and Size o f Plant, National 
I n s t i t u t e of Economic and Social Research, 1948. 
Florence, P. Sargant, The Logic o f B r i t i s h and American Industry,- . 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1953. 
G a l b r a i t h , J.K., "Countervailing Power",- American Economic Review, 
1954, v o l . 44, no. 2. 
G a l b r a i t h , J.IC, American Capitalism, Houghton M i f f l i n Co., Boston, 
1956. 
G a l b r a i t h , J.K., The Hew I n d u s t r i a l State, Penguin Books, London, 
1974. 
G a l b r a i t h , J.K., Economics and the Public Purpose, The Hew American 
L i b r a r y of Canada L t d . , 1975« 
George, K.D., "Changes i n B r i t i s h I n d u s t r i a l Concentration 1951-58", 
Journal of I n d u s t r i a l Economics, v o l . 16, I967. 
George, I'.D., "The Changing Structure o f Competitive I n d u s t r y " , 
Economic Journal Supplement, J-972, v o l . 82. 
George, K.D., "A Note on Changes i n I n d u s t r i a l Concentration i n the 
United Kingdom", Economic Journal, 1975> vole 85, pp. 124-128. 
Gibrat, R., Les Inef r s l i t i e ' s e'eonomicues, Sirey, P a r i s , 1931. 
Hansen, H.M.,"Development Pole Theory'- i n a Regional Context", Kyklos, 
1967, v o l . 21, pp. 709-727. 
Eart, P.E. and Fr a i s , S.J., "The Analysis of Eusiness Concentration; 
A S t a t i s t i c a l Approach", Journal of the Royal S t a t i s t i c a l Society, 
Series A, 1956, v o l . 119. 
Hirschman, A.O., The Strategy of Economic Development, Yale U n i v e r s i t y 
Fress, New Haven, 1958. 
Koussiaux, J., "Le concept dc • quasi-inte'gration' et l e rS l e des 
so u s - t r a i t a n t s dans I s i n d u s t r i e " , Revue economiaue, Pa r i s , 1?67» 
- . 220 -
Jacobs, D., "Dependency and V u l n e r a b i l i t y : An Exchange Approach 
to the Control o f Organisations", A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Science Quarterly, 
1974, v o l . 19, PP.45-59. 
Karaska, G.J., "The S p a t i a l Structure and Dynamics of I n d u s t r i a l 
Organisation", i n Hamilton, F.H.I., The Organisation o f S p a t i a l 
I n d u s t r i a l Systems, Volume 2 - S p a t i a l Structure and the M i g r a t i o n 
of I n d u s t r y , 1976. 
Keeble, D.E., "Local Linkage and Manufacturing Growth",. Town Planning 
Review, 1969, v o l . 40, pp. 163-188. 
Kindleherger, CP., I n t e r n a t i o n a l Economics, Fourth E d i t i o n , Richard 
D. .Irwin. Inc.,. Homewood, I l l i n o i s , 1963•• 
Klassen, L.H., Methods of Sele c t i n g I n d u s t r i e s f o r Depressed Areas, 
O.E.C.D., Pari s , 1967. 
Lawrence, P.R. and Lorsch, J.W., Organization and Environment, 
Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, Boston, 1967»< 
Leak, K. and Maizels, A., "The Structure o f E r i t i s h I n d u s t r y " , 
Journal of the Royal S t a t i s t i c a l Society, Series A, 1945, v o l . 108. 
L i k e r t , R., The Human Organization: I t s Management and Value, McGraw-
H i l l , Hew York, 1967. 
Lustgarten, S.H., "The Impact of Buyer Concentra.tion i n Manufacturing 
I n d u s t r i e s " , Review of Economics and S t a t i s t i c s , 1975, v o l . 57« 
no. 2, pp. 125-132. 
L y d a l l , H.F., "Aspects o f Competition i n Manufacturing I n d u s t r y " , 
B u l l e t i n of the Oxford I n s t i t u t e of S t a t i s t i c s , . 1958, v o l . 20,. 
no. 4, pp. 319-337. 
McKean, R.II.j "Discussion", American Economic Reviev?, 1971, v o l . 61, 
pp. 124-125. 
HcKie,: J.'.'., "Market Structure and Function: Performance Versus 
Behaviour",.- i n Karkharn and Papanek, 1970. 
Karen, J. and Simon, H.,• 0rganisations, John Wiley & Sons Inc., New 
York, 1963 
Markham, JCW. and Papanek, G.F., I n d u s t r i a l Organisation and Econ-
omic Development, Houghton-Mifflin Co., Boston, 1970. 
— .CO.- — 
Merrett Cyriax Associates, "Dynamics of Small Firms", Research 
Report Ho. 12, Committee o f I n q u i r y on Small Firms, H.M.S.O., 
1971. 
M i l l e r , S.J. and Rice, A.K.. Systems o f Organization, Tavistock 
Publications L t d . , London, 1971. 
Heedham, D., Economic Analysis and I n d u s t r i a l S t r u c t u r e , H o l t , 
Rinehart & Winston, 1971. 
Owen, K.,, "CEGE; To Concentrate More E f f o r t i n Design", The Times, 
20th February, 1976. 
Paelinck, J., "La t h e o r i e du developpement regional p o l a r i s e " , 
Cahiers de 1 ' I n s t i t u t de Science Econominue Appliquee, Serie L, 
1965, no. 15, pp. 10-11. 
Palamountain, Jr.., J.C., The P o l i t i c s o f D i s t r i b u t i o n , - Harvard 
U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1955'• 
Parsons, G.F., "The Giant Manufacturing Corporations and Balanced 
Regional Growth i n B r i t a i n " , i n Bluden, et a l , 1973. 
Penrose, E., The Theory of Grovrbh of the Firm, B a s i l Blackwell &. 
Mott L t d . , 1959. 
Perroux, F., "Economic Space: Theory and Applications",, Quarterly 
Journal o f Economics, 1950, v o l . 64, pp.- 90-97. 
Perroux, F., "La notion de poles de croissance", L'economie du 
XXerne s i e c l e , Second E d i t i o n , Presses U n i v e r s i t a i r e s de France, 
Paris, I964. 
P h i l l i p s , A., "Structure, Conduct and Performance - and Performance, 
Conduct and Structure?", i n Markham and Fapanek, 1970. 
Pickering, J.F., I n d u s t r i a l Structure ?;.nd Market Conduct, Martin 
Robertson & Co. L t d . , London, 1974* 
Prais, S.J., "A New Look at the Growth o f I n d u s t r i a l Concentration", 
Oxford Economic Papers, 1974, v o l . 26, no. 2, pp. 273-288. 
Robinson, J., The Economics of Imperfect Competition, Kacmillan 
and Co., London, 1933. 
- 222 -
Rowley, C.K., Steel and .Public Policy,-McGraw-Hill, • London, 1971* 
Sallez, A. and Schlegel, J.,.La sous-traitance.dans 1 ' i n d u s t r i e , 
. Dunod, ; P a r i s , 1963. 
Sawyer, K., "Concentration i n B r i t i s h Manufacturing I n d u s t r y " , 
Oxford Economic Papers, 1971, v o l . 23.. 
Shepherd, W.G., "Changes i n B r i t i s h I n d u s t r i a l Concentration 
1951-8",; Oxford Economic Papers,. 1966, v o l . 18. 
Shepherd, Vf.G., "Elements of Market S t r u c t u r e " . Review of Economics 
a n d . S t a t i s t i c s , 1972, v o l . 54-
S t i g l e r , G.J., "The D i v i s i o n of Labour i s Limited by the Extent o f 
the Market", Journal o f P o l i t i c a l Economy, 195i, v o l . 59, no.- 3.-
S t i g l e r , G.J.y "The Economist Plays With Blocks", American Economic 
Review, 1954, v o l . 44, no. 2. 
S t i g l e r , G.J., The Theory o f Price, T h i r d E d i t i o n , Macmillan, 
London, 1966. 
S t i g l e r , G.J., The Organisation o f Ind u s t r y , Richard D. Irwin,. I n c . , 
Homewood, I l l i n o i s , . 1968. 
Terreberry, S.,. "The Evolution of Organisational Environments",. 
Ad m i n i s t r a t i v e Science Quarterly, 1967-68, v o l . 12, pp. 590-613. 
Thorgren, B., "Regional Economic I n t e r a c t i o n and Flows of Information", 
i n Proceedings of the Second Poland-Norden Regional Science Seminar, 
Committee f o r Space Economy and Regional Planning of the P o l i s h 
Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, 1967• 
Tcrnqvist, G., Contact Systems and Regional DevelopmentLund Studies 
i n Geography, 1970, no. 35« 
To.wnroe, P.M., " I n d u s t r i a l Linkage, Agglomeration and 1 E x t e r n a l 
Economies")• Journal of Town Planning I n s t i t u t e , 3-970,- v o l . 56. 
Veblen, T», The Theory o f .Business Enterprise, Reprints of Economic-
Classics, Augustus H. K e l l y , New York, 1965. 
Vernon, R., Metropo 1 i s 1985 T Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, Cambridge,-
Mass.j I96O 
Watanabe, S«, "Subcontracting, I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and Employment 
Creation", I n t e r n a t i o n a l Labour Review,, 1971, v o l . 104. 
Weber,-A., Theory o f Location o f Industry, t r a n s l a t e d by C.T. Fred-
erick,- U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1929. 
Wildsmith, J.S.,' Managerial Theories o f the Firm, Martin 1 Robertson,. 
London, 1973. 
Williamson, J.E., " P r o f i t , Growth and Sales Maximisation", i n 
Archibald, 1971• 
Williamson,- O.E., "The V e r t i c a l I n t e g r a t i o n of Productions Market 
F a i l u r e Considerations", American Economic Review,- 1971, v o l . 61, 
pp. 112-123. 
Wood, P.A.j " I n d u s t r i a l Location and Linkages", Area, 1969* v o l . 2, 
PP. 32-39. 
